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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the district court properly ruled that defendants did not engage in 
"willful misconduct" by not marketing the Soldier Summit property in 1982-84. 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 
634, 636 (Utah 1989). 
Record: This issue was raised in defendants' memorandum supporting summary 
judgment (R. 1462-68), and decided in favor of defendants (R. 2046-47). 
2. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiffs' 
fraud claim for lack of proof of any detrimental reliance. 
Standard of Review: Correctness under a clear and convincing burden of proof. 
Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046-47 (Utah App. 1994). 
Record: This issue was raised in defendants' memorandum supporting summary 
judgment (R. 1478-79), and decided in favor of defendants (R. 1904). 
3. Whether plaintiffs' claims regarding non-sale of the Soldier Summit property 
are barred by statutes of limitation. 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 
1128 (Utah 1992). 
Record: This issue was raised in defendants' memorandum supporting summary 
judgment (R. 1468-77), but was not decided by the district court (R. 1905-06, 2046-48). 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
This case is governed by the terms of the limited partnership agreement, which is 
set out verbatim in the Addendum (hereafter "Add."). (Add. 14.) Also relevant are 
applicable statutes of limitation, U.C.A. §§ 78-12-23(2), -25(3), and -26(3), which are 
reproduced in the Addendum. (Add. 98-100.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by limited partners in a real estate development alleging 
wrongful failure by the general partner to market the property between 1982 and 1984. 
The plaintiffs alleged multiple claims and theories for relief, and the defendants alleged 
various counterclaims. (R. 847, 886.) However, all of those claims and counterclaims 
have now been resolved except for plaintiffs' three claims on this appeal, all of which 
pertain to development and marketing of the property. (R. 2042-44, 2048; Brief of 
Appellants, hereafter "App. Br.," at 14.) In claims two, seven, and eight of the Second 
Amended Complaint, plaintiffs allege breach of fiduciary duty, breach of partnership 
agreement, and fraud in the general partner's so-called "failure" to market the property 
between 1982 and 1984. (R. 858-64; App. Br. 18.) 
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that development and 
marketing of the property was entirely within the discretion of the general partner, that 
the partnership agreement limited general partner liability to "willful misconduct," and 
that non-sale of the property between 1982 and 1984 was based on business and 
economic factors, and did not constitute "willful misconduct." Defendants also 
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demonstrated that plaintiffs' claims are barred by statutes of limitation. (R. 1462-70, 
1475-79,) The district court granted defendants' motion, ruling that the decision not to 
market the property did not amount to "willful misconduct," and that plaintiffs did not 
prove any injury in reliance on any misrepresentation by defendants. (R. 1903-04, 2046-
47.) The district court did not decide the statute of limitations defense, rejecting 
plaintiffs' claims on other grounds. (R. 1905-06.) Plaintiffs appealed the order of 
summary judgment to the Utah Supreme Court, which transferred the case to this Court. 
(R. 2052.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Chang plaintiffs and the Lin defendants have been involved in various 
business relationships since the early 1970fs, when Mr. Lin, a resident of Taiwan, asked 
Mr. Chang, a Utah resident, to assist him in making and managing real estate investments 
in the United States. In 1974, Mr. Chang formed International Investment & 
Development Corporation ("IID") as a business entity to carry out these investments. 
The Lins and their children owned 80 percent of IID, while the Changs and their children 
owned 20 percent. Mr. Chang acted as president and conducted the affairs of IID. 
Thereafter, Mr. Chang formed other corporations as wholly-owned subsidiaries of IID to 
hold and manage specific assets of IID. Two of these subsidiaries were American Estate 
Management Corporation ("AEM") and American City (Development) Corporation 
("ACC"). Mr. Chang was also the president and managed the affairs of these subsidiary 
corporations. (R. 898-900, 1359-60, 1453.) 
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In November 1978, the Soldier Summit Development limited partnership was 
formed ("Soldier Summit"). The purpose of the Soldier Summit partnership was to own, 
hold, develop, improve, sell, lease, dispose of, and otherwise deal with 4,000 acres of 
unimproved real estate located in Soldier Summit (Utah County and Wasatch County), 
Utah. The designated general partner was ACC, which contributed 90 percent of the 
capital; the sole limited partner was Jay Murphy, who contributed 10 percent of the 
capital. (R. 1482-83; Add. 14-16.) Paragraph 12.1 of the partnership agreement states 
that the general partner "shall have full, exclusive and complete discretion in the 
management and control of the Partnership . . . and shall make all decisions affecting the 
Partnership's affairs." (R. 1485; Add. 17.) Paragraph 12.4 of the agreement provides 
that "[t]he General Partner shall not be liable to the Partnership or the Limited Partners 
for errors in judgment or for any acts of omission . . . that do not constitute willful 
misconduct." (R. 1487; Add. 19.) Limited partners had no authority to participate in the 
management or business of the partnership. (R. 1484; Add. 16.) The partnership 
agreement did not specify any particular time or deadline for marketing of the property. 
The relationship between the Changs and the Lins subsequently deteriorated due 
to conflict and distrust, resulting in a separation agreement between the parties in 
February 1982. (R. 1492; Add. 24.) Pursuant to this agreement, the Changs transferred 
their interest in IID, including the subsidiary ACC, to Lins. In return, the Changs 
received ownership of AEM and a limited partnership interest in Soldier Summit. The 
effect of these transfers was that ownership and control of ACC, the general partner of 
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Soldier Summit, was relinquished by the Changs and assumed exclusively by the Lins. 
(R. 1361, 1454; App. Br. 7.) In March 1982, the parties amended the Soldier Summit 
partnership agreement to reflect these changes, listing the Changs as additional limited 
partners, with a combined ownership interest of 9 percent, leaving ACC, the general 
partner, with an ownership interest of 81 percent. (R. 1498-99; Add. 30-31.) l 
Following the transfer in control of ACC, the Lins proceeded with the planned 
Soldier Summit development. They hired Henry Yen (Mrs. Lin's brother) as president of 
ACC to manage day-to-day affairs of the development. ACC also hired Clark Lin (no 
relation to the Lin defendants), a civil engineer, to help obtain plat approval for two 
subdivisions of recreational lots in the development. (R. 1457, 1512, 1515.) As 
conditions of plat approval, the Town of Soldier Summit required conveyance of water 
rights to the town, approval from the State of Utah to segregate the water rights, an 
access easement across adjacent railroad tracks, access easements from adjoining 
landowners, engineering data for roads, a design for a water pick-up station, and vacation 
of a prior overlapping subdivision. By January 1984, ACC had obtained plat approval 
for the two subdivisions. (R. 1458, 1515-16.)2 
1
 Plaintiffs assert that, "[a]fter the change in management, the Lins determined to simply delay the 
development," and that Lins made a "change of plans" to market the property. (App. Br. 19.) However, 
plaintiffs cite no support for any such decision or plan, and in fact there was none. As shown below, 
defendants actively developed the property following the change in management of ACC, the general 
partner. 
2
 The Changs claim that their "intent," while they managed ACC, was to sell the Soldier Summit 
property "as quickly as possible," and to sell 60 to 70 percent of the property between 1982 and 1983. 
(App. Br. 8-9.) However, that "intent" is nowhere stated in, or required by, the partnership agreement, 
which neither requires that the property be sold at all, nor specifies any certain timetable for sale or other 
action. Moreover, marketing of the property during that time was not possible because the infrastructure 
improvements, such as roads and waterworks, had not yet been completed. (R. 1821-25; Add. 35-39.) 
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Following preliminary approval of two plats, the development still faced 
significant obstacles, both governmental and economic. In April 1984, the State of Utah 
dissolved the Town of Soldier Summit. The Soldier Summit development was thereafter 
subject to the jurisdiction of Utah County, which imposed substantially more strict and 
difficult conditions for subdivision approval. In addition, the project had to be registered 
with the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") in order to 
permit interstate sales of the lots. The initial HUD registration was rejected and had to 
be revised and resubmitted. (R. 1458, 1505, 1516.)3 
In March 1985, ACC issued a general business plan to establish short- and long-
term goals for the Soldier Summit development. The plan envisioned a year-round 
"premier recreation property . . . to produce the maximum amount of profit with the 
available land resources." (R. 1821; Add. 36.) Necessary tasks for 1985 included 
construction of roads and a water pick-up station, as well as county approval of the 
master plan. (R.1823; Add. 38.) The business plan projected sales of 15 lots in the 
approved subdivisions. (R. 1822; Add. 37.) However, prior to marketing the lots, the 
plan called for a re-evaluation to ensure maximization of profits: 
Neither were economic conditions conducive to sale of the lots in 1982-83, as Changs themselves 
discovered in trying to market IID's Logan, Utah property. {See infra, n. 6.) In any event, defendants 
were not obligated to carry out the Changs' intent after management of ACC passed to the Lins in 1982. 
Rather, the Lins, as owners and managers of ACC, the general partner, assumed complete discretion to 
manage the Soldier Summit property according to their own best judgment. 
3
 Plaintiffs note that defendants planned to have the Soldier Summit property on the market in 1984, 
which is true. (App. Br. 9.) However, that projection was made before the various governmental 
obstacles arose, and before the results of independent marketing studies were received. In any event, the 
plan was couched in conditional terms of, "if all goes well" (R. 1810), but all did not go well. 
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[W]e need to re-evaluate whether the currently approved Plats C and D is 
the best way to go [I]t is advisable to look into other possibilities at this 
early stage of the development before we proceed to complete Plats C and 
D We may not have made the best use of the land resources under Plat 
C/D subdivision. [R. 1821; Add. 36.] 
Pursuant to this need for re-evaluation, ACC retained a real estate marketing 
expert, Thomas Kasper, to conduct a marketing study and determine the economic 
feasibility of the Soldier Summit development. In January 1986, Kasper issued his 
written report, analyzing the nature of the property, the market for such recreational lots, 
current economic conditions, the performance of competing or comparable prior projects, 
marketing strategies, and anticipated sales. (R. 1459, 1519; Add. 40.) Noting that "the 
recreational land boom lost much of its success in the 1979-82 era of economic 
adjustment9' (Add. 46), Kasper concluded: "Market demand is at a low ebb for 
recreational type property and any development should be undertaken with caution and a 
long term commitment." (Add. 49.) In fact, "[t]he master development of all 4500 acres 
will, if developed, take a number of years to accomplish." (Add. 64.) The report's 
executive summary concludes that "there is a substantial amount of risk in the 
development of any recreational land," and that risk is accentuated by "the lack of 
demand for recreational land at this time'' (Add. 42, emp. added.) Regarding the 
anticipated rate of sales, the report summary concludes that "absorption for this 
development will not be quick. Recreational land is no longer fueled by the speculation 
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buyer, therefore a rapid sellout is not reasonable to expect. In the best case scenario 20-
30 lots per year will be sold in the 88 lot phase of development." (Id, emp. added.)4 
After receiving the Kasper report, ACC placed test ads for the lots in local 
newspapers to verify the accuracy of the report's conclusions. Not a single response was 
received. Based on the Kasper report and negative results of test marketing, ACC 
decided not to market the lots at that time and to postpone further infrastructure 
improvements until the market for recreational lots improved sufficiently to justify the 
cost. In the meantime, ACC continued to work on perfection of water rights, to explore 
ways of reducing development costs, to meet with government agencies, and to monitor 
market conditions. In order to generate some income while waiting for market 
improvement, ACC leased the property for seasonal hunting and sheep grazing. (R. 
1459-60,1517-18.) 
In 1995, ACC received an offer to purchase the Soldier Summit property for $2 
million as part of a larger recreational development near Scofield Reservoir. ACC 
retained a different marketing expert, Robert Wietzke, to determine the economic 
feasibility of developing the Soldier Summit property in recreational lots, as compared to 
the proposed sale of the entire property to a larger developer. The Wietzke report found 
that the cost and revenue projections made in 1986 were still valid, and that development 
4
 Plaintiffs refer to the ACC 1985 business plan for Soldier Summit as "projecting" certain sales and 
revenues. (App. Br. 10.) However, those numbers were not guarantees, but were presented as short- and 
long-term "goals." (R. 1821-22; Add. 36-37.) In any event, those goals were set prior to, and without 
the benefit of the independent Kasper marketing study. In light of the Kasper report, the entire concept 
of the Soldier Summit development had to be reassessed. 
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would result in a negative cash flow of $1,677,400 over four years. (R. 1460, 1552-54; 
Add. 73-75.) The report concluded that "it would not be economically feasible to 
develop the subdivision because it results in a substantial net loss" (R. 1554; Add. 75, 
emp. added.) Based on this conclusion, the report recommends sale of the property as a 
whole for inclusion in a larger development. (Id.) Such a sale is presently under 
consideration. 
Plaintiffs commenced this action in September of 1990, alleging various claims 
and theories for relief regarding several business enterprises of the parties. (R. 1.) After 
extended discovery, amendments of pleadings, and various motions, rulings and 
stipulations, the issues have now been narrowed to those surrounding development of 
Soldier Summit. Plaintiffs, as limited partners, alleged that defendants, as general 
partner, wrongfully failed to market Soldier Summit in 1982-84, and that plaintiffs are 
entitled to damages under theories of breach of fiduciary duty, breach of partnership 
agreement, and fraud. (Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint, Second, 
Seventh, and Eighth Claims, R. 847.) Defendants moved for summary judgment on 
these claims on the basis that, under the terms of the partnership agreement, the general 
partner has absolute discretion in dealing with the property; the general partner can be 
liable only for "willful misconduct;" and the general partner's decision not to market the 
property in 1982-84 did not constitute "willful misconduct." Defendants also 
demonstrated the absence of fraud or detrimental reliance, and that all the claims were 
barred by statutes of limitation. (R. 1452-70, 1475-80.) The district court granted 
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summary judgment on the basis that the general partner's decision was not "willful 
misconduct," and there was no proof of detrimental reliance. The court did not decide 
the statute of limitations issue. (Mem. Decision, R. 1901, 1903-06; Add. 8, 10-13; Final 
Order, R. 2042, 2046-48; Add. 1, 5-7.) Plaintiffs appeal that order. (R. 2052.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary 
duty and contract claims because the general partner's non-sale of the property between 
1982 and 1984 was not "willful misconduct." Under the terms of the limited partnership 
agreement, the general partner has "exclusive and complete discretion" in the 
management of the Soldier Summit property and has "full power and authority . . . to 
take any action" deemed necessary in relation to the property. Moreover, by the express 
terms of the partnership agreement, the general partner "shall not be liable to . . . the 
Limited Partners . . . for any acts of omission . . . that do not constitute willful 
misconduct." "Willful misconduct" is defined in the case law as a wrongful act 
undertaken with knowledge that it will cause injury to another. An authorized business 
decision that is within the discretion of a general partner does not constitute "willful 
misconduct," even if the decision manifests error in judgment. 
The general partner's non-sale of the property between 1982 and 1984 was an 
authorized business decision based on the status of the property and economic 
conditions. The issue here is not whether the general partner willfully failed to market 
the property, but whether non-sale of the property is "willful misconduct." Because the 
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decision to sell, and timing of sales, was discretionary with the general partner, there was 
no "misconduct" at all. Neither did the general partner's conduct result in any actual 
injury to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have presented no evidence of loss, and no such loss can 
possibly be determined until the property is actually sold. Because plaintiffs have 
incurred no definable loss, their claims are not ripe for adjudication. 
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the fraud claim because 
plaintiffs have presented no clear and convincing evidence that defendants did not intend 
to develop and market the property according to their stated plans. Moreover, plaintiffs 
expressly denied any action or inaction in reliance on statements by defendants. In any 
event, plaintiffs have identified no actual injury which they incurred in reliance on any 
statement by defendants. 
Finally, plaintiffs' claims are barred by statutes of limitation. The central 
allegation of plaintiffs' case, common to all three legal theories, is that defendants 
wrongfully failed to market the Soldier Summit property between 1982 and 1984. 
Plaintiffs admit that they knew, at least by the end of that time period, that the property 
was not marketed during that time period. Therefore, plaintiffs' fiduciary and contract 
claims, filed in September 1990, are barred by the four- and six-year statutes of 
limitation, respectively. The fraud claim is barred by the three-year statute of limitations, 
which began to run on discovery of the supposed fraud in 1985. 
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ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs' statement of the standard of review is incomplete, and their application 
of the standard is inaccurate. (App. Br. 12-14.) Contrary to plaintiffs' characterization, 
the district court did not weigh the evidence and make findings of fact. Rather, the court 
granted judgment to defendants as a matter of law because plaintiffs failed to set forth 
specific facts from which a reasonable jury could conclude that defendants engaged in 
"willful misconduct." (Add. 5-6, 10-11.) 
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact, or where, "even according to the facts as contended by the losing party, the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Hunt v. ESI Engineering, Inc., 
808 P.2d 1137, 1139 (Utah App. 1991). See also Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 
(Utah App. 1987). Even a question of fact may be decided as a matter of law if a 
reasonable jury could reach only one conclusion. E.g., Robertson v. Utah Fuel Co., 889 
P.2d 1382, 1384 (Utah App. 1995); Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. v. Smith's 
Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah App. 1994) (summary judgment 
proper when reasonable minds could not differ on the result). In such cases, summary 
judgment serves the salutary purpose of eliminating the time and expense of an 
unnecessary trial. E.g., Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 
779 (Utah 1984). To avoid summary judgment, the opposing party "may not rest upon 
the mere allegations . . . of his pleading, but his response . . . must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary 
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judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him." Rule 56(e), Utah R. Civ. P. 
(emp. added). See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 322-25 (1986) (summary 
judgment required where nonmoving party fails to prove essential element of its case). 
Here, plaintiffs failed to set forth specific facts showing that defendants engaged 
in "willful misconduct," or that plaintiffs detrimentally relied on any misrepresentation. 
Plaintiffs have provided only conclusory allegations, which are not sufficient to raise 
genuine issues of fact. E.g., Reagan Outdoor Advertising v. Lundgren, supra, at 779. 
The central issue is not, as plaintiffs argue, whether defendants "willfully failed to 
develop and market Soldier Summit" in 1982-84 (App. Br. 13, 19), but whether non-sale 
of the property amounted to "willful misconduct." Certainly, the decision not to sell the 
property in 1982-84 was "willful," in that it was not by accident or chance; however, 
non-sale does not constitute "misconduct." Therefore, even according to the facts as 
contended by plaintiffs, defendants' conduct was not "willful misconduct." Accordingly, 
the district court properly granted summary judgment. 
POINT I: DEFENDANTS' DECISION NOT TO MARKET THE SOLDIER 
SUMMIT PROPERTY IN 1982-84 DID NOT CONSTITUTE 
"WILLFUL MISCONDUCTS 
Plaintiffs argue that defendants breached their fiduciary duty and breached the 
partnership agreement by not marketing the Soldier Summit property as recreational lots 
between 1982 and 1984. (App. Br. 15-18.) They further argue that the question of 
breach cannot be decided as a matter of law, but must be decided in a trial. (Id. at 20-
21.) However, the district court properly held, as a matter of law, that there was no such 
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breach because defendants' decision not to market the property according to plaintiffs' 
expectations was not "willful misconduct," the standard contained in the partnership 
agreement (Add. 5-6, 10-11.)5 
A. Terms of Partnership Agreement, 
Section 12 of the partnership agreement defines the scope of the general partner's 
discretion and liability. Paragraph 12.1 provides "exclusive and complete discretion" in 
managing partnership business: 
The General partner shall have full, exclusive and complete 
discretion in the management and control of the Partnership and its 
business of the purposes herein stated and shall make all decisions 
affecting the Partnership's affairs. The General Partner shall have full 
power and authority on behalf of the Partnership to take any action which 
the General Partner may deem necessary or advisable or incidental to the 
business of the partnership . . . . [Add. 17, emp. added.] 
The business purpose of the partnership was to acquire, own, hold, develop, improve, 
sell, lease, dispose of, or otherwise deal with the Soldier Summit property, and "to 
engage in all business activities necessary or convenient to the foregoing." (Paragraph 3; 
Add. 14.) Paragraph 12.4 limits general partner liability to "willful misconduct:" 
The General Partner shall not be liable to the Partnership or the 
Limited Partners for errors in judgment or for any acts of omission, 
whether or not disclosed, that do not constitute willful misconduct. [Add. 
19; emp. added.] 
5 Plaintiffs go to considerable lengths to argue the existence and elements of a fiduciary relationship 
between plaintiffs, as limited partners, and defendants, as general partner. (App. Br. 15-17.) While the 
existence of a fiduciary relationship may be open to question on the facts of this case, see Ong 
International v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 454 (Utah 1993) (when a partner relationship becomes 
adversarial fiduciary duties "may be extinguished"), defendants do not dispute the relationship for 
purposes of this appeal. However, what constitutes a breach of any fiduciary or contractual duty is 
defined by the standard of "willful misconduct," as contained in the partnership agreement. See 
Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 588 (Utah App. 1998). 
14 
Accordingly, plaintiffs agreed that defendants would have "exclusive and complete" 
discretion to deal with the property, whether by improving and selling or merely owning 
and holding, and that defendants would be liable, only for "willful misconduct." 
B. Defining Case Law, 
"Willful misconduct" is a term of art commonly used in defining the scope of 
liability in business relationships. For example, in Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain 
States Telephone and Tel Co., 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that a phone company's liability for an erroneous phone number listing is limited to 
situations involving gross negligence or willful misconduct. "Gross negligence" is 
recklessness that shows utter indifference to consequences, while "[wjillful misconduct 
goes beyond gross negligence in that a defendant must be aware that his conduct will 
probably result in injury." Id. at 335. In Golding v. Ashley Central Irrigation Co., 793 
P.2d 897, 901 (Utah 1990), the court reaffirmed this definition of willful misconduct in 
the context of landowner liability, restating the definition as "the intentional failure to do 
an act, with knowledge that serious injury is the probable result." See also Matheson v. 
Pearson, 619 P.2d 321, 322 (Utah 1980) (person guilty of willful misconduct "intends to 
cause harm"). Accordingly, willful misconduct is a wrongful act or omission undertaken 
for the purpose of causing injury to another. 
The willful misconduct standard is analogous to the business judgment rule 
applied in cases challenging the actions of corporate officers and directors. Section 16-
10a-840(4), U.C.A., states that a director or officer is not liable for any act or omission 
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unless "the breach or failure to perform constitutes gross negligence, willful misconduct, 
or intentional infliction of harm on the corporation or the shareholders." (Emp. added.) 
See C & YCorp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 55 (Utah App. 1995) 
(applying business judgment rule to dismiss claim that former directors breached 
fiduciary duty to corporation). The purpose of this rule is to encourage competent 
persons to direct business entities by insulating them from liability for errors in judgment, 
as well as to prevent courts from becoming enmeshed in reviewing complex business 
decisions. See Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042, 1046-47 (Pa. 1997) (rule 
historically shields directors from liability, except for willful misconduct, where they act 
within the scope of their discretion). 
For example, in Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577 (Utah App. 1998), this Court 
dismissed, as a matter of law, claims of mismanagement, breach of contract, and breach 
of fiduciary duty against trustees and officers of a condominium association on the 
grounds that the defendants engaged in no "intentional misconduct," the statutory 
standard applicable to nonprofit corporations. Id. at 584-89; see U.C.A. § 16-6-107. The 
exculpatory provision "defines the standard of care which the Trustees must breach 
before they can be held personally liable for their decisions as trustees." Id. at 588. To 
encourage competent persons to serve in these business capacities, the statute gives 
"blanket protection from personal liability for any acts amounting to less than intentional 
misconduct." Id. at 589. Moreover, the liability protection "applies universally to all 
claims alleging any type of breach of duty." Id. 
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An exculpatory provision shielding a general partner from liability in a limited 
partnership agreement is enforced in the same way as analogous statutory provisions 
applicable to corporations and other business entities. See Cincinnati Bell Cellular 
Systems Co. v. Ameritech Mobile Phone Service, 1996 W.L. 506906 at *12 (Del. Ch. 
1996), affd, 692 A.2d 411 (Del. 1997) (principles of limited corporate director liability 
apply to general partner of partnership) (Add. 101). In Cincinnati Bell, a limited partner 
in a phone service company sued the general partner for breach of fiduciary duty and 
mismanagement, including not having an adequate marketing plan. The partnership 
agreement provided that the general partner "will not be liable for any loss to the 
Partnership or the Limited Partners by reason of any act or failure to act unless the 
General Partner was guilty of willful misconduct or gross negligence." Id., W.L. at * 14 
(emp. added). The court granted summary judgment to the general partner on the basis 
that the parties had contracted to give the general partner broad discretion in conducting 
the business and to preclude liability for acts not amounting to willful misconduct. 
While the general partner's business forecasts were inaccurate, and the parties presented 
conflicting evidence on the wisdom of certain business decisions, "all of the questioned 
acts or decisions were business decisions," and therefore did not constitute willful 
misconduct. Id. at *18. 
C. Application to the Present Case, 
The exculpatory language in the Soldier Summit partnership agreement "defines 
the standard of care" that plaintiffs must prove was breached in order to hold defendants 
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liable for their business decisions as general partner. See Reedeker, supra, at 588. 
Accordingly, the standard for both breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the agreement 
is "willful misconduct." The conduct for which plaintiffs seek to hold defendants liable 
is the so-called "failure" to sell the Soldier Summit property as recreational lots "in the 
1982-84 time frame." (App. Br. 18-19.) However, plaintiffs have failed to prove 
misconduct, known probable injury, or actual injury. 
To begin with, non-sale of the property is not "misconduct" because "owning, 
holding, developing, [and] improving" the property is within the scope of the stated 
business purpose of the partnership, which the general partner had "exclusive and 
complete discretion" to carry out. In fact, defendants were working to develop the 
property between 1982 and 1984. They could not sell the lots during that time because 
they were not ready, and even if they had marketed the lots during that time, they would 
have lost money, as subsequent studies showed. Defendants planned to commence sales 
in 1984, but were delayed by the dissolution of the local town and other regulatory 
obstacles. Defendants continued their efforts through 1985 and made a business decision 
to postpone marketing the property only after receiving the January 1986 Kasper report 
that the proposed development would result in economic loss. These business decisions 
are plainly within the general partner's "exclusive and complete discretion" in dealing 
with the property and, therefore, cannot be characterized as "misconduct." See Atkin 
Wright & Miles, supra; C & YCorp. v. General Biometrics, supra; and Reedeker, supra. 
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Plaintiffs cite the opinions of other persons to question the general partner's 
business decisions. For example, they refer to Jay Murphy, a limited partner, who opined 
that the partnership objective was to sell the property "as quickly as possible." (App. Br. 
17.) However, those are his words; the partnership purpose, as stated in the partnership 
agreement, is not that narrow and simplistic. Moreover, limited partners have no 
authority in partnership business, while the general partner has exclusive authority and 
discretion. (Add. 16-17.) As verified by the subsequent independent marketing studies, 
quick sale of the lots, without a loss, was not possible. Plaintiffs also offer the opinion of 
Todd Harris, a real estate agent, that "the partnership missed a great business 
opportunity" to sell lots in 1982-84, and that "many lots could have been sold." (App. 
Br. 18; R. 1787.) However, this statement is pure conjecture and does not specify how 
many lots could have been sold, or whether those sales would have produced a profit to 
the partnership. Neither does this speculation diminish the general partner's "exclusive 
and complete discretion" to manage the property and to reach a different opinion. 
Conflicting evidence on the wisdom of a business decision, even if that decision is later 
shown to be in error, does not prove "willful misconduct." See C & YCorp., supra, 896 
P.2d at 55 (directors not liable for errors in judgment); Reedeker, supra, 952 P.2d at 587-
89 (business mistakes do not constitute "intentional misconduct"); Cuker, supra, 692 
A.2d at 609-10 (officers are not liable for mistakes in judgment while acting within their 
discretion); Cincinnati Bell Cellular Systems, supra, 1996 W.L. 506906 at *18 (disputed 
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evidence on validity of business decision does not establish "willful misconduct" or 
preclude summary judgment).6 
Plaintiffs have not only failed to show misconduct in non-sale of the property, 
they have failed to prove defendants' knowledge of any probable injury resulting from 
non-sale. See Golding, supra, at 90 L Plaintiffs claim that defendants chose not to sell 
the property as recreational lots because they supposedly regretted Changs receiving a 
partnership interest in Soldier Summit and wanted to "punish" plaintiffs by not selling 
the property. They claim defendants were motivated by supposed "ill will" between the 
parties. (App. Br. 19-20.) However, this argument defies reason. Given the 
disproportionate ownership interests in the partnership of only 9 percent for plaintiffs 
and 81 percent for defendants, any "injury" or "punishment" inflicted on plaintiffs 
through non-sale would wreak nine times that same injury on defendants themselves. No 
reasonable jury could characterize as "intentional" an injury that would fall 
simultaneously on defendants with an impact of ninefold. Mere economic loss or 
unrelated incidents of past conflict do not prove "willful misconduct" by defendants.7 
6
 It is interesting to note that even the Changs acknowledged the general market decline in real estate 
in 1982 when they were developing IID property in Logan, Utah. In explaining the slow sales to the Lins 
and other partners in January 1982, Mrs. Chang wrote: 
Due to general economic conditions in the United States we have had very little response 
and it is not anticipated that we will be able to sell or develop the property until the 
economic climate changes. [R. 1898; Add. 82.] 
Accordingly, in developing the Logan property, the Changs acknowledged the same difficulties and 
reached the same conclusion for which they have sued defendants in this Soldier Summit case. 
7
 Plaintiffs refer to the testimony of Clark Lin, a consulting engineer for ACC, as establishing that 
Lins decided not to market the property because of ill will toward the Changs. (App. Br. 10,20.) 
However, the Clark Lin testimony is quoted out of context and misconstrued. Mr. Lin was being 
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Moreover, plaintiffs have failed to prove any actual economic loss resulting from 
non-sale of the property. They have presented no evidence of how much the partnership 
would have earned from sale of lots in 1982-84, and regardless of what that figure might 
be, they have no way of proving actual loss until the property is actually sold. Until that 
time, plaintiffs have no way of proving that they would have earned more in 1982-84. If 
the ultimate sale of the property yields more than was expected in 1982-84, then 
plaintiffs will have no actual injury. Until the actual sale of the property occurs at some 
time in the future, plaintiffs9 injury is uncertain and purely speculative. Absent any 
actual injury, by definition, there is no "willful misconduct."8 
In summary, plaintiffs have identified no "willful misconduct" by defendants in 
not selling the property between 1982 and 1984. That course of conduct was entirely 
within the general partner's discretion and involved no misconduct or intent to injure 
plaintiffs. Moreover, plaintiffs can identify no actual injury. Absent "willful 
questioned about an unsigned agreement with the Soldier Summit Special Service District in 1986 to 
extend the time for completion of subdivision improvements, such as roads, culverts, and waterworks. 
He testified that the improvements had been delayed because of disputes regarding unpaid financial 
contributions by certain partners. (Clark Lin Dep. at 114-16, R. 1829-30; see exhibit, R. 1832.) Thus, 
Clark Lin was referring to reasons for delayed improvements in 1986, not to reasons for non-sale of the 
lots in 1982-84. Moreover, he did not testify, as plaintiffs have represented, that Lins' decision not to 
sell the lots was motivated by animosity toward, and a desire to injure, the Changs. 
Plaintiffs also repeatedly refer to the so-called "assault and battery" of Mrs. Chang, and the 
history of litigation between the parties as evidence of defendants' intent to injure the Changs. (App. Br. 
9, 19.) However, the "assault and battery" of Mrs. Chang was a single slap by an errant IID employee, 
without the knowledge or complicity of the Lins, which occurred in 1990, long after plaintiffs claim the 
Soldier Summit property should have been sold. (R. 1799.) As for litigation, it is the Changs who have 
repeatedly sued the Lins over frivolous claims such as those in this case. 
The absence of an actual injury also leaves plaintiffs' claims unripe for adjudication. See, e.g., 
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1151 (Utah 1983). 
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misconduct/' by definition, and as a matter of law, there was no breach of any duty, 
either fiduciary or contractual, to plaintiffs. See Reedeker, supra, 952 P.2d at 589. 
Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants. 
POINT II: THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON THE FRAUD CLAIM BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS 
FAILED TO PROVE ANY MISREPRESENTATION OR 
DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE. 
Plaintiffs argue that defendants committed fraud by stating their intention to 
market the Soldier Summit property and then not doing so. Plaintiffs claim that they 
detrimentally relied on defendants' statements by taking no action. (App. Br. 24-26.) In 
the district court, defendants demonstrated that plaintiffs had presented no evidence of 
misrepresentation or detrimental reliance. (R. 1478, 1606-08.) The district court granted 
summary judgment, holding that even if there were misrepresentations (which was not 
decided), plaintiffs had presented no evidence of detrimental reliance on such 
representations. (R. 1904; Add. 11.) 
In order to avoid summary judgment on a fraud claim, a plaintiff is required to 
prove all elements of the claim by clear and convincing evidence. See Andalex 
Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah App. 1994) (such proof is required 
at the summary judgment stage); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 254 
(1986). Those elements include misrepresentation of an existing fact and detrimental 
reliance. Andalex Resources, supra, at 1046. A statement of future intention is not 
fraudulent merely because that intent is not carried out. Because a statement regarding 
intended future performance is not a presently existing fact, such a statement cannot 
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support a fraud claim unless the plaintiff can prove that the statement was made with 
intent to deceive, with no present intent to carry out the future performance. Id. at 1047. 
Moreover, the plaintiff must show detrimental reliance on the statement, whereby the 
plaintiff incurred some injury; i.e., was induced to act or part with his money or property. 
Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608, 611 (Utah 1982). In the 
present case, plaintiffs have failed to establish either intent to deceive or detrimental 
reliance by clear and convincing evidence. This Court may affirm the summary 
judgment on either ground. See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 
1993) (summary judgment may be affirmed on any ground available to the district court 
even if not relied on below). 
A. No Intent to Deceive, 
A fraud claim may be denied as a matter of law in the absence of proof that a 
statement of future intent was made with intent to deceive. For example, in Andalex 
Resources, supra, a broker sued the buyer of a coal lease for future compensation 
allegedly promised by the buyer. This Court affirmed summary judgment for the buyer 
because the broker failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the buyer had no 
present intent to pay the future compensation. The broker's bald and conclusory 
assertions of fraud were insufficient. The intent to deceive cannot be inferred from 
"doubtful, vague, speculative or inconclusive evidence." Id. Similarly, in Cerritos 
Trucking Co., supra, the purchaser of real property initially represented to the seller that 
a second company would be participating in the purchase. When the second company 
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later dropped out for business reasons, the seller sought rescission on the basis of fraud. 
The court rejected the fraud claim, as a matter of law, because the seller presented no 
evidence that the purchaser did not intend to involve the second company when the 
statement was made. Id, 645 P.2d at 611. A statement of future intent does not preclude 
a change of mind based on changing business considerations. Id. at 612. 
As in the foregoing cases, plaintiffs here have presented no clear and convincing 
evidence that defendants did not intend to market the property when the cited 
representations were made. Plaintiffs recklessly repeat the vague and conclusory 
allegation that "defendants lied" about proceeding with the development, but they cite no 
specific instances and make no references to the record. (App. Br. 25.) The only specific 
statements referred to are three letters from Henry Yen, President of ACC, the general 
partner. The first letter is dated January 5, 1984, and states that "the lots [will be] on the 
market by spring, if all goes well." (R. 1810.) However, as indicated previously, all did 
not go well The Town of Soldier Summit dissolved in April 1984, Utah County stepped 
in with more strict conditions, and the HUD registration for interstate marketing was 
rejected. These difficulties, beyond defendants' control, necessarily delayed the 
development. The fact that the lots were not on the market by spring does not prove Mr. 
Yen was "lying" when he projected they would be. 
The other two letters, sent in October and December of 1984, stated that the lots 
were again close to being placed on the market. (R. 1811-12.) However, these letters 
also refer to the need for payment of partner contributions and development of a 
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marketing plan. (Id.) Plaintiffs balked at paying their contributions, and the 
development of a marketing plan involved the Kasper market study in 1985. When the 
Kasper report indicated that marketing the property as recreational lots would not be 
profitable, defendants decided to postpone their plans and investigate other alternatives. 
(Second Clark Lin Aff t, ffif 12-14, R. 1517.) Again, the fact that the lots were not 
placed on the market does not prove Mr. Yen was "lying" when he stated they would be. 
When it became apparent the development would not be profitable as planned, the 
general partner prudently changed the plan, as it had discretion to do and was obligated 
to do. If the general partner had proceeded with sales in the face of the negative Kasper 
report and produced a loss for the partnership, plaintiffs undoubtedly would have sued 
the general partner for their losses. Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that Mr. Yen, 
through ACC, did not intend to market the property when the cited statements were 
made. In fact, defendants' intent to market the property is manifested by the recording 
of two approved plats in January 1984 and the expenditure of hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in making subdivision improvements. (7tf.,^8-14, R. 1515-17.) In the absence 
of clear and convincing evidence of intent to deceive, summary judgment was properly 
entered on the fraud claim. 
B. No Detrimental Reliance. 
Plaintiffs claim that they detrimentally relied upon defendants' 1984 statements 
that the Soldier Summit project was going forward. (App. Br. 23-26.) However, 
plaintiffs failed to prove any injury from such claimed reliance. As the district court 
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ruled, "plaintiffs have failed to provide sufficient evidence to create a factual question as 
to whether they sustained any injury in reliance upon the [claimed] misrepresentations." 
(R. 1904; Add. 11.) Accordingly, the court properly granted summary judgment on this 
claim. 
Plaintiffs have identified no actual reliance on any of the three letters from Henry 
Yen. In his deposition, Mr. Chang testified: 
Q: Do you recall whether you did anything in reliance on those letters? 
A: Not in particular, I can't remember. 
Q: Is there anything you refrained from doing because of those letters? 
A: No. [R. 1635-36; Add. 96-97.] 
Absent any reliance, there can be no claim that the supposed misrepresentations caused 
injury. 
Plaintiffs now argue that they relied upon the Henry Yen letters regarding 
anticipated marketing of the lots "by taking no action with respect to the development." 
(App. Br. 26.) Elsewhere, plaintiffs attempt to explain, "Plaintiffs relied upon that by 
failure to act. Those lies and misrepresentations were provided so that plaintiffs would 
take no action regarding the partnership. They did not take such action to their 
detriment.9' {Id. at 25.) However, exactly what action plaintiffs are referring to, which 
they did not take, is not stated and is not clear. Neither have plaintiffs shown how this 
unspecified inaction caused them injury. Plaintiffs acknowledge that they could not 
manage the partnership themselves {id. at 24), so that is not an action that could have 
been taken. Plaintiffs could be referring to a lawsuit, but they eventually did take that 
action, with no loss or detriment. Defendants simply cannot guess at what plaintiffs are 
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referring to as action they did not take, to their detriment. In the absence of detrimental 
reliance, there is no injury, and the statements made by Henry Yen, whether true or false, 
are not actionable fraud. Therefore, this Court should affirm the summary judgment. 
POINT III: ALTERNATIVELY, PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY 
APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 
Defendants argued in the district court that plaintiffs' second, seventh, and eighth 
claims are also barred by applicable statutes of limitation. (R. 1468-70, 1477-79.) The 
district court did not decide these limitations issues, choosing instead to base its summary 
judgment on the grounds discussed above. However, this Court may affirm the summary 
judgment on alternative grounds, available to, but not relied upon by the district court. 
See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, supra, 855 P.2d at 235. 
The purpose of statutes of limitation is "to promote justice by preventing surprises 
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been 
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." Becton Dickinson and Co. 
v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983). The statute of limitations begins to run 
when the cause of action accrues. U.C.A. § 78-12-1. The general rule is that a cause of 
action accrues upon the occurrence of the last event necessary to complete the cause of 
action. Moreover, Utah law is clear that "mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of 
action does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations." Myers v. McDonald, 
635 P.2d 84,86 (Utah 1981); see also Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 
575, 578 (Utah App. 1996). 
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Plaintiffs' three pending claims are governed by different statutes of limitation. 
See Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass % 907 P.2d 264, 267 n.2 (Utah 1995). The 
second claim, for breach of fiduciary duty, is governed by the four-year statute of 
limitations in section 78-12-25(3), governing claims "for relief not otherwise provided 
for by law." United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 890 
(Utah 1993). The seventh claim, for breach of the partnership agreement, is governed by 
the six-year statute of limitations in section 78-12-23(2), governing actions on a contract 
in writing. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Utah App. 1987). The 
eighth claim, for fraud, is governed by the three-year statute of limitations in section 78-
12-26(3). Koulis, supra, at 1185. 
Plaintiffs' action is barred under all three statutes of limitation. The factual claim 
on which plaintiffs base this action, the claim common to all three legal theories, is that 
defendants wrongfully failed to market the Soldier Summit property in 1982, and at least 
by 1984. (App. Br. 9-10, 18; Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint, f^ 18, 
particularly subparagraph (b), R. 853.) Accordingly, if the claim is that defendants had a 
legal duty to market the property in 1982, the cause of action for breach of that duty 
accrued at the end of 1982, when it was clear to all partners that no sales had occurred in 
1982. Plaintiffs did not file their complaint in this action until September 28, 1990 (R. 
1), seven years after their cause of action accrued. Accordingly, this action is time-
barred, and summary judgment is appropriate on that alternative basis.9 
9
 In his deposition, Mr. Chang conceded knowledge of his cause of action by January 1, 1983: 
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In the district court, plaintiffs conceded that they knew the property was not on the 
market from 1982 forward, but they argued that the action was still not barred by the 
statutes of limitation because defendants concealed the status of the project and 
represented that the property would soon be on the market. (R. 1746.) They argued that 
their cause of action did not accrue until October of 1989, when they allegedly learned 
that the property would not be marketed as recreational lots. (R. 1747.) However, these 
arguments simply attempt to create a moving target that cannot be hit with a statute of 
limitations. Plaintiffs' complaint, as supported by their brief on appeal, alleges that 
defendants breached various duties and committed fraud by failing to market the property 
in 1982. Their supporting evidence focused entirely on selling the property in 1982. (R. 
1773, 1786-87.) Without amending their complaint, plaintiffs cannot later transform 
their cause of action to allege failure to market the property at all. If that is their claim, 
then it is not yet ripe, because defendants are still attempting to sell the property in the 
Q: Do you agree with the allegation that the marketing of the Soldier Summit 
property could and should have taken place as early as 1982? 
A: Absolutely. 
Q: So when you allege in [the complaint] that ACC has breached its obligations 
to you as a limited partner by failing to develop the property, you believe that breach 
started in 1982? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did you know it had not been in the market in early 1983? 
A: They just told us they are not ready yet. 
Q: So your answer is yes you knew that because they told you they were not 
ready yet? 
A: Yes, I know they are not in the market. 
Q: Did you complain to them at the time that ACC was not doing what it should 
be doing under the partnership agreement? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Who did you make that complaint to? 
A: To American City Corporation. [R. 1508-10; Add. 85-87.] 
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most profitable form possible, and may still do so. Justheim v. Division of State Lands, 
659 P.2d 1075,1077 (Utah 1983) (court cannot render advisory opinion on issue not ripe 
for adjudication); Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1151 (Utah 1983) (absent specific 
injury matter is not ripe for adjudication). Accordingly, plaintiffs' claim remains the 
alleged failure to market the property in 1982. 
The discovery rule does not apply to the fiduciary and contract claims. Utah law 
is clear that in order to invoke the discovery rule, plaintiffs must first show that they did 
not know and reasonably could not have known of any cause of action prior to the 
limitations bar. E.g., Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 
1995); Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992). Plaintiffs 
concede that they knew, more than six years before they filed their complaint, that the 
property had not been sold. They do not argue that non-sale of the property was 
concealed from them. Therefore, plaintiffs' fiduciary and contract claims, both of which 
are based on failure to sell the property prior to 1984, are barred. See Anderson v. Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc., supra, 920 P.2d at 578-79 (barring fiduciary and contract claims 
for loss of stock because plaintiff knew of the loss six years earlier but failed to 
investigate the cause of the loss). 
Plaintiffs' fraud claim accrues upon "discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts 
constituting the fraud." U.C A. § 78-12-26(3). Here, as discussed above, plaintiffs base 
their fraud claim on the letters from Henry Yen stating that the property would be on the 
market in the spring of 1985. (App. Br. 25-26.) Accordingly, plaintiffs' fraud claim 
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accrued at the end of that spring, after the specified time had passed for marketing the 
property. If plaintiffs claim fraud in that projection, then their claim accrued when the 
projection did not come to pass. Therefore, the fraud claim is barred because it accrued, 
at the latest, by July 1, 1985, more than five years before the complaint was filed. See 
Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., supra, 146 P.2d at 1185-86 (barring fraud claim under 
property lease because the plaintiff had learned the facts necessary to ascertain the fraud 
fourteen years earlier). 
In summary, this Court should affirm the summary judgment on the alternative 
grounds that plaintiffs' claims are barred by applicable statutes of limitation. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the order of summary judgment 
for defendants on the grounds that (1) defendants engaged in no "willful misconduct"; 
(2) defendants made no misrepresentation on which plaintiffs relied to their injury; and 
(3) plaintiffs' claims are barred by statutes of limitation. 
Respectfully submitted this /& day of June, 1998. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
By: ^^>^C—~a? >S~ S^G^y^ 
David M. Wahlquist 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PO-CHENG CHANG, BEATRICE H. 
CHANG, and AMERICAN ESTATE FTNAL ORDER 
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SOLDIER SUMMIT DEVELOPMENT, a 
Utah limited partnership, AMERICAN CITY 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, 
MING-CHENG LIN, individually and in his 
capacity as Trustee, HSIUN MEI YEN LIN, 
individually, and in his capacity as a partner, 
Defendants. 
BACKGROUND 
On February 12, 1997, the Court heard oral arguments on cross-motions for partial summary 
judgment of the Plaintifis and Defendants. Defendants were represented by David M. Wahlquist and 
m i o mi 
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Case No. 900905601 CN 
Judge Glenn Iwasaki 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Blake T. Ostler of the law firm of Kirton & McConkie. Plaintiffs were represented by R Brent 
Stephens and Ryan E. Tibbitts of the law firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau. 
The Court reviewed the parties' moving papers and exhibits appended thereto and heard oral 
argument on the motions. At the hearing the Court also received additional exhibits and deposition 
excerpts from the parties. At the conclusion of the hearing the Court ruled from the bench on 
portions of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. On February 26, 1997, the Court 
issued a Memorandum Decision on the remaining portions of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and on Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. On February 27, 1997, the 
Court held a conference call with counsel wherein the Memorandum Decision was explained and 
clarified to counsel for the parties. 
On February 28, 1997, another conference call was held with counsel for the parties wherein 
it was stipulated that the Court enter its order dissolving the Soldier Summit partnership pursuant to 
the terms of the partnership agreement and ordering that an accounting of the partnership be 
conducted as prayed for by the Plaintiffs in their Third Claim for Relief. Thereafter, the Court 
scheduled a one-day, nonjury trial on March 12, 1997, so that Defendants' claims regarding 
conversion of Homestead Associates funds could be tried. On March 10, 1997, the Defendants 
contacted the Court and indicated that they were voluntarily dismissing with prejudice their claims 
regarding the conversion of Homestead Associates funds. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby enters the following Findings and Conclusions and 
Order: 
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L FINDINGS 
A. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, filed September 6, 1995, states nine claims: 
1) Dissolution of Soldier Summit; (2) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (3) Accounting Regarding Soldier 
Summit; (4) Neghgent Misrepresentation; (5) Breach of Separation Agreement; (6) Breach of 
Consulting Agreement; (7) Breach of Partnership Agreement; (8) Fraud and Misrepresentation, and 
(9) Specific Performance. 
B. Defendants' Answer to the Complaint filed October 10, 1995, includes 20 affirmative 
defenses and six counterclaims: (1) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (2) Fraud and Misrepresentation; (3) 
Neghgent Misrepresentation; (4) Conversion; (5) Breach of Partnership Agreement, and (6) 
Accounting re: Homestead Associates. 
C. The parties moved for summary judgment as to some of the claims, and made certain 
stipulations and dismissals regarding the remaining claims. 
D. There are no genuine disputes as to any material facts relative to the conclusions set 
forth in Section II below. 
n. CONCLUSIONS 
A Bench Ruling. 
1. Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on Defendants' First, Second and Third 
Claims for Relief in Defendants' Counterclaim, except for the conversion claims regarding Homestead 
Associates funds, based upon the clear and unambiguous language of releases contained in the so-
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called Separation Agreement and Supplemental Agreement entered into by the parties on February 
8, 1982, and March 1, 1982, respectively. 
2. The Supplemental Agreement referred to above created a private statute of limitation 
between the parties for claims that are now being asserted in the First, Second and Third Claims for 
Relief of the Counterclaim (except for that portion of the First Claim relating to Homestead 
management fees) which Counterclaim was first filed on October 9, 1995. 
3. Pursuant to the private statute of limitation contained in the Supplemental Agreement, 
all such claims for relief were required to be filed prior to May 31, 1982, in accordance with the 
Supplemental Agreement. Although a Complaint was filed in May of 1982, that Complaint was 
dismissed in November of 1982, nearly 13 years before Defendants filed their Counterclaim 
4. The Separation Agreement also contains a clear, comprehensive and unambiguous 
release that precludes Defendants' claims arising prior to February 8, 1982. This release would 
therefore bar all claims in the First, Second and Third Claims for Relief other than the claim relating 
to Homestead management fees, which is dealt with below. 
5. The Court further relies upon the Utah Supreme Court case of Ong International USA 
v. 11th Avenue Corporation, 850 P.2d 447, 453. n. 18 (Utah 1993) which specifically recognizes that 
there are situations where a person would voluntarily choose to waive existing fraud claims or even 
waive unknown claims of fraud. Based upon the history of the parties, and the clear terms of the 
Separation and Supplemental Agreements, this case does present such a situation and Ong is, 
therefore, persuasive. 
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6. Even if the claims contained in the First, Second and Third Claims for Relief other 
than the Homestead management fee claim, are not barred by the release language of the two 
agreements cited above, those claims for relief would also be barred by the statute of limitations no 
matter whether the three-year, four-year or six-year statutes of limitations apply. The claims 
contained in the First, Second and Third Claims for Relief except for the Homestead management 
fee claim, have long since been barred by those statutes of limitations. 
7. The Court does not grant Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for the 
claims contained in the First Claim for Relief and Fourth Claim for ReHef for conversion of 
management fees of Homestead Associates by the Changs, but Defendants subsequently agreed to 
dismiss these claims with prejudice. 
B. Memorandum Decision. 
The Court's Memorandum Decision of February 26, 1997, is hereby adopted and 
incorporated into this Final Order by this reference with the following clarification: 
1. Section EDLB of the Memorandum Decision states that the Soldier Summit 
Development Partnership Agreement grants a general partner full discretion to manage the 
partnership's affairs and provides that it shall not be hable for errors in judgment lacking 'Svillfiil 
misconduct." In light of the agreement's broad language, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs' 
allegations are not sufficient to raise an issue of fact on that. Thus, the Court grants Defendants' 
motion insofar as it seeks dismissal of certain claims on this basis. This ruling also applies to 
Plaintiffs' Seventh Claim for ReHef for breach of the Partnership Agreement to the extent it alleges 
-5-
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a claim of willful misconduct for failure to timely develop and market the Soldier Summit property. 
To the extent that Plaintiffs' Seventh Claim for Relief alleges claims other than a claim for willful 
misconduct or the claims relating to the First Amendment of the Partnership Agreement which are 
ruled upon in the Memorandum Decision, Defendants' motion is denied as to any such claims. 
Plaintiffs subsequently indicated that there are no additional claims in the Seventh Claim for Relief 
other than the willful failure to develop claims, which have not otherwise been addressed by the Court 
in the Memorandum Decision or this Final Order. Therefore, summary judgment is granted against 
Plaintiffs and in Defendants' favor upon all willful failure to develop claims in Plaintiffs' Second and 
Seventh Claims for Relief. 
DDL. STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES 
A. Based upon a stipulation of the parties, this Court will order a decree of dissolution 
and an accounting of the Soldier Summit Partnership in accordance with Utah law and pursuant to 
the terms of paragraph 17 of the Certificate and Agreement of Limited Partnership of Soldier Summit 
Development dated November 1, 1978, as prayed for in Plaintiffs' First and Third Claims for Relief 
contained in their Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint, filed on September 6, 1995; and: 
1. Po Chang shall be entitled to payment from SSD of 2% of all proceeds 
from SSD's real property pursuant to the Consulting Agreement. 
2. Plaintiffs shall be obligated to pay 9% of the legitimate partnership 
expenses which arose after March 1, 1982, in accordance with the Court's ruling 
above. 
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B. Defendants voluntary agreed that their claims regarding the Homestead Associates as 
set forth in Defendants' First and Fourth Claims for Relief should be dismissed with prejudice. 
IV. ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby orders, adjudges and decrees that Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be and hereby 
are granted in part and denied in part, as set forth above and in the Memorandum Decision. Plaintiffs' 
claims for dissolution and an accounting of Soldier Summit are hereby granted in accordance with 
the terms set forth above. Each of Defendants' claims for conversion of Homestead funds are 
dismissed with prejudice. All claims of the parties set forth in their pleadings not reduced to summary 
judgment herein or otherwise dealt with by this Order are hereby dismissed. This Order disposes of 
all issues raised by the pleadings and will become final upon entry. 
DATED this ^ 2 r T 3 a y o W ^ g £ l _ i _ , 1997. 
B Y T B U r T j 9 K R T : / 
;NN IWASAKI 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
David M. Wahlquist 
N:\13877\2\DISSOLVI.ORD 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PO-CHENG CHANG, et. al.7 : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiffs, : CASE NO, 900905601 CN 
vs. : 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
SOLDIER SUMMIT DEVELOPMENT, et. : 
al., 
Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
cross-motions for partial summary judgment* 
The Court heard oral argument on the motions on February 12, 
1997# at which time the parties were represented by counsel. The 
Court ruled on one aspect of plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and took the remaining matters under advisement. Based 
upon the motions, memoranda of the parties (including supplemental 
memoranda), the exhibits attached thereto, the arguments of 
counsel, and for good cause shown, the Court hereby enters the 
following ruling. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, filed 9/6/95, states 
nine claims: (1) Dissolution of Soldier Summit, (2) Breach of 
Fiduciary Duty, (3) Accounting Re: Soldier Summit, (4) Negligent 
Misrepresentation, (5) Breach of Separation Agreement, (6) Breach 
of Consulting Agreement, (7) Breach of Partnership Agreement, (8) 
Fraud and Misrepresentation, and (9) Specific Performance. 
Defendants1 Answer to the Complaint, filed 10/10/9 5, includes 
2 0 affirmative defenses and six counterclaims: (1) Breach of 
Fiduciary Duty, (2) Fraud and Misrepresentation, (3) Negligent 
Misrepresentation, (4) Conversion, (5) Breach of Partnership 
Agreement, and (6) Accounting re: Homestead Associates. 
II. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The Court has already granted plaintiffs1 motion for summary 
judgment as it relates to counterclaims 1, 2 and 3 (Breach of 
Fiduciary Duty, Fraud and Misrepresentation, and Negligent 
Misrepresentation). The Court does not further address those issue 
here. 
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Plaintiffs also seek summary judgment on claim 9 of their 
Complaint (Specific Performance). Defendants have also moved for 
summary judgment on this claim. 
On March 1, 1992, the parties signed a "First Amendment to 
Certificate and Agreement of Limited Partnership of Soldier Summit 
Development," Defendant American City Development Corp., 
controlled by the defendant Lins, acted as the General Partner of 
the partnership. Paragraph 5 of that agreement provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of the 
Partnership Agreement, any and all debts, 
obligations, liabilities, bills, costs or 
expenses of the Partnership (whether known or 
unknown) incurred or arising prior to March 1, 
1982 and interest accruing thereon after March 1, 
1982 (the "Pre-Existing Obligations") shall be 
borne and discharged by the General Partner and 
Jay L. Murphy in the ratio that their respective 
percentage interests bear to one another. All 
allocations of profit and loss and distributions 
shall be computed as though the Pre-Existing 
Obligations were the individual obligations of 
the General Partner and Jay L. Murphy in such 
proportions, and the amounts that would otherwise 
be distributed to the General Partner and Jay L. 
Murphy shall be used to pay the Pre-Existing 
obligations. To the extent that the amounts 
allocated to the General Partner and Jay L. 
Murphy are not sufficient to discharge the Pre-
Existing obligations, the General Partner and Jay 
L. Murphy shall contribute to the Partnership 
(without affecting the rights of the other 
Partners) sufficient cash to discharge the Pre-
Existing obligations as they fall due. Except to 
the extent set forth above, the Partners shall 
each bear their pro-rata share of any 
liabilities, obligations, debts or similar items 
arising on or after March 1, 1982. 
Defendants have shown the mortgage on the partnership's 
property as a liability, expense, or debt on the books and records 
of the partnership. Plaintiffs contend that in doing so, 
defendants have violated the above provision that allocated the 
partnership's debts. Defendants admit"that they are responsible to 
pay the entire mortgage on the property (including those portions 
which were due in the future since the underlying debt had been 
incurred prior to March 1, 19 82), but respond that they are 
entitled to receive back their total cash contributions, including 
initial and additional, subsequent contributions. 
I U 
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According to paragraph 5, and " [n]otwithstanding any other 
provision of the Partnership Agreement," all pre-March 19 82 debts 
or obligations of the partnership are deemed personal obligations 
of the General Partner. There is no suggestion that the General 
Partner be credited for these payments as cash contributions to the 
partnership. Instead the agreement requires all preexisting 
obligations to be "borne and discharged" as "individual" obligations 
of the General Partner. Plaintiffs gave up their substantial 
interests in other assets in order to receive a partnership free of 
all debts. It would be contrary to the intent of the parties to 
explicitly preclude the mortgage payments as debts of the Limited 
Partner, while allowing those payments as contributions of the 
General Partner. 
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff1s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment is granted as to this issue. 
III. DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendants seek dismissal--at least against certain 
defendants--of all nine of the claims set forth in plaintiffs1 
Complaint. Many of defendants1 theories for dismissal apply to 
more than one claim. The Court will address the merits of these 
theories, and then determine which of the claims should be 
dismissed as a result of the Courtfs conclusions. 
A. Alter Ego 
Defendants contend that certain defendants should be dismissed 
from certain claims because those defendants were not involved in 
those claims. Plaintiffs respond that all of the defendants should 
remain in the case on all claims because they are all alter egos of 
each other. After examining the evidence on this issue, the Court 
concludes that there is sufficient evidence in this case from which 
a finder of fact could conclude that the defendants are the alter 
egos of one another. Thus the Court denies defendants1 motion 
insofar as it seeks dismissal of certain claims against certain 
defendants on this basis, including claim 1 (Dissolution of Soldier 
Summit), claim 3 (Accounting Re: Soldier Summit), claim 4 
(Negligent Misrepresentation), claim 5 (Breach of Separation 
Agreement), claim 6 (Breach of Consulting Agreement), claim 7 
(Breach of Partnership Agreement), claim 8 (Fraud and 
Misrepresentation), and claim 9 (Specific Performance). 
B. willful Misconduct 
The Soldier Summit Development partnership agreement grants 
the general partner full discretion to manage the partnership's 
affairs and provides that it shall not be liable for errors in 
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judgment lacking "willful misconduct." Defendants contend that 
there was no such breach. Among other evidence, they point to two 
market studies that state that development of the property would 
lose money. Plaintiffs respond that failing to develop the 
property while withholding information constituted willful 
misconduct. In light of the agreements broad authority to the 
general partner, the Court concludes that plaintiffs1 allegations 
are not sufficient to raise an issue of fact. Thus the Court 
grants defendants1 motion insofar as it seeks dismissal of certain 
claims on this basis, including claim 2 (Breach of Fiduciary Duty). 
c. Detrimental Reliance 
In order to state a claim for fraud or misrepresentation, 
plaintiffs must provide some evidence that they relied to their 
detriment on the alleged misrepresentation. Defendants argue that 
plaintiffs have failed to provide any evidence that they have 
sustained any injury in reliance upon defendants' alleged 
misrepresentations regarding either development prospects for the 
partnership property or financial information supplied by 
defendants. Plaintiffs have submitted the affidavit of Todd 
Harris, a real estate agent, stating that "with relatively little 
effort or expense," the property could have been placed on the 
market and that there was "considerable interest" by the local 
community in the project. He also states that "many" lots could 
have been sold from 1982-19 84 and that the partnership missed out 
on a "great business opportunity." 
The affidavit--apart from being speculative--does not assert 
nor attempt to assert that the development would have been 
profitable had it gone forward. Defendants1 own marketing study 
admits that some lots would be sold, but concludes that under the 
market conditions, the development would result in a significant 
financial loss to the partnership. The fact that a local realtor 
says he could have sold some of the lots during a two-year period 
does not contradict defendants1 position. 
Finally, Mr. Chang, in his affidavit, could not explain 
anything he did or did not do in reliance upon the alleged 
misrepresentations. 
Even assuming that defendants made misrepresentations, and 
that the claims are not barred by the statute of limitations, the 
Court concludes that plaintiffs have failed to provide sufficient 
evidence to create a factual question as to whether they sustained 
any injury in reliance upon the misrepresentations. Thus the Court 
grants defendants' motion insofar as it seeks dismissal of certain 
claims on this basis, including claim 4 (Negligent 
Misrepresentation), and claim 8 (Fraud and Misrepresentation). 
I -*L 
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D. Accord. Satisfaction, and Release 
Defendants claim that they are entitled to dismissal of claim 
5 (Breach of Separation Agreement) under a theory of accord, 
satisfaction, and release. They contend that any problems 
regarding the separation agreement were worked out by the parties 
when they signed a March 1, 1982 "Satisfaction of Debt." The 
document releases only indebtedness that "has not been specifically 
disposed of in some other manner by an instrument executed pursuant 
to the Closing contemplated by or delivered pursuant to the" 
February 8, 19 82 agreement. Claim 5, as stated in Plaintiffs' 
Complaint, is based on the alleged breach of the "March 1982 
Separation Agreement."1 
Defendants argument appears to be well taken. The release 
specifically disposed of claims arising from the Separation 
Agreement. Thus the Court concludes that the "Satisfaction of Debt" 
releases this claim and defendants1 motion is granted as to this 
claim. 
E. Claim 7 (Breach of Partnership Agreement) 
Claim 7 alleges: 
The Defendants have breached the Soldier 
Summit Partnership Agreement and Amendment by 
refusing to assume all debts of the partnership, 
and by willfully refusing to develop the property 
when reasonable, legitimate opportunities were 
available, and by refusing to, abide by the 
Amendment to the Partnership Agreement. 
Defendants contend that they had no contractual duty to 
further develop and market the partnership property because the 
partnership's purposes included holding and leasing the property. 
Plaintiffs respond that questions of fact preclude summary judgment 
on defendants1 duty to develop and market the property. 
Defendants also argue that this claim is barred by the six-
year statute of limitations governing written contracts. Plaintiff 
responds that defendants were concealing information as to the 
status of and their plans for the development and thus the statute 
2This reference to a "March 1992 Separation Agreement" is 
confusing as there is a February 1992 Separation Agreement and a 
March 1992 Amendment to the Agreement. The Court determines 
that, in drafting their Complaint, plaintiffs intended to mean 
the former because the nine particulars of claim 5 appear to 
refer to the former and not the latter. 
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of limitations should be tolled. 
The Court concludes there are questions of fact that preclude 
summary judgment on this claim. There is some evidence that 
defendants refused to provide plaintiffs requested information 
regarding the partnership and that defendants may have misled 
plaintiffs regarding the development prospects for the property. 
Thus the Court denies defendants' motion for summary judgment as to 
this claim. 
F. Claim 9 (Specific Performance) 
In this claim, "Plaintiffs pray for an order of the Court that 
the Defendants specifically perform the Separation Agreement, the 
Consulting Agreement and the Soldier Summit Amendment." The Court 
has made three previous rulings that affect summary judgment on 
this claim. 
The Court has already granted plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment on one aspect of claim 9 (in Section II, above), denying 
defendants the right to credit their mortgage payments as capital 
contributions toward the partnership. 
The Court has also ruled (in section III,D, above) that the 
parties' March 1, 1982 "Satisfaction of Debt" specifically disposed 
of claims arising from the Separation Agreement, unless those 
claims are specifically disposed of in some other manner at the 
time the "Satisfaction of Debt" was signed or pursuant to the 
separation agreement. 
Finally, the Court has ruled (in section III,E, above) that 
there are questions of fact that preclude summary judgment as to 
partnership agreement. 
With the briefing before the Court, the Court is unable to 
make any further rulings as to this claim. 
Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs' motion for partial summary 
judgment is granted, and defendants' motion for partial summary 
judgment is granted in part and denied in part. 
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THIS CERTIFICATE AND AGREEMENT 0? LIMITED PARTNERSHIP (the 
"Agreement") is entered into by and between AMERICAN CITY DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION, A Utah corporation (referred to herein as the "General 
Partner"), and JAY L. MURPHY (referred to herein as the "Limited Partner") 
for the purpose of forming a limited partnership (the "Partnershipn) which 
shall be subject to the following terms and conditions: 
-• ^
orir
-
ation: The General Partner and the Litnited Partner 
(who are collectively referred to herein as the "Partners") hereby 'form 
a limited partnership pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Code Annotated, 
Title 43, Chapter 2 (1953), otherwise known as the Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act of the State of Utah, The Partners agree promptly to file this 
agreement and to perform all other acts necessary to comply with the require-
ments for the formation and operation of a limited partnership under the laws 
of the State of Utah. 
2. Name: The name of the Partnership shall be SOLDIER SUMMIT 
DEVELOPMENT. 
3. Character of Business: The purpose of the Partnership and 
the character of its business shall be to engage in the business of 
acquiring, owning, holding, developing,"improving, selling, leasing, 
disposing of and otherwise dealing with real property located in Soldier 
Summit, Utah County and Wasatch County, State of Utah, and to engage in 
all business activities necessary or convenient to the foregoing. The 
Partners have hereto acquired approximately 4,000 acres of unimproved real 
estate located in Soldier Summit, Utah. 
4. Principal Place of Business:- The principal place of business 
of the Partnership shall be located at 1060 Beneficial Life Tower Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, or at such other place as the General Partner 
may designate from time to time by written notice to the Limited Partner. 
The General Partner may, at his descretion, also establish additional places 
of business from time to time. 
CERTIFICATE AND AGREEMENT 
OF 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
OF 
SOLDIER SUMMIT DEVELOPMENT 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
NOV 2 1978 
W. Sterling Evans, Clerk 3rd DisL Court 
By _ /s / Marsha Si 1 cox 
Deputy Clerk 
5- Partners: The name and residence address (or in the case 
or a partnership or corporation, its principal place of business) of the 
General Partner is: 
NAME ADDRESS 
American City Development 1060 Beneficial Life Tower 
Corporation 36 South State Screet 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
The name and residence address (or in the case of a partnership 
or corporation, its principal place of business) of the Limined Partner is: 
NAME' ADDRESS 
Jay L. Murphy 797 17th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
6. Term: The partnership-shall commence on the date this 
agreement is first filed in the office of the County Clerk of Salt Lake 
County, Utah, and shall continue thereafter for a period of thirty (30) 
years unless sooner terminated according to applicable law or the pro-
visions of this agreement. 
7. Capital Contributions : 
7.1 Each Partner has contributed the sum set forth in 
Section 7.2 in cash to the partnership. The Partners have agreed to 
make additional contributions to the partnership in cash according to 
percentage interest set: forth in Section 7.2 to .pay for the land cost 
and all associated development costs. Such additional cash contribution 
may be designated by the General Partner from time to time by written 
notice to the Limited Partner. If any Partner elects not to contribute^ 
designated shares, the_G.eneral_Partner^may adJustJThis pefcehta'ge interest 
in the Pa~rtnersnip accordingly. 
7.2 The respective interest of the Partners in the capital 
and the profits and losses of the Partnership shall be as follows: 
CASH PERCENTAGE 
PARTNER CONTRIBUTION INTEREST 
American City Development $270,000.00 90.00 
Corporation 
Jay L. Murphy $ 30,000.00 10.00 
TOTAL $300,000.00 100.00 
8. Status of Limited Partners: 
8.1 No Limited Partner shall be personally liable for 
any debts or obligations of the Partnership or for any of the losses 
of the Partnership beyond the amount contributed by him or it to the 
capital of the Partnership and his or its share of undistributed profits 
of the Partnership, 
8.2 No Limited Partner shall take part in the management 
of the business of the Partnership or transact any business for the 
Partnership. 
8.3 No Limited Partner in"his or its capacity as Limited 
Partner shall have authority or power to sign for or to bind the Partnership. 
8.4 No Limited Partner shall be entitled to the return of 
any amount contributed by him or it to the capital of the Partnership in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 17. 
8.5 In the event additional Limited Partners are admitted 
pursuant to Section- 16 hereof, no Limited Partner shall have priority 
over any other Limited Partner as to the return of capital contributions 
or as to net profits, net losses or distributions. 
9 . Allocation of Profits and Losses: 
9.1 Except as set forth in Section 9.2, the net profits 
and losses of the Partnership in any taxable year, and each item of 
income, gain, loss, deduction or credit, shall be allocated among and 
distributed to the Partners in the proportions which their respective 
interests in the capital of the Partnership bear to each other. 
9.2 The terms "net profits'.1 and ''net losses'* shall mean 
the net profits or net losses of the Partnership as determined on the 
basis of accounting used for Federal income tax purposes. 
9.3 Nothing in this Section 9 shall alter the limitation 
on a Limited Partner's personal liability for any debts or obligations 
of the Partnership as set forth in subsection 8.1. 
9.4 The expense reimbursement due to the General Partner 
pursuant to Section 11 of this Agreement shall be treated as an expense 
of the Partnership in determining net profits and net losses. 
10. Distributions: 
10.1 Distributions in the Ordinary Course of Business. 
The General Partner shall distribute to the Partners, in the proportions 
provided by Section 10.3, substantially all of the cash held by the 
Partnership; provided, however, that all such distributions shall be 
subject to maintaining the Partnership in a sound cash and financial 
position. 
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10.2 Extraordinary Distributions. Any distributions 
of property other than cash,either in connection with the dissolution of 
the Partnership, refinancing of its assets or otherwise, may be when there 
is sufficient cash or other property in the Partnership which the General 
Partner, in his sole discretion determines is nor needed .Inthe operation 
thereof, or as a reserve against future operating cash needs or contingent 
liabilities. 
10.3 Allocations of Distributions. Ail distributions made 
pursuant to this Section 10 shall be allocated as follows: 
(a) The Partners shall first receive an amount equal 
to their total cash capital contributions to the Partner-
ship up to that time as reduced by ail cash contributions 
theretofore made to them pursuant to this Agreement. 
(b) The amount of any distributions in excess of the 
amounts distributed pursuant to subsection (s) above shall 
be allocated among the Partners in proportion to their 
respective interests in the Capital and Profits and Losses 
of the Partnership. 
10.4 Procedure Uoon Distribution of ProDertv Other 
— - •* 
Than Cash. If the Partnership shall be dissolved prior to sale of all 
its non-cash assets, the value assigned tc c\:ch assets for purposes of 
distribution shall be (a) the value agreed upon by all the Partners, or, 
in the event of disagreement, (b) the appraised value established pursuant 
to the following: The General Partner and the Limited Partners shall each 
appoint an appraiser. In the event the two cannot agree upon a value, they 
shall mutually appoint a third appraiser whose decision shall be conclusive, 
but shall be limited to the value somewhere in between the values arrived 
at by the two original appraisers. 
^ * Expenses. The Partnership shall pay for any and all 
expenses incurred by the General Partner and each of them for and on 
behalf of the Partnership and shall reimburse the General Partner and 
each of them for amy such expenses advanced by them. 
12. Rights and Powers of the General Partner. 
12.1 The General Partner shall have full, exclusive and 
complete discretion in the management and control of the Partnership and 
its business of the purposes herein stated and shall make all decisions 
affecting the Partnership's affairs. The General Partner shall have full 
power and authority on behalf of the Partnership to take any action which 
the General Partner may deem necessary or advisable or incidental t: the 
business of the Partnership and to execute and deliver on behalf of the 
Partnership such documents or instruments as the General Partner deems 
appropriate in its conduct of the Partnership business. No person, firm 
or corporation dealing with the Partnership shall be required to inquire 
into the authority of the General Partner to take any action or make any 
decisions. 
12.2 In addition to any other rights and powers which 
it may possess, the General Partner shall have all specific rights and 
powers required for or appropriate to their management and control of 
the Partnership business, including by way of illustration but not by 
way of limitation the following rights and powers, ail costs and ex-
penses in connection with which shall be paid for by the Partnership: 
(a) To borrow money, and, if security is required 
therefor, to mortgage or subject to any other security 
device any portion of the property of the Partnership; 
to obtain replacements of any mortgage or other security 
device, and to prepay, consolidate, or extend any mortgage 
or other security device, all of the foregoing at such 
terms and in such amounts as it deems in its absolute 
descretion to be in the best interests of the Partnership. 
(b) To place record title to, or the right to use, 
Partnership assets in the name of the General Partner or 
the name or names of a nominee or nominees for any purpose 
convenient or beneficial to the Partnership. 
(c) To acquire and enter into any contract of insur-
ance which the General Partner deems necessary and proper 
for the protection of the Partnership, for the conservation 
of its assets, or for any purpose convenient or beneficial 
to the Partnership. 
(d) To employ persons in the operation and management 
of the Partnership properties. Such services may be per-
formed by the General Partner or by companies that are 
affiliated with the General Partner, and standard fees will 
be paid by the Partnership for such services as determined 
by the General Partner. 
(e) To employ attorneys and/or accountants to 
represent the Partnership. 
12.3 The General Partner shall devote himself to the 
Partnership's business to the extent that the General Partner, in his 
sole discretion, determines to be necessary for the efficient conduct 
thereof, but nothing herein contained shall preclude the General Partner 
or any officer, director, employee or other person holding a legal or 
beneficial interest, in or otherwise related to the General Partners 
from engaging or possessing an interest in other business ventures of 
every nature and description, including business ventures substantially 
identical to the Partnership, and neither the Partnership nor the 
Limited Partners shall have amy interest by virture of this Agreement 
in any such other business ventures or the income or profits derived 
therefrom. 
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12.4 The General Partner shall not be liable to the 
Partnership or the Limited Partners for errors in judgment or for any 
acts of oinission, whether or not disclosed, that do not constitute 
willful E?4.sconduct. The Partnership shall indemnify the General 
Partner but only from the assets of the Partnership, against any loss 
or damage incurred by the General Partner by reason of any act performed 
by him in good faith on behalf of the Partnership. 
13. Books of Account, Tax Returns and Reports: 
13.1 The General Partner shall maintain proper books of 
account in accordance with generally accepted accounting open to in-
spection by the Limited Partners at the principal office of the Partner-
ship during normal business hours. The taxable year of the Partnership 
shall be the calendar year unless otherwise determined by the General 
Partner, 
13.2 The General Partner shall supervise the preparation 
and filing of all tax returns for the* Partnership and shall make such 
tax elections and determinations on behalf of the Partnership as appear 
to it to be appropriate. Within a reasonable time prior to April 15 
of each y^ar, the General Partner shall furnish to the Partners all 
necessary tax reporting information with respect to the Partnership. 
13.3 Within a reasonable time after the close of each 
fiscal ye^r, the General Partner shall cause to be mailed to each 
Partner a report of the financial condition of the Partnership as of 
the close of the year and of the results of its operations for such year. 
14. Bank Accounts: All funds of the Partnership shall be 
deposited in the name of the Partnership in such bank account or accounts 
as shall be designated by the General Partners. All withdrawals therefrom 
shall be ihade upon checks signed on behalf of the Partnership by the 
General Partners or such other person or persons designated by the 
General Partner. 
15. Transfer of Partnership Interests: 
15.1 The Partnership interest of the General Partner may 
be assigned, transferred or otherwise disposed of with the consent of a 
majority 4_n interest of the other Partners, which consent shall not be 
unreasonably withheld. 
15.2 The Partnership interest of a Limited Partner may 
be transferred, assigned or otherwise disposed of, either voluntarily 
or involuntarily, with the prior written consent of a majority in interest 
of the Partners, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
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15.3 No assignee of the whole or any portion of a 
Limited Partner's interest in the Partnership shall become a sub-
stituted Limited Partner in the place of his assignor unless the 
following additional conditions are satisfied: 
(a) The assignee shall have executed and 
delivered to the Partnership such instruments as the 
General Partner may deem necessary or desirable to 
effect such transfer and substitution including a 
power of attorney similar in form to that signed by 
the assignor and a writren acceptance and adoption 
by the assignee of the provisions of this agreement. 
(b) The General Partner's consent in writing 
to -the assignee becoming a substituted Limited Partner. 
15.4 Upon the death or legal incompetency of an indi-
vidual Limited Partner (or in the case oft a Limited Partner that is a 
corporation, association, partnership, joint venture, or trust, the 
dissolution of such Limited Partner), the personal representatives, 
guardian or other successor in interest of such Limited Partner shall 
have all of the rights of a Limited Partner for the purposes of 
settling the estate or business of such Limited Partner possessed 
to assign such Limited Partner's interest in the Partnership assignee 
to become a substituted Limited Partner subject to the conditions of 
subsection 15.3. 
16. Admission of New Limited Partners: The General Partner 
shall have the right to cause the Partnership to sell additional interests 
in the Partnership and to admit additional Limited Partners to the Partner-
ship upon such terms and conditions as may be designated by the General 
Partner; provided, however, that the General Partner shall first offer 
such interests to the Partners at the price and upon the terms the General 
Partner proposes to sell such interests. 
17. Dissolution: 
17.1 The Partnership shall be dissolved upon the 
occurrence of any of the following events: 
(a) The expiration of the term .of the Partnership 
specified in Section 6. 
(b) The bankruptcy, receivership, liquidation or 
dissolution of all of the General Partners. 
(c) The resignation of the General Partner unless 
within sixty (60) days after such resignation a successor 
General Partner is elected by a majority in interest of the 
Limited Partners. 
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(d) Sixty (60) days after the General Partner's 
written notice of election to terminate the partnership, 
which written notice may be given to the Limited Partners 
by the General Partner at any time. 
(e) An event which makes it unlawful for the Partner-
ship business to be continued, 
17.2 The Partnership shall not be terminated by the 
death, legal disability, bankruptcy, or dissolution of any Limited 
Partner. 
17.3 Upon dissolution of the Partnership, the General 
Partner shall immediately commence to wind up and liquidate the Partner-
ship business. In liquidating the Partnership business, the General 
Partner may either sell all or part of the Partnership assets and 
distribute the proceeds therefrom, to the extent sufficient, shall be 
applied and distributed in the order provided by law. The General 
Partner shall not be personally liable to the Limited Partners for 
the return of their contributuons unless such insufficiency is the 
result of the willful misconduct of the General Partner. 
18. Amendments: 
18.1 This Agreement may be amended by written consent 
of the Partners owning seventy percent (70%) or more of the interests 
in the Partnership; provided, that to the extent this Agreement is 
used as a certificate of limited partnership for the purpose of filing 
or recording under state law, the General Partner, without the consent 
of any Limited Partners, shall have the right to amend this Agreement 
for the purpose of reflecting the admission, withdrawal, substitution 
or change in capital contribution of a Limited Partner, or any other 
change which the General Partner is authorized to approve. 
18.2 Notwithstanding Section 18.1, no amendment shall 
change the Partnership to a general partnership, change the term of 
the Partnership, or change the liability of the General Partner or the 
limited liability of the Limited Partners. 
^ * Notices: Notices required or permitted by this Agreement 
shall be in writing and shall be sent in the case of the Partnership to 
the principal place of business of the Partnership and, in the case of the 
Limited Partners, to the address of each shown on the records of the 
Partnership. 
2°- Validity: If any provision of this Agreement or the 
application of such provision to any person or circumstances shall be 
held invalid, the remainder of this Agreement or the application of 
such provisions to persons or circumstances other than those as to 
which it is held invalid shall not be affected thereby. 
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21, Section Headings: All section headings of this Agree-
ment ^re for convenience of reference only and are not intended to 
qualify the leaning of any section. 
22* Binding Effect: This Agreement shall be binding upon 
and shall inure to the benefit of the Partners, their respective 
legal representatives, heirs, successors and assigns. 
23* Governing Lav: This Agreement shall be governed and 
construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
24. Integration: This Agreement contains the entire agree-
ment of the parties and supersedes all prior understandings whether 
written or oral. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this 
Certificate and Agreement of Limited Partnership as of the \/^j-
day of ^ A<vJ2sry>\kiAS 1973. 
ATTEST: 
GENERAL PARTNER: 
/ ^ : c ^ CITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
idd^ By n i c ( 
• /, 
Its r> •; 
>\ 
ATTEST: 
LIMITED PARTNER: 
'A MURPHY | JAY LI
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SS 
On the /
 e<f~ Say of ) Ifriv: w.Lv H / 1978, personally 
appeared before me PO CHENG CHANG, who being by me duly sworn, did 
say that he is the President of CITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a Utah 
Corporation, and that the foregoing instrument was signed on behalf 
of said corporation by authority of its Bylaws or a resolution of 
its Board of Directors, and said officers acknowledged to me that 
said corporation executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
A - H /- "61/ 
"IvC t Yr \ (N-\TL '. ^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC • 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
STATE OF UTAH 
: SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this / pi' day of / / 
MURPHY, 
fi- W •J; w ^ \XS-\J , 1978, personally 
the within instrument, appeared before me, JAY L. the signer of 
who, being duly sowrn, duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same 
and that the statements set forth therein are true. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this O day of 
February, 1982, by and between MING CHENG LIN and KSTUR MEI YEN 
LIN, (collectively referred to herein as "Lin") and PO CHENG 
CHANG and BEATRICE H. CHANG (collectively referred to herein as 
"Chang"). 
Recitals 
A. The parties are each shareholders of, or otherwise hold 
a financial interest in, the following coroorate entities* 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT Corporation ("IID"), 
•INTERNATIONAL CONSOLIDATED ENTERPRISES ("ICE"), AMERICAN ESTATE* 
MANAGEMENT("AEM"), and AMERICAN CITY DEVELOPMENT ("ACD"). 
B. The parties,IID, AEM or ACD are partners in the 
following partnership entities: ECHO CREEK RANCH, SOLDIER SUMMIT 
DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, WILSHIRE PLAZA 
DEVELOPMENT, LAS VEGAS ASSOCIATES, LOCAN PLAZA ASSOCIATES, 
HOMESTEAD ASSOCIATES, and LOG HAVEN ASSOCIATES. 
C. The^parties. desire to end certain of their existing 
business relationships, and by this Agreement to express their 
mutual agreement as to the manner in which they shall conduct 
themselves with respect to the aforementioned corporate and 
partnership entities during the duration of the terms of this 
Agreement and to bind themselves as to how their various 
interests are to be divided and distributed or held. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and 
undertakings contained herein, it is agreed between the parties 
as follows: 
1. Acknowledgement of Recitals. The parties hereby 
stipulate and acknowledge that each and every fact or statement 
set forth in the Recitals of this Agreement is true. 
i^ *— 2rr -6-aULlUUaULdi l i jE -Order Si Th* T e m p o r a r y Rp <r T rmvfj2_CL OTHO'*" 
and Order both dated January 29, 1982 J^_suejLJ>y—ch~e"~'Third 
Judicial District Court in and^x^5^itnia1<eCounty, State of 
Utah in Chang et a lv_j__Xir«--xrC^ aT\ C82-703 shall remain in effect 
until s a i d ^ dismissed pursuant to the terms of this 
Agregjae^rt^nd the hearing presently scheduled for February 8/ 
l~5^X7~"~Tir'"tIiii 'ctLLiun ohall be continued-without dato-^  . 
3. Communications With Employees -e-g—Other Third Farticai 
The parties and each of them agree not to communicate in any way 
with any employee /-e~g—a-ay—third—party; with respect to the 
Businesses, except to the extent of communications made in the 
ordinary course of business, or except to make a statement 
substantially as follows: "A difference in business philosophies 
has arisen between us, and we are in the process of examining our 
business relationship to determine the extent to which, if any, 
it will be maintained. Pursuant to negotiations, we may, as to 
some or all of our mutual enterprises, divide our assets and go 
each his separate way." In no event shall one party disparage, 
r 
W»(/l -f^Uu.
 5 U u ^ AX-rfliv^ aJ^ 
:Ut Ss 
L:. „.M 
. /u 
4-. 
maiign, or in any way detract from the businessor professional 
reputation of the other. 
ft. Chang's Obligation to Manage and Report.v For ,the 
period commencing with the da.ce of this Agreement and continuing 
uncil<-?ebiniary=5'8T-i»2' '(the "Closing Date") Chang shall manage 
the day-to-day. operations of ^ the Businesses. U*-f si^ll K & L ^ , 
Line of Credit. Lin shall execute s uch inst ruments or 
agreements and take such actions as may be necessary or 
appropriate to maintain the line of credit with Commercial 
Security Bank which line of credit exists for the benefit of ICE; 
Provided that Chang shall indemnify Lin against any liability or oss with respect to such line of credit.A 
6. Intercorporate Transfer of Assets. Prior to the 
Closing Date, IID, Lin or ACD shall transfer, convey or assign 
(or cause to be transferred, conveyed or assigned) to AEM the 
following properties: 
(a) Real property located at 3772 South 2300 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(b) Real property known as the Twin Falls K-Mart 
corner lot, Twin Falls, Idaho. 
(c) Improved real property known as Highland Terrace 
Apartment Complex, Salt Lake City, Utah. £-,„, «v5 »--<:* -U y ^ 
i L^_ «.{«.•**•»- - ? . - - K — rx**.L w y . . , cv, Hv,u -j>%^ j>.../y (* if* 0+1 u;c. •••.«.. ) . 
(d) All shares of the common stock at Prudential 
Federal Savings & Loan owned or held by IID. 
(e) An undivided twenty-five percent (25Z) interest in 
all cash, savings accounts, checking accounts, receivables-
and similar 'assets held or owned, either directly or 
indirectly by IID as of the Closing Date; provided such 
amount shall 2equal—a.£—least— £20-> 000-., •.,—» / r . 
^-s.c*- fez.. W-vs -iwUs.. lir- *—:—J-c/f. y** o, / 
(f) The Cadillac and the Impala Chevrolet station 
wa ragon currently owned by IID and driven by Chang. -^ *>.*«. 4- -fc /« ~y 
(g) All office furniture, fixture^^and-"lequipmen^'J% 'ft/. 1:11 ^ 
located at 1360 Beneficial Life Tower and the interest of*: 11-.' 
IID as tenant under the-lease for such premises, 4«*icr/Urr--o t k^ 
<h) Fee interest in and to certain real property known ^Tlf-
as View Crest Lot II located in Salt Lake City, Utah. ^ 
(i) All of that certain real property located in 
Draper, Utah 'owned by IID, it being understood that such 
real property is currently encumbered by a deed of trust 
securing the line of credit to Commercial Security Bank 
referred to in Section 5 above. 
(j) All shares of stock in ICE owned by IID. 
_£> Ht-) Forrtrr percent- (^01) erf--the- Crctjj *r i l iuu , " i ! i 
amounts_j3iTQd to—IID bv Hbi>>oscead A s s o c i a t e s . J"\,v ^^ t*~*-' 
f
--r^7rJr^',K "*~' *7 ^^ ^ y-" |J^-'—frfrfti—\u» £•)/—f^ i^ P. 
(1) An Interest as a gen V*il par tner In Soldier s 
Summit Development Company equal to a -^ e-R percent f£SZ) 
Ojs.'^.j- ->lyJL.\\ 
\0 -flAC C2^-UK4- yo-S^i^lc, bald 4-VM^ S-T^ -Ji ^U^tl l»«.| 
^fo. -4^-**p0 
interest in the^ capital, profits and losses and 
distributions in such partnership. y gvc<^ AS z^fc+lly ***oL 
All of the foregoing transfers, conveyances/or assignments shall 
be by special warranty deed;Kin the case of (personal property, czs 
an equivalent bill of sale or assignment. • Personal property 
shall be transferred or assigned subject to no liens or 
encumbrances* Seal property shall be transferred subject only to 
encumbrances of record in favor parties not constituting Lin 
Affiliates (as that term is# defined in Section SJ/r-TJ,- xx"D -cS—— 
7. Interest in Echo Creek Ranch. Prior to the closing AEM 
shall transfer and assign to IID a portion of its interest in 
Echo Creek Ranch, a Utah limited partnership, equal Co thirty 
percent (201) of AEM's total interest therein(i.e., a ten percent 
(10Z) interest in Echo Creek Ranch); provided all of the interest 
so transferred shall be an interest as a limited partner in Echo 
Creek Ra/KchTTN) 
"cellation of Debt. As of the Closing Date, all si 
owing by fc'ICE, AEM, or Po and Beatrice Chang to IID or a "Lin-
Affiliate"
 %shall be cancelled and forgiven. For purposes of this 
Agreement fhe following, and each of them shall constitute "Lin 
Affiliates^ V'» : ; t >y^M : S, ' 1 !>. ,[ ^ L ^  < A ^ +< fa 
(a) Ming Cheng Lin, Hsiun Mei Yen Lin, Tsu-Yen Lin, 
Wan-Cien Lin, Tsu-Yu Lin, G-H-7=Lin, T.Y. Lin, Lily Ngan; 
(b) Any brother or sister of the persons referred to 
in (a) above; 
(b); 
(c) Any spouse of the persons referred to in (a) or 
(d) Any ancestor or descendent of any of the persons 
referred to in (a), (b) or (c); 
(e) Any trust for the benefit of, any corporation the 
shares of which are owned by, or any partnership (whether 
general or limited) or similar unincorporated entity any 
interest in which is owned by: any person described in 
(a)-(d) above or any entity described in this subsection. 
Lin warrants that no obligation owing to IID or a Lin Affiliate 
had been transferred assigned.pledged or otherwise alienated. 
9. J Homestead. The parties shall continue#to own their 
v
 V current interest in Homestead^Associates provided* that1Po Chang •-» 
[/I 3hall---continue-to manage*'"'the1 ciay to day operations of such 
partnership and Lin hereby consents to such day to day operation 
by Changl -P-rior- to Clogjng a manafipment agroomont evidencing the 
foregoing—ohall—bet entered—into—ky—Horses tend—Associates—and 
JrH^fHwJ' In the event future capital is required to operate 
Homestead Associates, the parties shall provide the same In 
proportion with their respective ownership. . , . . . i, , 
^ t > *,r«, \. I,..-!. : , ^ j . S —l V f r f ' , C...I J I-V ^ « fl.Cyio. 
10. Soldier's Summit. Prior to the Closing Lin shall cause 
an irrevocable and nonterminable agreement to be entered Into-
between Soldier's Summit Development Company and Chang the terra 
of which shall be thirty (30) years pursuant to which Chang shall 
be paid a consulting fee equal to two percent (2Z) of the gross^ 
1 / 
u 4j;\~e*3 4-
-^ . - ^. 
Ot-v • dtK-c.-Ka 
cicJo4- <n>>«-cL L^y 
sales price of the real property owned by said Partnership which 
shall be secured by the real property.—l 
11. Closing, The consummation of the transactions 
contemplated by this Agreement is referred to herein as the 
"Closing." The Closing shall occur on March 1, 1982 (the 
"Closing Date"). Prior to the Closing the matters set forth in 
Sections 6-10 above shall have been accomplished? provided that 
the completion of such items is specifically enforceable and is 
not a condition to Closing. At the Closing the shares of AEM 
held by IID shall be distributed to Chang in full redemption of 
all shares of IID owned by Chang. At the Closing Chang shall 
assign to ^ ££3 all of his interest as a partner in Log Haven 
Associates (and Lin shall assign to Chang all of h'is interest as a 
partner in {International Property Management. ^V6-^  a*Vl'5UM<iM'+ 5UA^ ^ , 
12. Operating Deficits. Lin snail pay to IID, AEM, ACD, 
££?, -Ue^£^^0 A&8fr&tigS3, and LOG HAVEN ASSOCIATES as of the 
date of this Agreement and shall continue to pay to such entities 
through the Closing all amounts necessary to discharge 
obligations of such entities now due or falling due during such 
period and to meet all operating costs and expenses not 
discharged out of current operating revenue; provided the parties 
shall each pay their pro rata share of the obligations and 
expenses of Homestead Associates from and after January 1, 1982. 
13. Intent. The parties intend that the distribution of 
shares in lC£ and AEM to Chang in total redemption of his shares 
in IID shall constitute a tax free corporate division within the 
provisions of Section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 
as amended. The transactions contemplated by this Agreement 
shall to the fullest extent possible be consummated and 
documented in a manner that qualifies for such treatment. 
14. Remedies for Violations Hereof. Each of the parties 
shall have~ in the event of a violation of any term or covenant 
of this Agreement by any other party, all remedies available in 
law or in equity, including but not limited to specific 
performance of this Agreement, in which the parties and subject 
matter are unique. 
15. Mutual Releases. As of the Closing Date Lin and the 
Lin Affiliates (and the entities to be owned or partially owned 
by Lin or Lin Affiliates after the closing) on the one hand and 
Chang (and the entities to be owned or partially owned by Chang) 
on the other hand do release and forever discharge * each of the 
others of, from and against any and all claims, demands, causes 
of action, obligations, damages and liabilities of any nature 
whatsoever, whether or not now known, suspected,| or claimed, 
which they and each of them ever had, now has, or may hereafter 
have, or claim to have against the others, or any of them, based 
upon facts in existence as of the closing date arising out of, or 
in any manner connected with the Businesses described in the 
Recitals, or any transaction in which they have engaged (the 
"Released Matters"), provided, however, that the foregoing 
release shall not apply to obligations specifically set forth In 
this Agreement or in the partnership agreements of Homestead 
Associates, Soldier Summit Development Company, Echo Creek Ranch 
and/or Logan Plaza Associates. 
16. Assumption of Liability by Lin. Lin assumes and agrees 
to hold Chang harmless from each and every liability and 
r ~4~ • 
obligation of IID and ACtf in existence at or arising after the 
Closing Date; provided that this provision shall not be construed 
as creating any right in or obligation to a third party. 
17. Assumption of Liability by Chang. Chang assumes and 
agrees to hold Lin harmless from each and every liability and 
obligation of ICE and AEM in existence at or arising after the 
Closing Date provided that this provision shall not be construed 
as creating any right in or obligation to a third party, 
18. Indemnification by Lin. Lin hereby covenants, promises 
and agrees to indemnify, defend and hold Chang and its affiliates 
harmless from and against any and all claims, demands, suits, 
causes of action, proceedings, judgment, losses, and liabilities, 
including reasonable counsel fees incurred in litigation or 
otherwise assessed, incurred or sustained by or against Chang 
with respect to or arising out of any of the Released Matters/^-"! 
any liability, loss or expense of IID or ACD arising after the \ 
Closing Date and any liability described in Section 16. l £<*.«* -i^ u-^-vV.^ 
19. Indemnification by Chang. Chang hereby covenants, ^ r \ w | ^ i 
promises a n d ^ a g j f ^ to indemnify, defend and hold Lin and each 
Lin Affiliate^"trom and against any and all claims, demands, 
suits, causes of action, proceedings, judgments, and liabilities,-- -
including reasonable counsel fees incurred in litigation or 
otherwise assessed, incurred or sustained by or against Lin_with 
respect to or arising out of any of the Released Matters^ ~any ^ 
liability loss or expense of AEM arising after the Closing Date" ) 
and any "liability described in Section 17,1 -- - *-( ^ s. -U v^^cA. L»^ 
— 1 U.^s L,^ n r^ fc-v* 
20. Survival of Indemnification. The foregoing 
indemnifications, covenants and promises shall survive the 
execution of this Agreement and the Closing Date. 
21. Applicable Law. This Agreement has been made and 
executed in the State of Utah and shall be construed in 
accordance with and governed by the laws of the State of Utah 
except that its choice of laws rules shall not -be applied. 
22. Binding Effect Upon Successors. This Agreement shall 
be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties and their 
respective heirs, executors, administrators, successors, legal 
representatives and assigns. 
23. Integration. This Agreement constitutes the entire 
agreement among the parties pertaining to the subject matter 
hereof, and supersedes all prior agreements and understandings 
pertaining thereto. No covenant, representation or condition not 
expressed in this Agreement shall affect or be deemed to 
interpret, change or restrict the express provisions hereof. The 
failure of any party to inspect the documents referred to herein 
constitutes a waiver of any objection, contention or claim that 
may be based upon such an inspection.
 t-)— 
I 
24. Lease. Lin and IID agree at the Closing to enter into 
a lease with ICE covering the space presently occupied by'ICE and 
Flower Gallery in the Broadway Building having the following 
fundamental terms: (1) the term of said lease shall be 16^years 
following the Closing, (2) rent shall be $1,000.00 per month 
payable in advance, (3) the lease shall be terminable by ICE upon 
60 days notice, but shall not be terminable by the landlord, (A) 
ICE shall be responsible for utilities and landlord shall be 
-5-
c ^SP CCv-cvlsw* -K-4, I*-A_S<S<J T)vJ.t^iy^.\# 
>y 
ceIAtaxes,land.other expenses relating responsible for %all insurance 
to such space. (5") L*~dlay4 a^-4-^ "P^V 
IN WITNESS HEREOF, this Agreement has T>een executed aa of r ht 
the day and year first above written. 
(Dace) 
ZS~. D^ ig'i Tw-J>-^ A.. SaWi'ca-3 Uoen>j*^-
MING CH cr 
-Ml 
6.LU. 
X u* 
: & ; 
4* x ^ *-a 
0 ^ *$*<* ^  ^ ^ ^ -^<£ cfeJlW* 4^ 
'h ice . 
i.I-^.Sr c^Wrv 7>t»c\ Tv*vy»*^C&- d^J. 
HSIUN M£I YEN LJT^— "Date) 
J2 
TSU-YEN LIN 
WAN-CIEN LIN 
TSU-YU LIN 
By 
v 
Trustee 
f* 
' - ? ? • > 
Agent and 
BEA: 
Trustee 
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FIRST AMENDMENT 
TO 
CERTIFICATE AND AGREEMENT 
OF 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
OF 
SOLDIER SUMMIT DEVELOPMENT 
We, the undersigned, previously foraed a Limited 
Partnership (the "Partnership") by filing a Certificate and 
Agreement of Limited Partnership (the "Partnership Agreement") 
with the clerk of Salt Lake County, State of Utah on November 2, 
1978, as File No. 13249, and now desire to amend such Certificate 
and Agreement as follows: 
1. The opening paragraph setting forth the names of 
the partners is hereby amended to state as follows: 
"THIS CERTIFICATE AND AGREEMENT OF LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP (the "Agreement") is entered into b^ and 
among AMERICAN CITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a 'Utah 
corporation (referred to herein as the "General 
Partner"), and JAY L. MURPHY, PO CHENG CHANG, and 
BEATRICE H. CHANG (referred to herein as the "Limited 
Partners") for the purpose of forming a limited 
partnership (the "Partnership") which shall be subject 
to the following terms and conditions:" 
2.. Paragraph 4 is hereby amended to state as follows: 
"4. Principal Place of Business: The 
principal place or business or the 
Partnership shall be at 2059 East 3900 South, 
Suite 101, Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84117 
or at such other place as the General Partner 
may designate from time to time by written 
notice to the Limited Partners. The General 
Partner may, at his discretion, also 
establish additional places of business from 
time to time/1 
3. Paragraph 5 is hereby amended to state 
as follows: 
"5. Partners: The name and residence address 
(or in the case or a partnership or corporation, its 
principal place of business) of the General Partner 
is : 
NAME ADDRESS 
American City 
Development Corporation 
2059 East 
Suite 101 
Salt Lake 
3900 
Citv 
South 
, UT 84117 
follows: 
The name and residence address (or in the case of a 
partnership or corporation, its principal place of 
business) of the Limited Partner is: 
NAME ADDRESS 
Jay L. Murphv 797 17th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Po Cheng Chang 1360 Beneficial Life Towe: 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake Citv, UT 84111 
Beatrice H. Chang 1360 Beneficial Life Tcwe: 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
4. Subparagraph 7.?. is hereby amended to state as 
"7.2 The respective interests of the 
Partners in the capital and the profits and 
losses of the Partnership shall be as 
follows: 
CASH PERCENTAGE 
PARTNER CONTRIBUTION INTEREST 
American City Development 5270,000.00 81.00 
Corporation 
Jay L. Murphy 30,000.00 10.00 
Po Cheng Chang 250.00 4.50 
Beatrice H. Chang 250.00 4.50 
TOTAL $300,500.00 100.00" 
5, Notwithstanding any other provision of the 
Partnership Agreement, any and all debts, obligations, 
liabilities, bills, costs or expenses of the Partnership (whether 
known or unknown) incurred or arising prior to March 1, 1982 and 
interest accruing thereon after March i, 1982 (the "Pre-Existing 
Obligations") shall be borne and discharged by the General 
Partner .and Jay L. Murphy in the ratio that their respective 
percentage interests bear to one another. All allocations of 
profit and loss and distributions shall be computed as though the 
Pre-Existing Obligations were the individual obligations of the 
General Partner and Jay L. Murphy in such proportions, and the 
amounts that would otherwise be distributed to the General 
Partner and Jay L. Murphy shall be used to pay the Pre-Existing 
obligations. To the extent that the amounts allocated to the 
General Partner and Jay L. Murphy are not sufficient to discharge 
the Pre-Existing obligations, the General Partner and Jay L. 
Murphy shall contribute to the Partnership (without affecting the 
rights of the other Partners) sufficient cash to discharge the 
Pre-Existing obligations as they fall due. Except to the extent 
set forth above, the Partners shall each bear their Dro-rata 
-2-
share of any liabilities, obligations, debts or similar items 
arising on or after March 1, 1982. 
6. Subparagraph 10.3 is hereby amended to state as 
follows: 
"10.3 Allocations of Distributions. 
All distributions made pursuant to this 
Section 10 shall be allocatec as follows: 
(a) The Partners shall first 
receive an amount equal to their total 
cash capital contributions to the 
Partnership up to that time as reduced 
by all cash contributions theretofore 
made to then pursuant to this Agreement; 
except that for purposes of this 
Subsection (a) it shall be assumed that 
the initial cash contribution of Po 
Cheng Chang was $13,500.00 and that the 
initial cash contribution of Beatrice K. 
Chang was $13,500.00. 
(b) The amount of any distribu-
tions in excess of the amounts dis-
tributed pursuant to Subsection (a) 
above shall be allocated among the 
Partners in proportion to their re-
spective interests in the Capital and 
Profits and Losses of the Partnership." 
7. Except as specifically amended hereby, the 
provisions of the above-described Certificate and Agreement of 
Limited Partnership of Soldier Summit Development shall remain in 
full force and effect. 
EXECUTED as of the date first set forth above. 
GENERAL PARTNER: 
AMERICAN CITY DEVELOPMENT 
ATTEST: CORPORATION 
~ Its: JTv&r •" 
7 
LIMITED PARTNERS: 
P0 CpJC cAm " A (date) 
Px 
BEATRICE H. CHANG (dape) 
yLU it 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On Che [$+ day of Mink , 1982, oersonallv 
appeared before me /fo- C£.V*.J> ll+\\ry Y*.^  » w'ao being by me 
duly sworn did say chac he Is che P^;^*.*^ ^__ of 
AMERICAN CITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and Che roregoins document 
was signed in behalf of said corporacion by auchoricy of a resolu-
tion of ics board of directors and said AJv*» - CU^a l-hnry V«e* 
acknowledged co me Chac said corporacion execucea che same. 
IC, res id ing m 
rJi uu co:. vki, 
My coirnission exp i re s : 
WO ///*r 
- 4 -
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this Aj day of y ^ ^ V / O 
"CHENG CHANT/ the si 
1982, personailv 
gner of the foregoing appeared before me PC instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the 
same. 
My commission expires: 
s/ // 
NpTARY/ PUBLIC /"rersidin& in 
ss /,U - /.>/>/ M. 
/ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this /</ day of ^/>y^/</ , 1982, personally 
appeared before me BEATRICE H. CfyANG, the signer of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the 
same. 
My commission expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC,/residing in 
/ • • / , 7 , , .' 
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A. Water Report 
1. One hundred forty four acre feet of water is currently 
available for use. Thirty eight acre feet has been deeded 
to county- Current plans call for the water to be used 
to developer 
500 recreational lots 
80 high density lots 
1 Motel 
2. Water rights can be pruchased for future higher density 
developments. 
3. Plans for the water system have a pickup station where 
owners can obtain clean water from a holding tank. This 
sysem will be designed and implemented by Uintex. 
4. The water system will be subject to an inspection by the 
county once it serves more than 15 families. 
HUD Application 
1. Once FTJD has approved the development of the project; state, 
county and city offices are expected to follow suit. 
2. To get approval from HUD the following information and im-
provements are needed. 
a. Financial disclosures 
b. Improvements 
1. Roads need to be rough cut and graveled in certain 
areas. 
2. Water culverts need to be installed 
3. Water stations need to be made available to the 
owners• 
4. Water needs to be deeded to the water district. 
5. A title report needs to be prepared within 20 days 
of applications. 
C. Owners Association 
1. The articles of Incorporation of the Association should 
have a provision for allowing future developed properties 
.to join the membership. 
2. It should also allow the management of the association 
to be transferred to the owners after approximately 25% 
of the lots have been sold. 
BUSINESS PLAN 
SOLDIER SUMMIT DEVELOPMENT 
MARCH 11, 1985 
,Executive Summary 
In reference to maximizing the value of the property in 
Soldier Summit, the current mode of development may not 
have made the best use of the land resources. We recom-
mend that a master plan be considered for the whole pro-
ject. Plat C should be developed to (1) test the mark-
et, (2) to raise some fund for the master plan and (3) 
to recover the investment. A business plan is drafted 
as a starting point for discussion: Short term and long 
term goals are identified. Market research needs are 
discussed. Production activities for 1985 are outlined. 
Marketing tasks are described. A cash flow projection 
is tabulated. And finally work schedule is designed. 
1 . Concept 
The concept of this project is to provide well planned 
premier recreation property. If this concept is also to produce 
the maximum amount of profit with the available land resources, 
we need to re-evaluate whether the currently approved Plats C 
and D is the best way to go. In view of the outstanding phys-
cial assets of the project it is advisable to look into other 
possibilities at this early stage of the development before we 
proceed to complete Plats C and D. 
The present development concept - Plats C and D as approved 
is basically the same as that of Echo Creek Ranch: subdivide 
and sell lots. I believe that Soldier Summit has features far 
superior than that of Echo Creek Ranch. We may not have made 
the best use of the land resources under Plat C/D subdivision. 
The greates.t strength of this project is the fact that (1) 
it is under one ownership and (2) the size is large and there is 
enough latitude for large scale planning. Total acres of the 
project are comparable to the combined area of Park City and 
Park West. There is opportunity to plan the project in the 
style of Aspen, Colorado, or Irvine, California. Other assets 
of Soldier Summit Development include: 
Seclusion of property (by railroad) from public. 
Proximity to Scofield Reservoir. 
Neighboring proposed Indian Eead Reservoir. 
-* Business Plan *- 3/11/85 
Land for summer resort development 
Slopes for ski development, ranging from 20Z^to 30Z. 
Relative easy access through highway 6 or railroad. 
Snowmobiling already popular in the area. 
Exhibit A shows some features of other ski resorts in Utah. 
Compare them with Soldier Summit's and you will find that Sol-
dier Summit Development offers a truely all-season recreation: 
boating, fishing, golfing, hiking, skiing, snowmobiling. 
2. Objectives 
Soldier Summit Development has both long term and short 
term objectives. The short term objective is to recover the 
investment and become a self-sustained economic entity by the 
end of 1987. The long term goal of the development is to 
achieve a 30-to-300 million dollar company by 1995. 
The short term development goal can be sequentially accom-
plished in three phases: 
(1) Phase 1 (1985): Develop Plat C and sell 15 lots. Complete 
master plan. 
(2) Phase 2 (1986): Sell 15 lots. Get approval of master plan. 
(3) Pahse 3 (1987): Sell 15 lots. Design facilities under mas-
ter plan. Estimate costs. 
The revenue from the sales of Plats C should be sufficient 
to recover owner's investment and have left-over for the 
master planning. The goal should be at least 2 million 
dollars. 
If the short term goals are completd as scheduled, the rest 
of the work is to carry out the master plan. We expect to redo 
Plat D as a planned unit development. Plat D and area west of 
it will be reserved for resorts where a resident would step out 
of his/her door and ski. 
We expect that the area in Wasatch County will be reserved 
for golf course recreation homes or lake front vacation homes* 
3. Market Analysis 
We will engage a local reserach institution to perform 3 
preliminary market analysis. As needs develop, we will then 
hire a national company to perform a more precise study. The 
market segment has to be the upper income class or corporations. 
The market analysis will be performed in 1985 before we formu-
late our master plan. 
-* Business Plan *- 3/11/85 
We know that Utah's ski industry is growing. In 1983, 
there were 2.4 million skier visits; and the in-state visitors 
and the out-of-state visitors roughly split the total. A Utah 
visitor would spend $19 per day versus $74 per day for out-of-
state visitors. In 1983, total revenue of the ski industry was 
110 million dollars, of which the out-of-state skiers contri-
buted 80Z. It is believe that ski dollars has increased consid-
erably since 1983. Host of the ski resorts are overflowing with 
skiers. 
Profiles of buyers at Echo Creek Ranch, Jeremy Ranch, Park 
City's Resort Center (see Exhibit B) and other developments 
should be consulted. We need to determine our market segment: 
upper income class or middle income class, Utah buyers or out-
of-state buyers . 
We believe that the lots in Plat C should be sold at 50,000 
apiece with 10,000 downpayment. The tasks of market analysis 
for 1985 are: 
301 Seek and engage consultants 
302 Market analysis reports 
4. Product ion 
We believe that quality of development is essential. We 
must establish our credibility as a quality developer to gain 
the trust of county officials. 
We will request for an extention of the road improvement of 
Plat C until 1986, synchronizing with the sale volume. We will 
finish about half of the road improvement in 1985. The water 
pick-up station will be finished in 1985. 
Producing the naster plan will be an important undertaking 
for 1985. The tasks for 1985 are: 
401 Water pick-up station 
402 Road improvement, 1st mile 
403 Master plan, conceptual 
404 Coordination with counties 
405 Master plan, preliminary 
5. Marketing 
For 1985, our goal is to sell 15 lots in Plat C. We will 
concentrate our effort on the upper income segment in Utah and 
other major metropolis. The tasks identified include: 
Bro chures 
Recruit sal eman 
Business Plan *- 3/11/85 
Advertising 
Strategic planning 
6. Organization 
?• Cash. Flow Projection for 1985 
-* Business Plan *- 3/11/85 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1. Market conditions indicate that there is a substantial amount 
of risk in the development of any recreational land. This is 
highlighted by the subjective nature of the buying process and 
the lack of demand for recreational land at this time. 
2. The absorption for this development will not be quick. Rec-
reational land is no longer fueled by the speculation buyer, 
therefore a rapid sellout is not reasonable to expect. In the 
best case scenario 20-30 lots per year will be sold in the 88 
lot phase of development• 
3. If developed, an important key to success for this develop-
ment will be to create a very believeable image of a financially 
secure development company. This will be accomplished 
principally in the way the property is presented and promoted. 
4. There will be two principal target markets for the lots. The 
counties of Utah, Carbon, Emery, Wasatch and Sanpete will be the 
major target markets. The Wasatch Front cities will be a secon-
dary target market, but will not contribute as much in sales as 
the surrounding counties. Out of state marketing will be of very 
limited significance. 
5. The development of a marketing program to create "family 
estates" will be important. Multiple lot purchases by the exten-
ded family will prove desirable to many targeted buyers. A 
family purchase program will need to be part of the marketing 
plan
- &Mee2^tt: 
6. The marketing effort should not be perceived as a "slick" or 
for the perceived costs of a high powered marketing effort, 
7. The sarles and brokerage personnel will be a critical key in 
achieving steady sales. Local brokers as well as onsite sales 
people should be utilized. For continued motivation, adequate 
commissions should be provided as well as a unique bonus program 
to generate continued enthusiasm. 
8. A substantial community center will be necessary and useful. 
It will provide the community its own identity and at the same 
time become a gathering place for owners to rely on for messages, 
emergencies etc. An added benefit will be provided as the commu-
nity center will double as an attractive sales office. This will 
be important in establishing the identity of the community and 
the stability of the developer. 
9. The development must create an identity of its! own and avoid 
association with Soldiers Summit. A community name should be 
created with sub-developments which reference the larger communi-
ty. Example: The Summit of Lost Creek; The Woodlands of Lost 
Creek; The Crested Fork of Lost Creek, etc. A name has yet to 
be finalized. 
10. The property has many of the natural elements needed to 
attract the recreational buyer. However the lack of a stream on 
the property and the lack of immediate proximity to Scofield Lake 
will detract from the desirability to some buyers. The property 
has the minimum acceptable requirements of vrater, access, 
electricity and sewage. The septic tank disclaimer from the 
county will have to be resolved prior to marketing. 
11, The most difficult problem posed by this project is to 
establish the pricing. Because of the lack of immediate compar-
ables, the pricing will drift to what the market will bear. The 
price range that has been developed is from $13,000 to $$37,000, 
or an average of approximately $20,000 per lot (See Exhibit 2). 
Prices can be quickly changed as demand dictates. 
12, Financing will be extremely important to the buyer* It 
should be easy to buy at Scofield Summit, A 10-15% downpayment 
and a 8,75%, 30 year amortization with a 15 year call, will allow 
the prospective buyers to afford monthly payments of $135-$175. 
13* Promotional events should become an integral part of the 
marketing effort* Snowmobiling, cross country skiing events 
should be promoted during the winter months and in the summer 
month promotions of fishing, camping and other outdoor 
recreational events should be attempted. 
14. Consideration should be given to the establishment of a 
recreational vehicle campground. This would serve as a staging 
area for the overall development and if successful will turn into 
a strong cash generator. 
V>Uini2J^Ar^ 
MARKET RESEARCH 
KM062544-
There have been a number of recreational land developments 
which, in the past, have not met with success in the state of 
Utah. The recreational land boom lost much of its success in the 
1979-82 era of economic adjustment. Indeed all real estate 
underwent a major transformation. That transformation seems to 
be principally complete and the days of rapid speculation in 
nearly all types of real estate are for the most part over. 
Early recreational projects were fueled by speculation. In 
today!s more conservative market, the speculative buyer is no 
longer creating unjustified demand. 
In a county by county search of new recreational land 
developments conducted in November 1985, there appears to be 
little new recreational land planned for development in Utah for 
1986-1987. In checking Salt Lake, Sanpete, Carbon, Utah, Emery, 
Sevier, Summit, and Wasatch counties, there appears to be only 
three other developments of recreational land to be developed in 
the near future. 
In Sevier County, there will be a 318 lot subdivision, near 
Salina, started in 1986. The first phase of Mount Air Oaks, over 
1600 acres, will be approximately 80 lots. They will be five 
acres in size and have been approved for cabins with septic tanks 
and wells. The developers have installed a water pickup station 
and oiled roads will provide year round access. Having not 
visited the site, I am advised that it features desirable natural 
landscaping of aspen and pine and a very small Scootum Par 
reservoir for fishing. The developers will sell the lots for 
In Summit County, there has been approved a 2500 acre site 
near Tollgate Canyon (near Park City). This site will be devel-
oped as a PUD and will require a substantial amount of work 
before any physical development can begin. The developers will 
be required to put in a complete water system for the develop-
ment. It seems doubtful that this development will occur before 
1987. There will be substantial front end cost to this 
development. 
Also in Summit County there will be a major new recreational 
development by a Dutch group. Known as the Mayflower develop-
ment, this 5400 acre project will be a multi faceted project 
which will boast a year round recreational opportunity. The 
project will range from single family lots to multifamily condo-
miniums and feature a complete commercial development. The site 
is unique as it will front on the new Jordanelle dam now under 
construction. The project will be able to offer every type of 
recreational activity as it has access to the Deer Valley skiing 
areas and all the activities that Park City has to offer. 
Development plans remain uncertain as the developers are 
reportedly very concerned with the overall marketability of this 
major recreational development. Indeed the present condition of 
the Park City area and its continuing deterioration should cause 
any developer second thoughts prior to embarking on a major 
development of this type. No prices are available at this time, 
however construction of the infrastructure is to begin this 
summer and marketing of the commerciaJ pads is expected to 
commence fall of 1986. Final configuration of the development 
and its various aspects should take place in 1987. 
There are two existing recreational land areas which should 
be briefly reviewed. Both Summit County and East Canyon resort 
have had lackluster performance over the past few years relative 
to the absorption of the recreational land available. 
There presently exists an substantial amount of recreational 
land available in Summit County. This has been a result of 
ambitious development aimed at the Wasatch Front buyer. There is 
simply too much product to be absorbed by the urbanized 
population of Salt Lake City, Ogden and Provo. The target 
market may well be unwilling to purchase land "fee simple" when 
there are already so many attractive alternatives available such 
as timeshare rentals, condominiums, rental cabins etc. to be 
used. 
The East Canyon Resort, near Morgan, is a large 10,000 acre 
development which was started over four years ago. It has not 
enjoyed success and is presently attempting to regroup and re-
capitalize to continue its' marketing effort. The development 
has been sold similar to a time share concept with owners buying 
a 14 day use privilege for $17,000. The annual fee is $245, 
which enables owners to enjoy condominiums, campsites, summer and 
winter sports. The East Canyon Resort has the capacity to 
accommodate 10,000 buyers, to date they have sold 2,000. This 
project will not be a directly competing development with 
Scofield Summit, as the buyer profiles are entirely different. 
The lack of success of this project may be attributable to the 
down fall of the time share industry specifically the decline of 
absorption problems Summit County has for recreational property. 
There may be just too many already developed recreational 
alternatives for the Wasatch Front buyer/user to enjoy which 
require much less time and effort to become involved with* 
In the immediate area of Scofield Summit, there is only one 
small development of recreational lots available* The [Mountain 
Home subdivision on the west side of Scofield lake is approx-
imately 10 years old and has only a few lots currently available. 
They are small 1/2 acre lots which are selling for $9,000-$11,000 
with no terms available. This development will not be a serious 
competitive factor. 
Overall, from a product standpoint, there will not be a 
substantial amount of competing projects to be concerned with. 
However, this primarily reflects the overall condition of the 
market. Market demand is a a low ebb .for recreational type 
property and any development should be undertaken with caution 
and a long term commitment. 
i/LLCLA 
THE MARKETING PLAN 
There exists six basic functions in the marketing of any 
project. They are: 1) Identifying the primary and secondary 
markets; 2) Creating the advertising and merchandising to 
attract sufficient prospects to the property; 3) Qualifying the 
prospect; 4) Demonstrating the property and its potential 
benefit to the buyer; 5) Closing the sale, 6) Followup 
marketing with existing buyers. 
The most important aspect of the marketing plan is first to 
identify the markets which are most likely to respond to the 
marketing program and then to create an advertising campaign 
which will illicit a response from the targeted buyer* 
There exists two primary markets and a limited number of 
secondary target markets for Scofield Summit Estates. These 
various markets will be isolated and examined and then blended 
into an overall marketing plan. 
One of the primary markets that this development will appeal 
to is the existing population of the surrounding counties. Those 
counties will be Utah, Carbon, Sanpete, Wasatch and Emery. This 
targeted market has the advantage of knowing the peculiarities of 
the area better than any other group. This targeted buyer will 
know for example the impact the weather patterns have upon the 
area, the best areas for hunting and fishing and how seasonal 
changes impact outdoor recreational opportunities. They will 
have a good idea as to the recreational areas which are near the 
property. They will also have the best subjective feel for the 
overall desirability of the property. 
the four county area is expected to grow slowly at under 2% per 
year through the year 2000. Historically, strong population 
growth has not been a particular characteristic of recreational 
land being absorbed. This is because of the need for the 
existing population base to have the recreational experience. In 
this case the growth can only help in the absorption of the 
project as new growth will provide new prospects• 
The five county area, with the exception of the Provo area 
is comprised of a workforce which is predominantly more blue 
collar than professional. This blue collar worker has 
historically had a much higher involvement with outdoor 
recreational activities such as fishing and hunting. As a target 
market they will be responsive to the concept of owning their own 
recreational acreage. It is important to note that this buyer is 
urbanized in smaller cities throughout the immediate counties. 
Their principal real estate holdings are in their homes. They do 
not own large acreage outside of their principal dwelling. A 
development which provides an easy access of ownership will allow 
this target buyer to become his own "land baronrT. This will have 
substantial appeal to ones status and identity. A development of 
recreational property which is subjectively attractive to this 
buyer and provides ease of purchase will have demand from this 
market segment. 
It should be noted, however, that Carbon and Emery counties 
have a very unsteady economy. The coal mining industry has had a 
number of layoffs and strikes as the demand for Utah coal 
income of prospects from these counties. 
It will not be unusual for this five county primary target 
market to make multiple purchases of recreational land. In Utah, 
the family unit is much more than father, mother and children. 
Often is the case of extended families which include 
grandparents, uncles, aunts and cousins. It is anticipated that 
this extended * family unit will make a purchase of contiguous lots 
thus creating a "family retreat" or a "family estate". This 
should be encouraged and marketed by offering a discount to 
family members if a purchase of a lot is made within a certain 
period of time. A discount of 10% to 15% will encourage multi-
lot purchases by the same family group. The establishment of a 
"family recreational estate" which can be used by any of the 
family members will have great appeal. On a practical level it 
will also spread the responsiblity of ownership and speed the 
overall development of permanent mountain homes, as the financial 
burden can be shared by two or more family groups within a 
family. 
The Wasatch Front buyer will be a secondary market for -the 
project. The cities of Salt Lake, Ogden and Provo comprise the 
bulk of population for the state. Because of the distance 
involved, the Ogden market and northward will not be actively 
cultivated. The Salt Lake City area will provide prospects, 
simply because of the population base there. However, the cost 
to cultivate buyers from Salt Lake City on a non-selective basis 
will Drove to be too exnensive for the Droiect to bpar. The Sale KJAQA^fSS 
information that will pre-qualify him to be interested in owning 
recreational land. This can be done by obtaining lists from the 
state which show fishing and hunting licensees and other lists 
which detail ownership of recreational vehicles and mobile homes. 
At very little expanse, a substantial prospect list of 
recreational users can be obtained from the Salt Lake county 
area. This type of approach to pre-select prospects from the 
Salt Lake county area project will prove to be much more cost 
effective than a blanket advertising and promotion campaign to 
the Wasatch Front buyer. 
This is particularly true when considering the large number 
of competing recreational options, including mountain lots, that 
the Salt Lake county user has. In addition to the Summit County 
and East Canyon areas which have all types of recreational 
opportunities available, there are all the existing recreational 
activities available in the developed canyons. 
The distance from Salt Lake and subsequent drive time to 
Scofield Summit will limit the number of prospects from the Salt 
Lake county area. Because of existing options and the time 
factor, a broad based marketing approach to Salt Lake county 
cannot be justified. 
The financing of the property will be a critical key to its 
marketing. The developer must make it extremely easy for he 
buyer to become involved with ownership at Scofield Summit. This 
is true because typical sources of real estate lending would not 
be favorably inclined to participate in the financing of mountain 
lots at a rate which our target markets could qualify for or ^__. ~ 
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and a 30 year amortization with a 15 year call will make the 
payments of approximately $135—$175 per month affordable. 
The key for success in any development is traffic. People 
must physically visit the site in sufficient numbers for the 
selling function to take place. Hence the advertising and 
promotional elements of a successful marketing program will be 
devised to stimulate the targeted buyer to visit the site. The 
creative -aspects of the advertising program will have to 
stimulate the buyer to take his own time and investigate the 
possibility of owning his own recreational land. 
The advertising campaign for the property should be 
developed jointly by an experienced advertising agency and the 
marketing broker. Although the potential buyers of this type of 
property will shun from flashy and slick promotions, the basic 
ingredients of effective and creative advertising themes cannot 
be minimized. Therefore it will be necessary to involve the 
expertise of those who are experienced in the creation of 
advertising concepts and graphic design. The creative themes once 
developed, can be used in a variety of different and effective 
ways. 
The most effective type of advertising medias to be used for 
this development will be direct mail, radio, print medias and 
signage. From this type advertising effort, it is hopeful that 
substantial word of mouth will also be generated. As illustrated 
in Table 2A,B&C, this media mix will prove to be the most cost 
effective in generating the adequate traffic needed for sales Co 
materialize. As pointed out earlier, the only purpose or Che 
advertising program is to deliver to the site a prospect who is 
willing to let a sales person demonstrate the product. 
One of the advantages of direct mail is the ability to 
pinpoint the targeted buyer* Already this researcher has 
identified available lists of potential recreational land users. 
Additional lists are available for a very small fee. Direct mail 
as an advertising form is relatively inexpensive and if properly 
done can provide substantial traffic to the project. For direct 
mail to be effective, repetition is critical. For this reason, a 
continuing emphasis on the direct mail approach is recommended. 
To reinforce the direct mail program, radio advertising should be 
used also. This is perhaps the most economical form of reaching 
a potential buyer and again has the advantage of being tailored 
to a specific market. The radio stations used will be those 
principally in the major cities of the surrounding counties. 
Because of the location and relative size of these markets, radio 
advertising will prove to be an inexpensive media. Thus it will 
allow a continuing schedule of exposure to the markets targeted. 
When combined with the direct mail program, the rate of 
recognition for the project will be unusually high. The direct 
mail and radio should be coordinated so that maximum exposure is 
gained during peak selling seasons which will be May through 
September. It should be noted, that radio used in the Wasatch 
Front cities, excepting Provo, will not be cost effective and is 
not recommended. 
The use of print media advertising will be explored and 
evaluated as it is used. Print media includes magazines, 
targeted buyer. The principal purpose of print media advertising 
will be to give directions to the project and reinforce the 
direct mail program and the radio. Again, this media should be 
evaluated and eliminated if it is determined that the direct mail 
program is sufficient in directing traffic to the project. 
One additional source of advertising, which is free, is an 
effective public relations campaign at the beginning of the 
marketing of the project. If done properly, substantial 
recognition can be obtained through well orchestrated press 
releases and media coordination. The development*can be treated 
as a news item, which for a very short time will attract public 
attention. A complete public relations campaign should accompany 
the marketing program* 
From Spanish Fork to the development there is a traffic 
count of approximately 4200 vehicles daily. From the property to 
the Carbon County line, there are approximately 4170 vehicles per 
day. One other method of reinforcing all the other types of 
advertising and promotions will be to use adequate signage that 
will take advantage of this traffic flow. At the same time, 
signage will provide the needed directions for prospects to find 
the property. In addition to the major site sign, there should 
be three to four signs from Spanish Fork and also Price. 
Once people have been stimulated to visit the project, the 
principal objective of the advertising has been accomplished. 
Once a prospect has determined to visit the site for an 
inspection, the site presentation and sales personnel become the 
critical ingredients for sales. Kf4tH^?5^^ 
The one adage that is particularly true in a site 
presentation is that ,fyou never have a second chance at a first 
impression.fT So many campaigns fail because of inadequate 
preparation and presentation of the sales office and immediate 
area. 
As indicated previously it will be necessary to establish a 
project sales and community center- This will serve many 
important functions as it will provide the community with its' 
own identity. It will allow owners of the property a center for 
messages and emergencies that may arise. It will also provide 
the proper showcase for the property to be exhibited and 
demonstrated to the prospective buyer. Thus the sales 
office/community center will serve as a multiple use structure 
and should be planned as such. It should have easy access to and 
from the highway and give an immediate sense of the development 
theme and include landscaping. Again the sales office/community 
center should not be located within Soldiers Summit. Using the 
existing master plan, a good location for the sales 
office/community center will be in Area B, just off Highway 6. 
As future phases of the development are introduced it may be 
advantageous to continue to use the same sales office/community 
center. Thus the establishment of the structure should be 
considered over the life of the project. 
Included in Exhibit 1, are various floorplans of 
prefabricated log homes. The cost of this type of structure 
ranges from about $10,000 to $20,000 for the log home package. 
This does not include the earth work, foundation, septic tanfe-h
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structure would cost from $25,000 to $40,000 depending on the 
size and type of finish required. It is recommended that a 
structure of this type be used for Scofield Summit Estates as it 
will create the rustic image that recreational property owners 
will desire and imagine for their own lots. 
The salespeople who are involved with the project will make 
all the difference. The objective of course is to sell 88 lots. 
This can be accomplished by limiting the selling function to one 
or two site salespeople or to expand the sales force and include 
the existing real estate brokerages in the area. 
In some types of projects, it is best to utilize only site 
salespeople and exclude outside brokerages. This is true when 
there is strong demand for product. In the case of Scofield 
Summit Estates it is recommended that both site sales and 
existing brokerages be used in order to maximize the traffic and 
ultimate sales volume. 
Manning the sales office on a regular schedule will allow 
the results of the advertising and promotion campaign to be 
maximized as there will be a sales person there to be continually 
focused on the project. In order to command the attention to 
detail required and to make sure that specific marketing programs 
are carried out, the site salesman will probably need to receive 
a small monthly salary with the bulk of his income to be derived 
from commissioned sales. 
Perhaps the best arrangement that could be made for the 
actual sales management of the project would be to involve one of 
the existing brokerages in the area as the sales agency for the 
development. There exists two or three veteran brokerages who 
have had substantial experience in the selling of all types of 
land in the area. Most importantly, the local brokerages are 
familiar with the local populace and have developed these 
contacts over many years. This cannot be done by advertising. 
The property will need to be demonstrated. Successful 
selling involves the prospect and all of his senses. When the 
prospect visits the sales office, he should be greeted with a 
well organized presentation of the property. The best way to do 
this is with excellent photographs of the property with lots 
overlaid showing the dimension and location within the larger 
development. Once the prospect has been sufficiently qualified, 
the prospect must physically inspect the property. This will 
entail the selling agent to accompany the prospect to the various 
lots and to demonstrate the beauty and desirability of the 
property. To accommodate this, a four wheel vehicle should be 
made available for this purpose. The time to close a sale is 
when the emotions are strong and the objections have been 
eliminated. This will happen most often when the prospect is 
physically on f,his own lot" and imagining his own future cabin. 
In order for any sales operation to be successful, adequate 
compensation must be part of a good marketing program. Because 
of the relatively small price of the lots and the slow absorption 
of the lots, the marketing cost for the project will be high. 
Unfortunately, without adequate compensation to the sales people 
involved, the motivation to ,Tscourff the countryside for 
prosDective buyers will be substantially diminished. In checking 
property, a 6% commission would be adequate motivation. Usually 
the commission for land of this type is about 10%, but because of 
the advertising program which will be carried by the developer, a 
smaller commission structure will be acceptable. 
To reward particularly high sales acheivers, an extremely 
motivating reward would be a premium or gift program for 
outstanding sales performance. Even though many different 
brokerages will participate in the selling of Scofield Summit, 
after the initial "newness" of the project wears off, there will 
be left a small cadre of sales agents who will consistently 
produce sales. If a sales motivation program could be designed 
that would increase sales to allow only a two year sell out, then 
it would be worth it to reward those acheivers with premiums 
which would really motivate them* For example, any sales person 
that sells 20 lots in one year could receive a new four wheel 
drive vehicle. Other motivational premiums could be vacations, 
snowmobiles, motorcycles, etc. The premium would be large enough 
and desirable enough to make the "right" sales person focus his 
attention on selling lots. The price the premiums is if it can 
reduce the marketing time of the project one year. A complete 
premium program such as this could be an important motivational 
factor for sales people. 
From a continuity standpoint, a continued emphasis should be 
placed on stimulating the existing brokerages in the area. Sales 
meetings, special presentation luncheons and other types of 
interactive meetings should be regularly scheduled with brokers 
in the area to keep them abreast of the development's progress 
and hopefully to keep their interest in the project. 
One additional area of marketing the overall project will be 
to create events. Year round activities should be developed, and 
the most promising should be developed into a full blown 
promotional events. This would include snowmobiling races, 
hunting contests, fishing contests, wilderness events. The 
purpose of these events will be to establish the development and 
be generators of additional traffic and exposure. 
Promotions such as these will be expensive and should only 
be considered relative to the development activity which is 
definitely planned. 
RECREATIONAL VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT 
The master development of all 4500 acres will, if developed, 
take a numbers of years to accomplish. As indicated previously, 
the development of the property into a year round facility would 
be the optimum situation. That possibility will be governed 
primarily by market forces and the completed development plan 
utilized. If the year round operation of the property is 
desired, then some consideration to the development of a recrea-
tional vehicle should be considered, 
RV parks can be extremely profitable. In this case if the 
demand can be demonstrated for an RV camp en Highway 6, then such 
a development could provide two important features to the market-
ing of the various developments of Scofield Summit, It could 1) 
provide a substantial cash flow for the developer; and 2) provide 
a staging area for visitors to the property. 
RV parks can be a high risk venture and certainly much more 
study should be conducted to see if there is enough traffic to 
offset the risk, however as the following pro forma shows, they 
are strong cash generators. 
Profonna 
100 Unit RV Park 
Development Costs $5,000 per pad 
Loan (75% LTV) 
Equity Required 
$500,000 
375,000 
$125,000 
Annual Ooerational Proforma 
Assumptions: $10.50 per vehicle per night and expenses of 20%. 
A permanent loan of $390,000, 25 year term, 
12% interest. 
Occupancy 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 
Income $75,600 $113,400 $151,200 $189,000 $226,800 
Expenses 15,120 22,680 30,200 37,800 45,360 
NOI $60,480 $ 90,720 $120,960 $151,200 $181,440 
Debt 
Service 49,290 49,290 49,290 49,290 49,290 
Net 
Income $11,190 $41,430 $71,670 $101,910 $132,150 
The information used to construct these proformas has been 
taken from recently developed RV parks within Utah and is 
reliable and accurate. However, it is not within the scope of 
this report to recommend the feasibility of developing an RV 
park, only that this type of development should be given more 
research, if the property is developed. 
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TABLE 1 
UTAH BASELINE PROVISIONAL POPULATION PROJECTION 
1980-2010 
DECEMBER 1984 
COUNTY 
Box Elder 
Cache 
Rich 
Davis 
Morgan. 
Salt Lake 
Tooele 
Weber 
Summit 
Utah 
Wasatch 
Juab 
Millard 
Piute 
Sanpete 
Sevier 
Wayne 
Beaver 
Garfield 
Iron 
Kane 
Wash. 
Daggett 
Duchesne 
Uintah 
Carbon 
Emery 
Grand 
San Juan 
Total 
1980 
33500 
57700 
2150 
147900 
4950 
624500 
26200 
145400 
10350 
220400 
8650 
5550 
9050 
1350 
14750 
14850 
1950 
4400 
3700 
17450 
4050 
26450 
750 
12650 
20700 
22350 
11650 
8250 
12400 
1474000 
1985 
36700 
67500 
2300 
172000 
6200 
691800 
30000 
158200 
12550 
249600 
9150 
6900 
17700 
1650 
18000 
17050 
2300 
5100 
4050 
19350 
4400 
32700 
850 
14750 
25100 
25100 
13400 
7800 
13400 
1665600 
1990 
42350 
76400 
2450 
217500 
8900 
786400 
39000 
178400 
15100 
284500 
10100 
6900 
15400 
1800 
20700 
20300 
2500 
5150 
4100 
21400 
4700 
37450 
850 
16900 
28950 
27800 
13700 
8050 
14650 
1912400 : 
2000 
50000 
87250 
2650 
285300 
16100 
912600 
52750 
223950 
19600 
295800 
11500 
7800 
16300 
1900 
21500 
21700 
2800 
5350 
4250 
25600 
5500 
46500 
900 
18600 
32200 
31200 
14500 
8800 
15800 
2238700 
2010 
60000 
100600 
3000 
346000 
24400 
1099C00 
68300 
265300 
26300 
338800 
14000 
9300 
19000 
2000 
24700 
27000 
3000 
5900 
4650 
31400 
6800 
58750 
900 
21450 
37900 
39300 
15700 
10000 
17600 
2681050 
Annu 
Cha 
1.96 
1.87 
1.12 
2.87 
5.46 
1.90 
3.25 
2.02 
3.16 
1.44 
1.62 
1.74 
2.50 
1.32 
1.73 
2.01 
1.45 
.98 
.76 
1.98 
1.74 
2.70 
.79 
1.78 
2.04 
1.90 
1.00 
.64 
1.17 
1.89 
Estimates and projections as of July 1 each yea 
Source: Universtiy of Utah 
Department of Business and Economic Review 
T a b l e 2A 
P r e l i m i n a r y M a r k e t i n g Budget, f o r S c o f i e l d Summit. 
FIRST YEAR 
J a l e s E s t 
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC TOTAL 
0 0 0 4 5 6 4 4 4 3 0 0 30 
ADVERTISING 
' r i n t media 
! a d i o 
l i r e c t Mai l 
•v 
^ a m o t i o n s 
b r o c h u r e 
I i g n a g e 
J a l e s O f f i c e 
>os t age 
M i n t i n g 
Graph i c s 
[ODEL HOME EXPENSE 
' u r n i t u r e L e a s e 
t e n t / L e a s e 
r t i l i t i e s 
' e l e p h o n e 
' l e a n i n g 
a i n t e n a n c e 
i u p p i i e s 
IALARIES & 
'QMMISSIONS 
ialesaan 
'oaaission 0 
2500 
4500 
5500 
1500 
2500 
1000 
1000 
3500 
1000 
1500 
3500 
2500 
25 
1000 
1000 
3500 
25 
500 
750 
3500 
25 
500 
750 
3500 
25 
500 
750 
25 
500 
500 
25 
350 
450 
100 
350 
75 
50 
25 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75 
50 
25 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75-
50 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75 
50 
25 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75 
50 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75 
50 
25 
25 25 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75 
50 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75 
50 
25 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75 
50 
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
0 0 4800 6000 7200 4800 4800 4800 3600 
55,000 
S6,250 
S17,5Q0 
SO 
52,500 
S2,500 
S4,500 
55,500 
S200 
51,500 
52,500 
50 
50 
SO 
50 
5350 
54,050 
SSOO 
51,550 
5675 
5450 
5125 
SO 
SO 
SO 
SO 
S3,000 
S36.000 
'OTAL 
.vg Price 
520,000 
'ax»is3ian 
6.00^ 
0 17500 12700 16725 14900 11775 11750 8275 6800 2225 1200 5101,050 
Total Sales: S600,000 
Marketing ~ Sales: .84* 
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Table 2B 
Preliminary Marketing Budget for Scofieid Summit 
SECOND YEAR 
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV 
Sales Est 0 0 1 4 5 6 5 6 3 2 0 
DEC TOTAL 
0 32 
ADVERTISING 
Newspaper 
Radio 
Direct Mail 
TV 
Promotions 
Brochure 
Signage 
Sales Office 
Postage 
Printing 
Graohics 
MODEL HOME EXPENSE 
Furniture Lease 
Rent/Lease 
Utilities 
Telephone 
Cleaning 
Maintenance 
Supplies 
SALARIES & 
:OMMISSIONS 
Salesman 
Commission 
500 
1500 
1000 1000 1000 500 500 
1000 1500 1000 750 750 
3500 3500 3500 3500 3500 
2500 
25 25 25 25 
500 
750 
500 
500 
350 
450 
100 
350 
75 
50 
25 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75 
50 
25 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75 
50 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75 
50 
25 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75 
50 
25 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75 
50 
25 
25 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75 
50 
25 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75 
50 
25 
25 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75 
50 
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
0 1200 4300 6000 7200 6000 7200 3600 2400 0 
S5,000 
S6,250 
S17,500 
SO 
52,500 
SO 
SO 
S500 
S200 
SI,500 
SO 
SO 
SO 
so 
so 
S350 
S4,050 
S900 
SI,550 
S675 
S450 
S125 
SO 
SO 
so 
so 
S3,000 
538,400 
•QTAL 
ivg Price 
S20,000 
'omaission 
6-OOX 
0 4200 12700 16725 14900 12975 14150 7075 5600 2225 1200 533,950 
Total Sales: S640,000 
Marketing * Sales: 13.90* 
4\M00256g» 
T a o i e 2C 
P r e l i m i n a r y M a r k e t i n g Budget f o r S c o f i e l d Summit 
THIRD YEAR 
S a l e s E s t 
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC TOTA 
0 0 1 4 5 4 3 4 3 2 0 0 2 
ADVERTISING 
D r m t media 
? a d i o 
) i r e c t H a i l 
'V 
^ o a o t i o n a 
i r o c h u r e 
J i g n a g e 
l a l e s O f f i c e 
' o s t a g e 
' r i n t m g 
r a u h i c s 
QDEL HOKE EXPENSE 
u r n i t u r e L e a s e 
e n t / L e a s e 
t i i i t i e s 
e l e p h o n e 
l e a n i n g 
a m t e n a n c e 
a p p l i e s 
ALARIES Sc 
OMMISSIONS 
a l e s n a n 
o a a i a a i o n 0 
250 
1000 
1000 1000 1000 500 500 
1000 1500 1000 750 750 
3500 3500 3500 3500 3500 
2500 
25 25 25 
500 
750 
500 
500 
350 
450 
100 
350 
75 
50 
25 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75 
50 
25 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75 
50 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75 
50 
25 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75 
50 
25 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75 
50 
25 
25 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75 
50 
25 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75 
50 
25 
25 
350 
450 
100 
150 
75 
50 
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
0 1200 4800 6000 4800 3600 4800 3600 2400 0 0 
S5,00< 
S6,25< 
S17,50( 
S( 
S2,50( 
S( 
sc 
S25C 
520C 
Sl,0OC 
SC 
SC 
sc 
sc 
sc 
S35C 
S4,05C 
SSOC 
S1,55C 
S67= 
S45C 
S12S 
SC 
SC 
SC 
SC 
S9,00C 
S31,20C 
3TAL 
/ g P r i c e 
S 2 0 , 0 0 0 
D a a i s s i o n 
6 . 0 0 * 
0 3450 12700 16725 12500 10575 11750 7075 5600 2225 1200 
Total Sales: 
S81,00C 
S81,00C 
S520,000 
Marketing * Sales: 15.58? 
EXHIBIT 1 
COMMUNITY CENTER 
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STRATEGIC VALUATIOiNS 
1245 East Brickyard Road, Suite 110 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
(801) 486-2999 • Fax (801) 486-7500 
January 24, 1996 
Mr. Blake T. Ostler 
Kirton & McConkie 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0120 
Dear Mr. Ostler: 
We have been engaged to review the economic feasibility of the Soldier Summit Development plan to 
develop the property described below on a stand alone basis. 
We have also been asked to compare the economic advisability of implementing a development plan to the 
alternative of accepting an outstanding offer to purchase the property as is for 52,000,000. 
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION 
The property under question is 4,246 acres of mountain recreational land that is described in an Appraisal 
Report dated January 8, 1996, by Jud Howard, MAI as follows: 
1. Approximately 97 acres within the townsite of Soldier Summit. 
2. An area of approximately 1,451 acres platted and recorded into a mountain home 
subdivision with 154 lots. The lots include water rights of 75 acre feet that is sufficient to 
supply the needs for the lots within the property. No site improvements have been made at 
this date. 
3. The remaining open mountain range land consists of 2,698 acres, 598 to the East and 2100 
to the West. 
In performing our review, we visited the property on December 13, 1995, and found it to be very remote, 
"w^ lh the nearest hospital, grocery store and shopping center 32 miles~aw~ay in Price. The distance of such 
services is important because fire protection will be required by Utah County. 
The 154-lot subdivision was platted and recorded when the property was in the incorporated town site of 
Soldier Summit, which existed only from 1982 to 1984. 
We have reviewed the estimated costs to develop the subdivision lots prepared by 
Tuttle Engineering as to: 
•Site grading for roadways, installation of culverts and sewers, and 
installation of road base for approximately $1,036,500. 
•Installation of an underground electric power system and substation 
upgrade for approximately 5792,000. 
•A water supply system, consisting of a well water pump station, a main 
water line, water service connections, fire hydrants, two booster pumping stations and two 
water storage tanks with a capacity of 400,000 gallons. 
Total costs for the water system are estimated to be $1, 350,400. 
The development requirements are not flexible because they are imposed primarily by Utah County and 
the State of Utah. The total costs of all of the above improvements will be necessary in order to obtain 
building permits for permanent structures. Unless these permits can be obtained, the subdivided lots will 
not be marketable other than as raw land. 
The remaining acreage can legally be subdivided into 50 acre plots under current zoning. However, 
development of that acreage into building lots cannot be economically achieved, due to steep slopes, rocky 
terrain, lack of trees, low density, costs of improvements and water limitations. We believe this property is 
best used to support and enhance the subdivided lots so they can be marketed for a better price. 
REVENUE PROJECTIONS 
Next, we reviewed the original marketing plan dated January 1986, projecting revenues of 
S 1,733,624 for 88 home sites. The sites consist of lots of 5 to 10 acres each in phase one at an average 
price of $19,700, or $2,036 per acre over a three to four year period. We assumed these projections to still 
be valid today, although they are aggressive, based upon a discussion with David G. Cunningham, a 
broker knowledgeable in the sale of this type of property. 
Mr. Cunningham stated that similar improved property is being advertised today in Sanpete County (20 
miles southwest) for $1,000 per acre. It is not known whether this property included common areas as 
planned for Soldier Summit. 
Further confirmation of the reasonableness of the projection was also contained in the real property 
Appraisal Report prepared by Mr. Harward. He stated that his research and experience strongly indicate 
that mountain land properties have been stable over the last 10 to 15 years. 
Properties in Heber and the Park City area were not considered similar, due to the proximity of medical, 
retail and recreational facilities compared to those of Soldier Summit. 
We have therefore concluded the revenues projected in the 1986 marketing plan is still valid in 1996. 
Assuming $2036 per acre, the subdivision revenues over a four year period would be $2,954,236, which 
wtThave rounded to $3,000,000 for all 154 subdivided lots. We have^assumed the following breakdown for 
revenue projection purposes: 
Year 1-20% $600,000 
Year 2-30% 900,000 
Year 3-30% 900,000 
Year 4-20% 600,000 
EXPENSE ASSUMPTIONS 
We assumed that the entire amount of development costs would be incurred in year one, with the entire 
amount borrowed at 10%. One half of the interest would be incurred in the first year. We then assumed 
marketing costs, commissions, maintenance, and taxes of SI 50,000 per year would be incurred in each of 
the four years. This was based upon the original marketing plan projections. The plan projected expenses 
of 5271,450 over the first three years for 88 of the 154 lots, without regard to maintenance and taxes. 
CASH FLOW PROJECTION 
We constructed a cash flow model to represent the development of Soldier Summit over a four year 
period, with the following assumptions: 
•A construction loan, secured by the personal guarantee of the general 
partners of Soldier Summit Development of 53,000,000 at 10% interest for 
four years. 
•Expenditure of development costs of 53,178,900 in the first year. 
•Revenues of 53,000,000 over the four year period as outlined above. 
• Administrative and maintenance expenses of 5150,000 per year. 
• Positive cash flow after operating and interest expense applied to the 
principle balance, with any remaining balance due at the end of year four. 
We assumed that all revenue and expenditures occurred in the beginning of each period, due to the 
obvious fact that the result would be negative. In a typical projection, revenue and expenses are projected 
on a monthly or quarterly basis, however, we deemed that level of detail unnecessary for this analysis. 
The projection resulted in negative cash flow of 51,677,400, over the four year period. Discounted at 12%, 
this amount represents a negative present value of 51,063,436. 
A typical real estate investor requires a minimum of a 12% return. 
The resulting negative cash flow represents an infinite negative return on the original 5 3,000,000 
investment. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of a review of the above, we have concluded that it would not be economically feasible to 
develop the subdivision because it results in a substantial net loss. 
With regard to the offer to purchase the property for S2,000,000, it would be prudent to seriously consider 
accepting the offer under current market conditions. It appears that the offer is approximately 20% above 
the fair market value. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Robert R. Wietzke, President 
Strategic Valuations 
David M. Wahlquist - A3349 
Blake T. Ostler - A4642 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendants Soldier Summit Development, 
Homestead Associates, American City Corporation, 
International Investment and Development, 
Ming-Cheng Lin and Hsiun Mei Lin 
60 East South Temple, #1800 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PO-CHENG CHANG, BEATRICE H. : SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF CLARK LIN 
CHANG, et al, : 
: Civil No. 900905601CN 
Plaintiffs, : 
: Judge Glenn Iwasaki 
vs. : 
SOLDIER SUMMIT DEVELOPMENT, a : 
Utah limited partnership, et al : 
Defendants. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Clark Lin, being first sworn upon my oath do depose and say as follows: 
1. I am over twenty-one (21) years of age and am otherwise competent to make 
this Affidavit. 
2. I have a bachelor's degree from National Taiwan University, a master's degree 
from the University of Iowa in water resources and a doctorate from the University of Iowa in 
hydraulics. 
3. I am an experienced civil engineer. I worked for Bauer Engineering in 
Chicago, was an associate professor in the Department of Civil Engineering for the University 
of Utah, served as a Utah State House Fellow for Governor Calvin Rampton as a water 
resource engineer and for several years operated my own engineering consulting business 
under the name of Uintex. 
4. Since 1987,1 have been the CEO of Soldier Summit Development. 
5. I am acquainted with all of the parties involved in this action. Beginning about 
1982 I became aware of the business entities involving the Lins and the Changs and was aware 
of the Agreement dated February 8, 1982 ("Separation Agreement") whereby the Lins and the 
Changs sought to separate most of their business relationships. 
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6. Within a short time after the parties entered into the Separation Agreement, I 
became aware that Po and Beatrice Chang became limited partners of Soldier Summit 
Development. 
7. I first became involved with Soldier Summit Development in my capacity as a 
civil engineer early in 1983. I was hired to assist Soldier Summit Development in resolving 
certain water and access problems relating to the development and to obtain plat approval for 
two subdivisions in the development. 
8. In order to obtain plat approval, the Town of Soldier Summit "(Town") required 
Soldier Summit Development to enter into an agreement to convey part of its water rights to 
the Town, obtain approval from the State of Utah to segregate the water rights conveyed to the 
Town, confirm the existence of an easement providing access across the railroad tracks 
bordering the Partnership Property, obtain an easement from adjoining land owners to access 
the proposed subdivisions, prepare engineering details for roads required for the subdivisions, 
design a water pick up station and vacate an existing subdivision which overlapped the 
proposed Plat C. From the time I started work on plat approval until the plats were finally 
approved, I worked full-time on obtaining plat approval. 
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9. The Town approved Plat C and Plat D late in 1983 and the plats were recorded 
in December 1983 and January 1984. 
10. On April 24, 1984, the State of Utah dissolved the Town. Soldier Summit 
Development's project was thereafter subject to the jurisdiction of the Special Service District 
which consists of a commissioner of Utah and Wasatch Counties and a representative of the 
property owners in the Soldier Summit area. The Special Service District was created to 
oversee services and development activities on the land previously included within the 
boundaries of the Town. The Special Service District's development requirements were 
significantly stricter than those of the Town of Soldier Summit. 
11. I believed it was necessary to obtain a HUD Interstate Sales Act approval in 
order to effectively market the Property. I was aware that prior to my involvement with the 
project, Soldier Summit Development had hired legal counsel to prepare a HUD registration 
application. The application had been submitted to HUD but was rejected by HUD due to a 
number of deficiencies in the proposed project. Soldier Summit Development procured new 
legal counsel for Soldier Summit Development to cure the deficiencies in the HUD registration 
application. I was engaged to correct the deficiencies and worked closely with the new legal 
counsel to revise the application. 
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12. In 1985, at my recommendation, Soldier Summit Development commissioned a 
marketing expert to conduct a market study to determine whether it was economically feasible 
to complete construction of the infrastructure for and market the two platted subdivisions. Mr. 
Kaspar concluded that although further development was possible: 
1. Market conditions indicate that there is a substantial amount of risk in 
the development of any recreational land. This is highlighted by the 
subjective nature of the buying process and the lack of demand for 
recreational land at this time. 
2. The absorption for this development will not be quick. Recreational 
land is no longer fueled by the speculation buyer, therefore a rapid 
sellout is not reasonable to expect. In the best case scenario 20-30 lots 
per year will be sold in the 88 lot phase of development. 
A copy of Mr. Kaspar's marketing study is attached as Exhibit "D". 
13. After Soldier Summit Development reviewed the Kasper report, Soldier Summit 
Development placed ads in newspapers to determine whether Mr. Kaspar's bleak assessment 
of the market was accurate for recreational lots. Soldier Summit Development did not receive 
a single response to any of those ads. Soldier Summit Development management informed me 
that as a result of Kasper's report and the lack of response to the ads, that they would not 
proceed with plans for complete infrastructure development until the market improved. 
14. During the next several months, I continued the work necessary to perfect 
Soldier Summit Development's water rights and collected water samples for water quality tests 
as required by the State. I regularly attended meetings of the Special Service District. I also 
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monitored the market for recreational property by periodically consulting with local residents 
and real estate agents. I also investigated options for reducing the cost of road improvement 
and water delivery systems for the subdivisions. 
15. To maintain the Property's Green Belt tax status, I negotiated the terms of a 
lease to a livestock company for sheep grazing. I also allowed a limited number of seasonal 
hunters to pay a small sum for hunting privileges on the Property. 
16. I continue to monitor the market situation and perform the tasks necessary to 
comply with State and Special Service District requirements. 
Clark Lin 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 2^ day of January, 1997. 
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ERNATIONAL INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
meficlai life Tower • 36 South State Street • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, U.S.A. 
one: (801) 534-1321 • Telex: 388 366 INTERPRISE SLC • CaDle! INTERPRISE SLC 
January 13, 1982 
Tsu Yu Lin 
4432 Lon* Pine Drive 
Salt Laka City, Utah 84117 
Let this letter serve as an up date to bring everybody current 
on the status of the Logan Association Property-
Aa previously mentioned the property has been subdivided into 
five commercialy zoned lota arranging in size from % acre 
to approximately l*j acres. We have improved by putting sewer, 
water, power, street with curb and gutter and dedicated what 
is known as Sky Ridge Drive to the City of Logan. The approximate 
volue of holdings is $500,000, Recently we have had architects 
give artists renderings of potential office buildings suitable 
to that location. We have taken these artists renderings and 
created attractive bill board signs that have been constructed 
on the property offering for sale or lease. Due to general 
economic conditions in the United States we have had very little 
response and it is not anticipated that we will be able to sell 
or develop the property until the economic climate changes. 
.The 1982 property tax for Logan Plaza is $2,553.65 and the 
architects work comes to 3,776.00. We are short about $6,000.00 
for this years operation. We would like the partners to contribute 
to help pay these bills. The following is a list of partners 
portions: 
James Lai $1,800 P.C. Lu $600 Tsu Yen Lin $264 
Jay Murphy $ 840 S.C, Lu $600 Tsu Yu Lin $264 
P.C. Cluing $ 780 P.C. Lu $600 Wan Cian Lin $252 
If you would take care of this at your earliest convenience 
it would be greatly appreciated. Thank you. 
Sincerely* 
Beatrice Chang 
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in Soldier Summit, Utah? 
A Yes. 
Q At the time that Soldier Summit limited 
partnership was formed did you have any responsibilities 
with respect to that particular partnership? 
A I was the president of American City Development 
Corporation, which is a sole general partner of Soldier 
Summit Development. 
•Q At that time did you have an understanding as to 
the responsibilities of the general partner in that limited 
partnership? 
A Yes. 
Q What was your understanding of those 
responsibilities? 
A To serve as a general partner of the limited 
partnership of Soldier Summit Development, to do whatever 
necessary effort to develop 4,500 acres of property for the 
best interest for all partners of the partnership. 
Q Did you have any involvement in the acquisition 
of 4,500 acres by the partnership? 
A Yes. 
Q What involvement did you have in that activity? 
A I participated with Jay Murphy under the 
directions of Ming-Cheng Lin to negotiate with United Farm 
to purchase this subject property. 
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1 1982." Do you see that allegation? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q Do you agree with the allegation that the 
4 marketing of the Soldier Summit property could and should 
5 have taken place as early as 1982? 
6 A Absolutely. 
7 Q So when you allege in Exhibit 1 that ACC has 
8 breached its obligations to you as a limited partner by 
9 failing to develop the property, you believe that that 
10 breach started in 1982? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q What do you believe should have been done in 
13 1982 with respect to the development of the property? 
14 A Real estate development, especially the 
15 development of this type of unique property, timing, timing 
16 of development is critical. 
17 Q Why? 
18 A The development of this type of property could 
19 only get harder and harder because of the governmental 
2 0 regulations. The reason why we developed tremendous amount 
21 of effort to annex this property to Soldier Summit is the 
22 reason as I described before. When there is such a land 
23 mass annexed into a city of that size, you naturally make 
24 the other political entity such as Wasatch County and Utah 
2 5 County not happy purely from political and revenue reasons. 
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1 Q When you say they needed to complete the 
2 construction subject to the city's final input, are you 
3 including in that input any improvement of the water system 
4 that needed to be done? 
5 A At this moment I cannot recall what kind of 
6 specific input the city has, but I recall there were 
7 pick-up stations to be installed. 
8 Q That had not been done? 
9 A I don't believe the physical work of that part 
10 was started when I left American City Corporation. 
11 Q When did you first learn that phase 1 and phase 
12 2 were not developed by the end of 1982? 
13 A Well, we continuously asked for the update for 
14 the past ten years, and initially from 1982 to 
15 approximately 198 5 they kept promising in very general 
16 terms that the property would be in the market shortly and 
17 would be a very successful project, but never specifically 
18 inform us what kind of progress they had made. 
19 Q Did you know in early 1983 that the property had 
2 0 not yet been marketed? 
21 A They didn't tell us they had been in the market. 
2 2 Q Did you know it had not been in the market in 
23 early 1983? 
24 A They just told us they are not ready yet. 
25 Q So your answer is yes you knew that because they 
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1 told you they were not ready yet? 
2 A Yes, I know they are not in the market. 
3 Q Did you complain to them at the time that ACC 
4 was not doing what it should be doing under the partnership 
5 agreement? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q Who did you make that complaint to? 
8 A To American City Corporation. 
9 Q Do you recall who at American City you made that 
10 complaint to? 
11 A I don't know specifically who, but either H.L. 
12 Lai or Ming-Cheng Lin. 
13 Q Did you tell them they were breaching their 
14 obligation under the partnership agreement? 
15 A I don't know whether we said that in such strong 
16 words, but individually besides myself as well as Jay 
17 Murphy I recall both of us write very specific letters to 
18 urge them to do such kind of move. 
19 Q Did you consider American City to be in breach 
20 of its obligation under the partnership agreement in early 
21 1983 for failure to develop? 
22 A I don't think at that time I considered at that 
23 stage they had breached the contract or breached the 
24 agreement as you term it. 
25 Q Approximately when did you send the letter you 
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P. CHANG - EXAM BY MR. WAHLQUIST 
1 | than six months. Did you rely upon anything in the 
2 I letter to either take some action or to fail to take 
3 some action? 
4 MR. STEPHENS: I object to the question. I 
5 think the time period may have been inclusive of '84. 
6 THE WITNESS: Well, with that type of letter 
7 naturally the -- at least lead me not to worry about 
8 the progress of the project. 
9 Q. So you relied upon the representation by not 
10 worrying about it? 
11 A. And anticipating the project would be on the 
12 market to generate return and income in the very near 
13 future. 
14 Q. Anything else you did to rely upon the 
15 representation in the letter that the marketing would 
16 occur shortly? 
17 A. Well, the -- not that I can think of. 
18 J Q. What would you have done differently had the 
19 | representation not been in the letter? 
20 | A. . I would definitely be more active as limited 
21 | partners to urge the general partner to take necessary 
22 | actions to continue the effort accomplished up to 1982 
23 I and get the job completed. 
24 | Q. Has there been any time you haven't 
25 I diligently urged the general partner to undertake 
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those activities? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When? 
A. In certain periods I just assume that 
everything is being done with due diligence by the 
general partners. 
Q. What period? 
A. I don't remember the period. That depends 
upon the period of the communications our office had 
with IID or ACD's entities. 
Q. And you knew within six months after 
receiving the letter that the property was not on the 
market; isn't that true? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The second item that you mentioned was a 
partnership meeting that you attended in, I believe 
you said 1982 or 1983. You didn't recall exactly who 
said what, but you understood from the meeting that 
property would be developed within six months to a 
year . 
A, This is the impression I got. 
Q. You couldn't recall that anybody really said 
to you, It will be developed within six months to a 
year; is that correct? 
A. I think that the discussions, when you term 
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develop, is primarily related to what needs to be done 
to get the final approval and put this one into the 
market. So when you say developed, it's maybe a 
different understanding to me about the -- what we 
were talking about marketing. 
Q. Let me rephrase the question. 
Do you recall anybody specifically telling 
you at the meeting that the property would be placed 
on the market within six months to one year? 
A. No . 
Q. And you certainly knew one year after the 
meeting that the property had not yet been placed on 
the market? 
A. That's true. But that continuously led me to 
believe they were working on this one. 
Q. What did you do or not do in reliance upon 
the representation you understood from the meeting? 
A. If I knew, for example, like the Plat C, Plat 
D, were recorded, the performance bond, and the detail 
requirement was specified, I would urge the general 
partner to finish this improvement as soon as 
possible . 
Q. On the 1982, 1983 meeting, the plats hadn't 
been recorded yet, nor had there been bonds given; is 
that right? 
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MR. STEPHENS: Again, I'm not sure you have 
that communication correctly pegged as to time. 
Q. Isn't that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So in this meeting you described as having 
occurred in '82 or '83, what did you do or not do in 
reliance upon what you understood from the meeting? 
A. Well, when we have the chance to meet at the 
first time I began to realize, you know, that 
so-called putting the market -- put the property into 
the market is still far away because they are still 
working on -- or try to understand what needs to be 
done to get the final plat "approved. But like meeting 
like in '82, '83, you know, replaced whatever the 
impression from the letter and then led us to believe 
in another one following that something is coming, 
something is being done. So based upon this, we did 
not specifically urge or try to find a detail of what 
should be done, why something was not done. 
Q. Anything else you did in reliance upon the 
meeting? 
A. No. 
Q. Let's go to the next incident that you have 
described, which was a meeting you believe occurred 
either in 1984 or 1986, the meeting that you believe 
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1 was recorded. I believe you had said there was some 
2 discussion of how to take care of a water tank or 
3 pickup station and some discussion about the bond. 
4 What did you do in reliance on the information you 
5 understood from that meeting? 
6 A. Well, again, you know, from that meeting my 
7 anticipation is that this property would be on the 
8 market, you. know, again were maintained, so I take th 
9 same position as I did before. 
10 Q. When you're talking about the property being 
11 on the market in the course of these discussions, 
12 you're referring to the Plat C and D? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. When you referenced another meeting that you 
15 thought might have occurred in 1987, you didn't know 
16 who exactly said what in that meeting -- maybe it's 
17 not correct to even call it a meeting, I think you 
18 said there was some communication -- but it led you t 
19 believe that the physical improvements were done or 
20 nearly done and that there would be some market study 
21 I performed. What action did you take or refrain from 
22 | taking in reliance upon the information you got from 
23 I that particular communication? 
24 | A. Well, I anticipated, whatever the study, a 
25 | continuous monitoring of that, it would be prepared, 
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the property, ready for marketing when the market 
arrives. The fundamental thing that needs to be 
prepared is we need to get the improvement done, get 
the necessary registration done. And it turned out 
the improvement was never done, completely done. The 
registration was never completed. So even if we look 
back now, even the market was acceptable, we are 
really not ready to put the property into the market. 
MR. WAHLQUIST: Would you read back his 
answer, please. 
(Whereupon the record was read by the 
reporter as follows: 
ANSWER: Well, I anticipated, whatever the 
study, a continuous monitoring of that, it would be 
prepared, the property, ready for marketing when the 
market arrives. The fundamental thing that needs to 
be prepared is we need to get the improvement done, 
get the necessary registration done. And it turned 
out the improvement was never done, completely done. 
The registration was never completed. So even if we 
look back now, even the market was acceptable, we are 
really not ready to put the property into the market.) 
Q. I'll return to my question. 
What did you do or not do in reliance upon 
information you received from this 1987 communication? 
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A. Well, as I mentioned before, with that 
information I simply assumed that when the market is 
going to be ready, they would put this one immediately 
on the market. 
Q. So you didn't do anything other than assume 
that it would be -- that when the market was ready, 
the property would be marketed? 
A. Right. 
Q. Did you refrain from doing anything because 
of the information you received? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What would you have done if you had not 
received the information, which you didn'c do because 
you received it? 
A. Well, you know, I would -- you know, with 
unusual length of the performance bond, I would urge 
them to get these things done as soon as possible 
because we are, you know, risking ourselves to a very 
dangerous position. 
Q. Didn't you tell them that in the 1987 
communication, that you thought they ought to get it 
done as quickly as they could? 
A. In 19? 
Q. '87, when you received this information about 
the market study. 
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1 I A. That is not the understanding I have at that 
2 t ime. 
3 Q. You did not tell them that they ought to get 
4 everything done as quickly as possible? 
5 A „ Because I was led to believe that all the 
6 improvement and necessary registration are going to be 
7 done soon and could react to the market any time. 
8 Q. Did someone tell you that the HUD 
9 registration had been completed? 
10 A. No. That is not the impression, even at the 
11 present time, that I get the impression that we had 
12 the HUD registration. If there is such a thing, I 
13 have never seen a complete one. 
14 Q. You talked about some letters also that you 
15 received. Do you remember the dates on any of those 
16 letters or the approximate time of any of those 
17 letters? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. Do you remember how many there are? 
2 0 A. No. 
21 Q. Do you recall whether you did anything in 
22 reliance on those letters? 
23 A. Not in particular, I can't remember. 
24 Q. Is there anything you refrained from doing 
25 because of those letters? 
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1 I A. No. 
2 | Q. Let's return for a few minutes to the time 
3 I prior to the acquisition of the Soldier Summit 
4 I property by you. When did you first communicate with 
5 | Mr. Lin about the possibility of an investment in 
6 I Soldier Summit? 
7 A. I don't remember. 
8 Q. Sometime after Mr. Donovan first approached 
9 you about the property? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Did you ever prepare any kind of a written 
12 summary of the project or investment opportunity for 
13 Mr. Lin to review and consider whether or not he 
14 wanted to be involved in the investment? 
15 A. Well, for an important investment opportunity 
16 like this, I must have written some letter. 
17 Q. Do you have a copy of that letter? 
18 A. I don't believe so. 
19 Q. You don't have anything like that in your 
20 files? 
2 1 A. No. 
22 I Q. Do you recall when you first learned that: RLC 
23 I Investment, Inc. had paid only $555,000 for the 
24 I property? 
25 I A. Well, you mean me? 
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-23 
violate the automatic stay provisions of the 
federal bankruptcy code, because a renewal is 
not an at tempt to enforce, collect, or expand the 
original judgment. Barber v. Emporium Part-
nership, 800 R2d 795 (Utah 1990). 
Stipulat ions. 
Parties to contract may stipulate for period of 
limitations shorter than that fixed by statute of 
limitations. Clark v. Lund, 55 Utah 284, 184 P. 
821 (1919). 
Support or maintenance . 
The eight-year s tatute of limitations applies 
to past due unpaid installments for alimony or 
support of minor children, and therefore execu-
tion may issue only for the arrearages accumu-
lated within a period of eight years. Seeley v. 
Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah 1975). 
A Utah action brought in 1978 to enforce a 
1975 Ohio action for support arrearages, which 
also included a 1967 Ohio action for support 
arrearages, was timely filed under this section. 
Logan v. Schneider, 609 P.2d 943 (Utah 1980). 
Wife could apply her time-barred claim for 
child support arrearages to offset her husband's 
lien on the marital home, and then affirma-
Am. Jur. 2d. — 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and 
Separation §§ 1073,1074; 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judg-
ments § 897 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 27C C.J.S Divorce §§ 684 to 693; 50 
C.J.S. Judgments §§ 854, 871; 67A C.J.S. Par-
ent and Child §§ 73 to 89. 
A.L.R. — Statute of limitations: effect of 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-23; L. 1984, ch. 16, § 2; 1996, 
ch. 79, § 109; 1996, ch. 210, § 5. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1996 amend-
ment by ch. 79, effective April 29, 1996, in the 
introductory paragraph, substituted "An action 
may be brought within" for "Within"; deleted 
"An action" at the beginning of Subsections (1) 
to (3); and in Subsections (1) and (2), substi-
tuted a semicolon for a period. 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 210, effective 
tively assert her claim for past due support that 
had accrued within the limitations period. 
Coulon v. Coulon, 915 P.2d 1069 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996). 
Tolling. 
In action by administrator, indebtedness cre-
ated by check was held to be barred, and 
statute was not tolled by unauthorized acts of 
plaintiff. Bingham v. Walker Bros., Bankers, 75 
Utah 149, 283 P. 1055 (1929). 
Action to renew a judgment brought more 
than eight years after the date of entry of the 
original judgment was barred by this section 
even though defendant had signed a written 
agreement acknowledging the obligation and 
had made some payments thereon less than 
eight years before commencement of the action. 
The common-law rule which tolled the limita-
tion period in case of acknowledgment or part 
payment is limited by § 78-12-44 so that it now 
applies only to contract actions. Yergensen v. 
Ford, 16 Utah 2d 397, 402 P.2d 696 (1965). 
Cited in Van Tassell v. Shaffer, 742 P.2d 111 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
delay in appointing administrator or other rep-
resentative on cause of action accruing at or 
after death of person in whose favor it would 
have accrued, 28 A.L.R.3d 1141. 
Key Numbers . — Divorce «s=> 311; Judgment 
&* 910, 934; Parent and Child «=» 3.3(4), 3.4(2). 
April 29, 1996, deleted former Subsection (3) 
regarding distribution of criminal proceeds to 
victims. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Cross-References. — Product Liability Act, 
s tatute of limitations, § 78-15-3. 
Promise to pay extends period, § 78-12-44. 
Three-year limitation period for action on 
written insurance contract, § 31A-21-313. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
78-12-23. Within six years — Mesne profits of real prop-
erty — Instrument in writing. 
An action may be brought within six years: 
(1) for the mesne profits of real property; 
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instru-
ment in writing, except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. -
§ 33 et seq 
54 C J S Limitations of Actions Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions £=> 
58(2) 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
An action may be brought withm four years 
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instru-
ment m writing, also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchan-
dise, and for any article charged on a store account, also on an open 
account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished, 
provided, that action m all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at 
any time withm four years after the last charge is made or the last 
payment is received, 
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections 
of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), wThich m specific situations limits the 
time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10, 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b), or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1), 
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp , 104-12-25; L. 1988, ch. 59, § 14; 1996, 
ch. 79, § 110. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1996 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1996, m the introduc-
tory paragraph, substituted "An action ma> be 
brought withm" for "Withm", deleted 'An ac-
tion" at the beginning of Subsections (1; and (3), 
and made stylistic changes 
Cross-References. — Antitrust Act actions, 
§ 76-10-925 
Product Liability Act, statute of limitations, 
§ 78-15-3 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality 
Assigned cause of action 
Breach of fiduciary duty 
Conflict of laws 
Damage of private property for public use 
Discovery rule 
Discovery rule 
Divorce actions 
Equitable actions 
Excessive freight charges 
Extension of period 
Federal civil rights actions 
Indemnity or guaranty bond 
Judgment hen 
Land contract 
Malpractice 
Mortgages 
Negligent employment 
Nuisances 
Open account 
Oral contract 
Oral modification of written contract 
Other claims for relief 
— Federal claim 
— Negligence 
— Promissory estoppel 
Paternity action 
Overpayment 
Personal injuries 
Pleading and proof 
Product liability 
Purpose of section 
Quieting title 
Recovery of payments under note 
Reformation of instrument 
Relation back of complaints 
Relief not otherwise provided for 
Restraining actions 
Running of statute 
— Payment of settlement obligation 
Stockholder's duty to pay taxes 
Taking for public use 
Tax paid under protest 
Tolling 
— Class actions 
Torts 
Trustees 
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-26 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 13 Am. Jur. 2d Building and 
Construction Contracts § 114. 
A.L.R. — What statute of limitations gov-
erns action by contractee for defective or im-
proper performance of work by private building 
contractor, 1 A.L.R.3d 914. 
Time of discovery as affecting running of 
statute of limitations in wrongful death action, 
49 A.L.R.4th 972. 
Application of statute of limitations in pri-
vate tort actions based on injury to persons or 
property caused by underground flow of con-
taminants, 11 A.L.R.5th 438. 
Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions ®=> 
55(3). 
78-12-26. Within three years. 
An action may be brought within three years: 
(1) for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property; except that 
when waste or trespass is committed by means of underground works 
upon any mining claim, the cause of action does not accrue until the 
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting such waste or 
trespass; 
(2) for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including ac-
tions for specific recovery thereof; except that in all cases where the 
subject of the action is a domestic animal usually included in the term 
"livestock," which at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if 
the animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without the owner's 
fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner has actual knowledge of 
such facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the 
possession of the animal by the defendant; 
(3) for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of 
action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved 
party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake; 
(4) for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other than for a 
penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where in special 
cases a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this state; 
(5) to enforce liability imposed by Section 78-17-3, except that the cause 
of action does not accrue until the aggrieved party knows or reasonably 
should know of the harm suffered. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; c. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-26; L. 1986, ch. 143, § 1; 1996, 
ch. 79, § 111. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1996, in the introduc-
tory paragraph, substituted "An action may be 
brought within" for "Within"; deleted "An ac-
tion" at the beginning of Subsections (1) to (5); 
and made stylistic changes. 
Cross-References. — "Action" includes spe-
cial proceeding, § 78-12-46. 
Livestock branding, Title 4, Chapter 24. 
Product Liability Act, statute of limitations, 
§ 78-15-3. 
Right of action for waste, § 78-38-2. 
Three-year period for actions on insurance 
contracts, § 31A-21-313. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Accounting. 
Damage to personal property. 
Damage to real property. 
Discovery rule. 
Fraud. 
— In general. 
— Application. 
— Running of statute. 
— Health care malpractice. 
Injury to real property. 
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CINCINNATI BELL CELLULAR SYSTEMS 
COMPANY, an Ohio corporation, Plaintiff, 
v. 
AMERITECH MOBILE PHONE SERVICE OF 
CINCINNATI, INC., a Delaware corporation, 
Cincinnati SMSA Limited Partnership, a 
Delaware limited partnership, 360 < < 
degrees > > > Communications Company, a 
Delaware corporation, The Champaign 
Telephone Company, an Ohio corporation, Git-
Cell, Inc., an Ohio corporation, 
and Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., a 
Delaware corporation, Defendants. 
Civ. A. No. 13389. 
Court of Chancery of Delaware, New Castle 
County. 
Submitted: April 26, 1996. 
Decided: Sept. 3, 1996. 
Vernon R. Proctor and John H. Newcomer, Jr. of 
Bayard, Handelman & Murdoch, P.A., Wilmington 
(James R. Adams, William D. Baskett, III, and 
Michael F. Haverkamp, of Frost & Jacobs, 
Cincinnati, Ohio; and Alan R. Bromberg and 
George W. Coleman of Jenkins & Gilchrist, Dallas, 
Texas, of counsel), for Plaintiff. 
Richard L. Sutton, Paul P. Welsh, Thomas C. 
Grimm, Matthew B. Lehr and Maryellen Noreika of 
Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington, for 
Defendants Ameritech Mobile Phone Service of 
Cincinnati, Inc. and Ameritech Mobile 
Communications, Inc. 
Richard D. Kirk of Morris, James, Hitchens & 
Williams, Wilmington, for Defendant 360 
< < degrees > > Communications Company. 
Thomas A. Beck of Richards, Layton & Finger, 
Wilmington, for Defendants Git- Cell, Inc. and The 
Champaign Telephone Company. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
CHANDLER, Vice Chancellor. 
*1 Plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks judicial dissolution 
and ultimately the sale of a Delaware limited 
partnership engaged in providing cellular telephone 
services. The case illustrates the partnering 
arrangements that increasingly characterize the 
telecommunications industry's effort to exploit 
emerging technologies and to meet increasing 
competitive pressures. Because technology (along 
with competitive interests) often advances in ways 
unanticipated by the entities that create these 
partnering arrangements, this kind of litigation 
should not be unexpected. 
In 1982, plaintiff Cincinnati Bell Cellular Systems 
("Cincinnati Bell") and defendant Ameritech Mobile 
Phone Services of Cincinnati ("AMPS") [FN1] 
formed a limited partnership (the "Partnership") to 
"fund, establish and provide" cellular mobile 
services within and including the geographic area 
bounded by Cincinnati, Dayton and Columbus, 
Ohio. See Agreement Establishing Cincinnati 
SMSA Limited Partnership (the "Partnership 
Agreement" or "P. Agmt.") §§ 1.3, 2.5. AMPS, 
the Partnership's general partner, is a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of defendant Ameritech Mobile 
Communications, Inc. ("AMCI") which, in turn, is 
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Ameritech 
Corporation ("Ameritech Corp." and collectively 
with AMCI and AMPS, "Ameritech"). Ameritech 
Corp. is the regional bell company for the Columbus 
and Dayton markets. Cincinnati Bell, one of the 
Partnerships limited partners, is the regional bell 
company for Cincinnati. Ameritech owns 52.793% 
of the Partnership, 12.793% as a limited partner and 
40% as the general partner. Cincinnati Bell owns a 
45.067% limited partnership interest in the 
Partnership. Sprint Cellular Company (recently 
renamed as 360 < < degrees > > Communications 
Company), the Champaign Telephone Company and 
Git-Cell, the other limited partners, collectively own 
2.14% of the Partnership. 
FN1. In 1982, AT & T owned AMPS, formerly 
Advanced Mobile Phone Services. Later, however, 
AT & T divested itself of this subsidiary. Thus, 
Ameritech Corp. now owns AMPS. 
In July of 1994, Cincinnati Bell filed an amended 
and supplemental complaint requesting several forms 
of relief. [FN2] First, Cincinnati Bell requests this 
Court to dissolve the Partnership pursuant to 6 
Del.C. § 17-802 and appoint a liquidating trustee to 
effectuate the dissolution. Count I asks the Court to 
dissolve the Partnership, alleging that it is not 
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reasonably practicable to carry on the Partnership's 
business for its intended purpose. Count II alleges 
Ameritech has breached unspecified fiduciary duties 
to the limited partners and committed gross 
negligence in managing the Partnership. Cincinnati 
Bell also pleads demand futility in this Count. [FN3] 
Count III claims that Ameritech has been involved in 
self-dealing, in breach of their fiduciary duties, by 
failing to sell the Partnership and continuing to 
employ AMCI as the general partner. In Cincinnati 
Bell's view, a more effective manager could have 
produced a higher rate of return for the Partnership. 
[FN4] 
FN2. Cincinnati Bell filed its initial complaint on 
February 23, 1994. It contained the same causes 
of action as the amended and supplemental 
complaint. 
FN3. Ameritech does not contest the futility of 
demand allegation. 
FN4. In addition to dissolution, damages and 
attorney fees, Cincinnati Bell requests this Court to 
order Ameritech to account to Cincinnati Bell for 
all transactions since the Partnership's formation 
and to provide Cincinnati Bell with all Partnership 
records. The parties did not mention the request 
for an accounting in the briefing on the pending 
motions. 
Before me now are the parties' cross-motions for 
summary judgment. Cincinnati Bell moves for 
summary judgment as to Count I's request for 
dissolution and Count Ill's claim that Ameritech 
breached unspecified fiduciary duties to the limited 
partners by failing to sell the Partnership. However, 
as to Count II's claim for gross negligence in 
managing the Partnership and Count Ill's self-
dealing claim concerning Ameritech's duty to sell 
the Partnership, Cincinnati Bell argues that issues of 
fact exist which preclude summary judgment. 
Ameritech also moves for summary judgment and 
does so as to each of the three counts. 
*2 The parties have generated a substantial record. 
After carefully reviewing that record, the amended 
complaint and the parties' extensive briefing on the 
legal issues, I conclude that summary judgment 
should be granted on all counts of the complaint in 
favor of defendants and against plaintiff 
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
The Court may award summary judgment if the 
moving party establishes that no genuine issue of 
material fact exists with respect to the dispute and 
that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Ch.Ct. Rule 56(c); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 
Del.Supr., 575 A.2d 1131 (1990). When the non-
moving party has the ultimate burden of proof on its 
claims, this Court may grant summary judgment if 
the moving party can demonstrate a complete failure 
of proof on an essential element of a claim. 
Burkhart v. Davies, Del.Supr., 602 A.2d 56, 60 
(1991) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
316, 322-23 (1986)). If the moving party properly 
supports its motion, then the burden shifts to the 
non-moving party to demonstrate that material issues 
of fact exist so that summary judgment is 
inappropriate. State v. Regency Group, Inc., 
Del.Super,, 598 A.2d 1123, 1129 (1991). 
Further, the Court must assume that uncontroverted 
facts which are set forth in the record are true. 
Tanzer v. Int'l Gen. Indus., Inc., Del.Ch., 402 
A.2d 382 (1979). On a cross-motion for summary 
judgment, the Court may imply both that the parties 
concede the absence of material factual disputes and 
acknowledge that the record is sufficient to support 
their motions. Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc., 
Del.Supr., 606 A.2d 96, 100 (1992). 
II. THE UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The Partnership is governed by the Partnership 
Agreement and the Delaware Limited Partnership 
Act, 6 Del.C. §§ 17-101-17-1109. The Partnership 
Agreement allows Ameritech, as general partner, to 
determine if the Partnership requires additional 
capital to fund expansion or operations of the 
business. P.Agmt. § 5. It does not limit the amount 
of capital that the general partner may request. 
Rather, if a partner does not wish to participate in 
that capital call, then it may choose not to 
contribute. In that case, the non- participating 
partner's interest in the Partnership is diluted 
accordingly. Id. 
Each year since the parties formed the Partnership, 
Ameritech, as general partner, has required its 
limited partners to make capital contributions. From 
1984 through 1994, the partners contributed a total 
of $* [FN5] million to the Partnership. Each of the 
partners, including Ameritech, has participated in 
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the capital calls. In 1995, the Partnership made its 
first capital distribution of $* million. 
FN5. Throughout this Opinion, an asterisk denotes 
proprietary information redacted by the Court with 
the parties' consent. 
The Partnership Agreement allows a limited partner 
to sell its interest in the Partnership. If a limited 
partner wishes to sell its interest, the Partnership 
Agreement grants the current partners the first right 
of refusal to purchase that interest. P.Agmt. § 11. 
The Partnership Agreement also allows the limited 
partners to withdraw from the Partnership. In that 
case, the Partnership must pay the limited partner 
for its interest. P.Agmt. § 12. 
*3 The Partnership Agreement allows the partners 
to dissolve the Partnership if the partners 
unanimously agree to do so. P.Agmt. § 14.1(e). 
Only Cincinnati Bell seeks to dissolve the 
Partnership. The Delaware Limited Partnership Act 
also provides a judicial method of dissolution should 
the Court of Chancery find that "it is not reasonably 
practicable to carry on the business in conformity 
with the partnership agreement." 6 Del.C. § 
17-802. 
The Partnership Agreement charges Ameritech, as 
general partner, with the following duties. First, it 
must act in the best interests of the Partnership. 
Second, the general partner must manage the 
Partnership, file all instruments required by law, 
maintain the Partnership's accounts, furnish 
financial statements, and develop an annual business 
plan. P.Agmt. § 8. Notably, however, the 
Partnership Agreement exculpates Ameritech from 
liability for loss to the Partnership or the limited 
partners for "any act or failure to act" unless that act 
or omission amounts to willful misconduct or gross 
negligence. P.Agmt. § 16.1. Further, the 
Partnership Agreement does not provide the limited 
partners with a method by which they may remove 
Ameritech as general managing partner of the 
Partnership. 
The Partnership Agreement denotes the following 
as the Partnership's business purpose-"to fund, 
establish, and provide Cellular Service" in the 
specified geographic area. P.Agmt. § 1.3. The 
Partnership Agreement does not specify a certain 
time by which the Partnership must be profitable or 
any other measure of performance that, if not met, 
will signify that the Partnership is performing 
outside of its business purpose or is a basis upon 
which a partner may seek dissolution. However, in 
the event that the partners dissolve the Partnership, 
the Partnership Agreement requires the general 
partner to distribute its license to provide cellular 
services in the Cincinnati SMS A, as well as the 
assets involved in this service, to Cincinnati Bell. 
P.Agmt. § 14.3. 
The Partnership has provided cellular services to its 
chosen geographic area for approximately ten years. 
It has increased its subscriber base from 7,692 in 
1984, to over *, generating revenues of 
approximately $* million. The Partnership has also 
improved its operating cash flows. In its first five 
years of existence, the Partnership produced 
negative cash flows. In contrast, over the last five 
years, the Partnership has produced positive cash 
flows. For example, in 1994, the Partnership netted 
a positive cash flow of over $* million. The parties 
dispute whether the Partnership has performed 
adequately as a financial matter, especially 
compared to other cellular service providers. No 
one disputes that the Partnership made its first 
partnership distribution in 1995 in the amount of $* 
million. 
In the coming years, cellular service providers will 
face increasing amounts and forms of competition. 
Cincinnati Bell appears especially concerned about 
competition from "personal communication service" 
or "PCS" providers. Analysts project that AT & T 
and GTE may begin providing PCS services as soon 
as 1997. In spite of the Partnership's less than stellar 
performance and the forecasted increase in 
competition, Cincinnati Bell's own expert projects 
that the business is worth $* million. [FN6] 
FN6. Cincinnati Bell's expert claims that its 
projection of the Partnership's worth is based on 
the assumption that the Partnership is managed by 
an entity other than Ameritech. Under 
Ameritech's management, Cincinnati Bell projects 
that the Partnership has a zero net present value. 
Ameritech, however, disputes this fact. Lehman 
Brothers, Ameritech's expert, values the 
Partnership at $* million. 
*4 Apparently, the cellular phone service business 
is not merely a complement to landline services. 
Instead, Cincinnati Bell has found that cellular 
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services compete directly with landline service. 
Importantly, the Partnership Agreement does not 
contain a non-competition clause whereby the 
partners are limited from competing with one 
another. On the contrary, the Partnership 
Agreement provides that the partners are permitted 
to resell cellular services or equipment 
independently from the Partnership either in or 
outside of the Partnership's geographic area. 
However, if a partner chooses to resell services or 
equipment, the transaction must be on an arms-
length basis. P.Agmt. §§ 8, 10. 
On February 8, 1996, President Clinton signed the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "Act") into 
law. Pub.L. 104-133, 110 Stat. 56(1996). The Act 
allows greater competition in the 
telecommunications industry. For example, the Act 
allows the regional Bell companies, including 
Ameritech and Cincinnati Bell, to compete with one 
another. Apparently, Ameritech intends to take 
advantage of this new business opportunity. 
Ameritech issued a notification stating that 
Ameritech Communications, Inc. ("ACI") is 
AMCI's agent with respect to ordering and 
providing telecommunications services and facilities. 
Then Ameritech notified its partners, including 
Cincinnati Bell, that the Partnership will begin 
offering long distance cellular services "bundled" 
with local cellular services in states such as Ohio. 
This packaging of services allows customers to 
purchase cellular and landline services from one 
entity. Cincinnati Bell also provides long distance 
services with its own long distance subsidiary, 
Cincinnati Bell Long Distance Inc. The bundling 
will allow Ameritech Corp. to compete with 
Cincinnati Bell's primary business, its landline 
services. Therefore, ACI's plan to bundle services 
is particularly aggravating to Cincinnati Bell. 
Although Cincinnati Bell has expressed concern 
about the bundling, Ameritech's notification states 
that the profits from the arrangement will accrue to 
the Partnership. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. COUNT I: Judicial Dissolution Pursuant to 6 
Del.C. § 17-802. 
In Count I of the amended complaint, Cincinnati 
Bell seeks dissolution of the Partnership and 
appointment of a liquidating trustee. Both parties 
request summary judgment in their favor as to Count 
I pursuant to 6 Del.C. § 17- 802. Under this 
section, the Court of Chancery may dissolve a 
limited partnership when "it is not reasonably 
practicable to carry on the business in conformity 
with the partnership agreement." 6 Del.C. § 17-802 
(emphasis added). 
Ameritech opposes dissolution and argues that 
Cincinnati Bell has not provided the Court with any 
rationale on which the Court may dissolve the 
Partnership pursuant to § 17-802. Ameritech 
emphasizes that the Partnership is serving its stated 
purpose "to fund, establish and provide Cellular 
Service." Ameritech notes that the Partnership 
Agreement does not require the Partnership to be the 
best in the industry or to meet any level of economic 
performance. In any case, Ameritech's expert, 
Lehman Brothers, estimates that the business can be 
profitable; their discounted cash flow analysis 
indicated that the business is worth $* to $* million. 
Further, Cincinnati Bell's own expert testified that 
the opportunity to carry on the Partnership's 
business is extremely valuable, estimating that the 
business is worth between $* and $* million. In 
fact, all of the partners, except Cincinnati Bell, wish 
to carry on the business, with or without Cincinnati 
Bell. 
*5 In contrast, Cincinnati Bell argues that two bases 
exist on which this Court may grant summary 
judgment in its favor on the dissolution claim. First, 
Cincinnati Bell argues that the Partnership has not 
performed adequately in the past and will fare worse 
with increased competition from the PCS providers. 
Cincinnati Bell insists that the Partnership's purpose 
is to generate economic returns. It notes that, by 
definition, the law presumes that Delaware 
partnerships are "for profit" entities, citing 6 Del.C. 
§ 1506 (defining "partnership" as two or more 
entities associated to carry on a business for profit). 
In support of its argument, Cincinnati Bell claims 
that the present situation mirrors the situation in PC 
Tower Center, Inc. v. Tower Center Dev. Assoc, 
L.P., Del.Ch., C.A. No. 10788, Chandler, V.C. 
(June 8, 1989) where the Court dissolved the 
partnership pursuant to § 17-802 based upon the 
finding that the partnership in question was unlikely 
to turn a profit at any point in the foreseeable future. 
In evaluating whether to dissolve a partnership 
pursuant to § 17-802, courts must determine the 
business of the partnership and the general partners 
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ability to achieve that purpose in conformity with the 
partnership agreement. Red Sail Easter Ltd. 
Partners, L.P. v. Radio City Music Hall Prod., 
Inc., Del.Ch., C.A. No. 12036, Allen, C. (July 28, 
1993), Mem.Op. at 2 (citing PC Tower Center, Inc. 
v. Tower Center Dev. Assoc, L.P., Del.Ch., C.A. 
No. 10788, Chandler, V.C. (June 8, 1989)). In the 
present case, the Partnership Agreement states that 
the Partnership's business purpose is "to fund, 
establish and provide Cellular Service" in the 
specified geographic area. P.Agmt. § 1.3. The 
Partnership Agreement does not establish a time 
schedule by which the Partnership must be profitable 
or any other measure of performance. Nor does the 
Partnership Agreement establish required 
performance standards. Further, Cincinnati Bell has 
failed to provide any evidence suggesting that the 
parties were not intentionally silent on this point 
when they entered the Partnership Agreement. 
Moreover, Cincinnati Bell has not suggested a 
reasonable time period which the parties surely 
would have specified had they considered the issue. 
The Court will not find an implied reasonable time 
period for performance of a contract where the 
agreement is silent on that point. See Gluckman v. 
Holzman, Del.Ch., 53 A.2d 246 (1947) (relying on 
the fact that the parties were intentionally silent on 
the time period for performance). Cf. Bundesen v. 
Beck, Del.Ch., C.A. No. 11347, Berger, V.C. 
(June 23, 1992) (Bundesen II), Mem.Op. at 5 
(finding that if the parties did not intentionally omit 
a time period for performance, then the Court may 
add some reasonable time frame for performance to 
the agreement). 
In spite of the fact that the Partnership appears to 
be operating within its stated business purpose, 
Cincinnati Bell believes the Court should dissolve 
the business because its financial position is so weak 
that it is impractical to carry on the business. 
However, the record shows that the Partnership has 
improved its financial position and currently has 
over * subscribers, generating revenues of 
approximately $* million. The Partnership has also 
improved its operating cash flows. In its first five 
years of existence, the Partnership produced 
negative cash flows. In contrast, over the last five 
years, the Partnership has produced positive cash 
flows. 
*6 Cincinnati Bell's reliance on PC Tower is 
misplaced. In PC Tower, the partnership owned 
certain rental real estate in Dallas, Texas. The 
Dallas real estate market had taken such a dramatic 
downturn that the partnership was unable to service 
its debt and had gone into default on its loans. The 
value of the partnership's real estate had dropped to 
a level below that of the debt. Thus, the partnership 
could only be run at a loss of $6 million per year. 
Importantly, because the Dallas real estate market 
was over-developed, the partnership had no 
reasonable prospect of redeveloping equity in the 
property. Notably also, the partnership agreement 
stated that the business purpose was for profit. 
Thus, the financial situation in PC Tower was 
extremely poor, and the prospects for future 
recovery were dim. 
In contrast, in the present case, the undisputed 
record demonstrates that the Partnership is currently 
producing returns for its investors. Perhaps the 
Partnership's returns are not as great as its 
competitors, but it is meeting its stated purpose of 
providing cellular services. Moreover, Cincinnati 
Bell admits that the business is quite valuable, 
believing that they could receive a healthy return on 
their investment if the Partnership's business were 
sold. In effect, Cincinnati Bell urges the Court to 
compare the Partnership's ideal degree of financial 
success with the actual figures and use this as a basis 
for dissolving the Partnership. Such a comparison, 
while perhaps demonstrating disappointing past 
returns, is an inappropriate basis on which to order 
dissolution. Although Cincinnati Bell may be 
disappointed in its investment, it has not 
demonstrated that the cellular business can no longer 
be sustained. See Red Sail, Del.Ch., C.A. No. 
12036, Allen, C. (Oct. 6, 1992) Mem.Op. at 10 
(noting that a "blizzard of accounting complaints ... 
do not make the business of the firm 
impracticable...."). A report by Cincinnati Bell's 
own expert, Joseph N. Walter, shows that the 
Partnership's performance—measured by number of 
subscribers, growth in market share, revenues and 
EBITDA, and reduction in the churn rate-has 
improved steadily from 1992 through 1994. See 
The Walter Group Report, Appendix to Ameritech's 
Opening Brief, Vol. II at pp. R664, R703. The 
undisputed facts, therefore, fail to provide a basis 
upon which the Court could order dissolution of the 
Partnership. 
In its second argument in support of its dissolution 
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request, Cincinnati Bell posits that another purpose 
of the Partnership is to provide cellular services as a 
complementary, rather than competitive, service to 
its limited partners' primary business-local 
exchange service. Cincinnati Bell notes that the 
parties did not anticipate the extent to which cellular 
services would compete with landline services when 
they entered the Partnership Agreement. The 
parties have found that consumers substitute cellular 
service for landline services. Thus, Cincinnati Bell 
finds itself in the position of funding its own 
competition. 
*7 Moreover, Cincinnati Bell raises its concern 
over the Partnership's intention to provide bundled 
local and long distance cellular services. In 
Cincinnati Bell's view, the bundling allows the 
Partnership to compete directly with Cincinnati 
Bell's primary business, i.e., its wireline 
communications. Cincinnati Bell characterizes 
Ameritech's bundling of services as the general 
partner using the Partnership to advance its own 
competitive position against its limited partners' 
primary business. This competition, argues 
Cincinnati Bell, violates the Partnership Agreement, 
making it not reasonably practicable to carry on the 
Partnership. 
Ameritech insists that the Partnership can, in 
conformity with the Partnership Agreement, 
compete with the limited partners' wireline services. 
Ameritech notes that the Partnership Agreement 
contains no prohibition or limitation on the 
Partnership's competing with wireline services. 
Thus, this competition may occur without violating 
the Partnership Agreement. Moreover, Ameritech 
notes that the parties were aware at the time of 
entering the agreement that wireless services could 
compete with wireline services. Instead of 
protecting itself in the Partnership Agreement, 
Cincinnati Bell executed the Partnership Agreement 
that does not contain a non-compete clause; nor did 
it ever seek an amendment to the Partnership 
Agreement. 
Considering the standard for dissolution under § 
17-802, I cannot accept Cincinnati Bell's argument. 
Indisputably, the Partnership Agreement does not 
limit the Partnership from competing with its limited 
partners. In fact, the Partnership Agreement 
contains a section which permits competition. It 
also provides that the partners may resell cellular 
services or equipment independently from the 
Partnership either in or outside of the Partnership's 
geographic area. The only limitation imposed by 
these sections is that the transactions must be on an 
arms-length basis. P.Agmt. §§ 8, 10. When the 
relationship between the parties is primarily 
contractual in nature, Delaware courts will not 
reform agreements to bestow additional rights on the 
parties for which they did not bargain unless it is 
clear that, had they negotiated on that matter, they 
would have agreed to that point. See generally Katz 
v. Oak Indus. Inc., Del.Ch., 508 A.2d 873 (1986) 
(considering the relationship between a corporation 
and its debt holders as contractual in nature). Here, 
it is not clear that the parties would have included a 
no compete provision in the agreement. 
Competition between the Partnership and Cincinnati 
Bell is not a viable rationale for determining that the 
Partnership cannot be carried on in a "reasonably 
practicable" manner, consistent with the Partnership 
Agreement. [FN7] Notably, Cincinnati Bell is free 
to cash out its interest in the Partnership. Thus, it 
need not continue to fund competition against itself. 
Strangely, however, while it complains about 
funding its own competition, Cincinnati Bell 
continues to hold its Partnership interest. [FN8] 
Absent some limitation on competition against the 
Partnership in the Partnership Agreement (or some 
indication that had the parties considered it ex ante, 
they would have included such a provision in the 
Partnership Agreement), the fact that Cincinnati Bell 
is frightened of future competition is not a basis for 
unilaterally dissolving a viable business at the 
request of one limited partner. 
FN7. This rationale for dissolution would also 
broaden the standard for dissolution expressed in 6 
Del.C. § 17-802. As mentioned later in this 
Opinion, it is not appropriate to broaden the 
dissolution standard so as to expand the Court of 
Chancery's power beyond what the Legislature 
intended. 
FN8. Notably, Cincinnati Bell and Ameritech 
entered discussions concerning a sale of Cincinnati 
Bell's interest in the Partnership to Ameritech in 
1992. Ameritech offered a substantial amount of 
money for Cincinnati Bell's interest, an amount 
that even Cincinnati Bell's chief executive officer 
has characterized as a "good return all in all" 
considering the size of Cincinnati Bell's investment 
at the time. Because Cincinnati Bell's officers and 
directors viewed the Partnership as ultimately 
Copr. © West 1998 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
Not Reported in A.2d 
(Cite as: 1996 WL 506906, *7 (Del.Ch.)) 
Page 7 
worth more than Ameritech's offer, they decided 
Cincinnati Bell should remain in the Partnership. 
*8 Finally, Cincinnati Bell argues that Ameritech 
will compete with the Partnership itself by bundling 
services. Cincinnati Bell explains that ACI will 
place Ameritech in a conflict of interest situation 
because ACI will choose between selling wireline 
services or wireless services. If it chooses to sell 
wireline services, then Ameritech will receive 100% 
of the wholesale profit, whereas if it sells wireless 
service, AMCI will receive only 53% of the profit. 
Cincinnati Bell insists that this alleged competition is 
a breach of Ameritech's fiduciary duties and that the 
breach is a basis upon which to dissolve the 
Partnership. 
Ameritech contends that Cincinnati Bell has no 
basis for asserting that Ameritech will provide 
cellular service within the Partnership area other 
than by reselling the Partnership's services. Section 
7.1(a) of the Partnership Agreement expressly 
permits reselling of services and, further, authorizes 
Ameritech, as general partner, to cause the 
Partnership to enter into agreements for such 
services. Additionally, Ameritech argues that the 
profits will accrue to the Partnership itself and that 
providing long distance services is in the 
Partnership's best interest. Ameritech notes that it 
has not violated its duties to the Partnership at this 
point and that Cincinnati Bell's concerns are merely 
speculative. Ameritech also notes that Cincinnati 
Bell is free to enter into similar reselling 
arrangements. 
Cincinnati Bell suggests that by reselling cellular 
services through ACI, ACI is competing with the 
Partnership's retail cellular service operations. 
Cincinnati Bell notes that the Partnership has 16 
stores that sell cellular services, but these stores do 
not provide the "bundled" service. Thus, according 
to Cincinnati Bell, ACI is a subsidiary of AMCI that 
competes with one of the Partnership's lines of 
business. Even though Cincinnati Bell 
acknowledges that ACI is currently selling long 
distance services through the Partnership, it believes 
that Ameritech intends to offer long distance through 
ACI or another subsidiary. 
Cincinnati Bell's argument here is flawed because 
its own concessions demonstrate that Ameritech 
currently does not compete with the Partnership. 
First, by recognizing that ACI is currently selling 
long distance services through the Partnership, 
Cincinnati Bell is conceding that Ameritech is not 
competing with the Partnership currently. Whether 
Ameritech will compete with the Partnership in the 
future is unknown. Second, the fact that Ameritech 
plans for the profits from the bundling to accrue to 
the Partnership also demonstrates that Ameritech is 
not competing with the Partnership. Cincinnati Bell 
is merely speculating that Ameritech will compete 
with Cincinnati Bell by offering long distance 
through ACI in the future. This conjectural 
rationale is not a basis on which the Court may 
dissolve the Partnership now, especially considering 
that the Partnership Agreement does not proscribe 
competition between partners. Moreover, even if 
such competition were occurring today, it is not a 
basis for dissolution because the Partnership 
Agreement is intentionally silent on the risks of 
competition between and among partners. 
*9 As more fully explained later in this Opinion, 
Cincinnati Bell agreed to limit Ameritech's fiduciary 
duties as the general partner. In Section 16.1 of the 
Partnership Agreement, Cincinnati Bell agreed that 
Ameritech would not be liable to either Cincinnati 
Bell or the Partnership for any breaches (fiduciary 
or otherwise) unless the breach involved willful 
misconduct or gross negligence. Ameritech believes 
that bundling services does not violate the 
Partnership Agreement. This interpretation of the 
Partnership Agreement appears reasonable and, at 
the very least, reasonable minds may disagree as to 
whether the bundling of services is beneficial to the 
Partnership. Thus, one cannot conclude as a matter 
of law that by bundling services, Ameritech willfully 
or in a grossly negligent manner violated its duties 
of loyalty to the Partnership's business. Its duties to 
the limited partners only go so far as the business of 
the Partnership itself. See Davenport Group MG v. 
Strategic Investment Partners, Inc., Del.Ch., C.A. 
No. 14426, Steele, V.C. (Jan. 23, 1996), Mem.Op. 
at 15. In sum, because the exculpation provision in 
the Partnership Agreement encompasses the 
allegedly self-dealing plan to bundle services, this 
alleged breach is not a reason for the Court to 
dissolve the Partnership. 
Cincinnati Bell has failed to point to specific facts 
on which this Court may determine that the business 
is no longer reasonably practicable to continue. 
Since Cincinnati Bell has the ultimate burden of 
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proof on its dissolution claim, and it has failed to 
show specific facts supporting this claim, Ameritech 
is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on the 
dissolution claim. Burkhart v. Davies, Del.Supr., 
602 A.2d 56, 60 (1991). 
B. Counts II and III: Ameritech's Duty to Sell the 
Partnership Assets 
The parties agree that the Partnership's business 
purpose is "to fund, establish and provide" cellular 
mobile services within a geographic area bounded by 
Cincinnati, Dayton and Columbus, Ohio. The 
Partnership Agreement does not contain provisions 
authorizing the general partner or the limited 
partners to sell the Partnership assets as a going 
concern. Nevertheless, Cincinnati Bell seeks 
summary judgment on the claim, asserted in Counts 
II and III of its complaint, that Ameritech, as 
general partner, has a fiduciary duty to sell the 
Partnership's business and distribute the sale 
proceeds proportionately to the partners. This duty 
to sell the business, contends Cincinnati Bell, arises 
from two interconnected sources: (1) the general 
fiduciary duty that all general partners owe to their 
limited partners, Boxer v. Husky Oil Co., 
Del.Super., 429 A.2d 995, 997 (1981), and (2) the 
specific fiduciary duties of a trustee with respect to 
the assets of a trust, since trust law principles are 
applicable by analogy (argues Cincinnati Bell) to 
limited partnerships. Against the backdrop of these 
two legal frameworks, Cincinnati Bell then argues 
that Ameritech has a fiduciary duty to the limited 
partners to sell the Partnership's business because 
the business is worth more if sold than if it is 
managed by Ameritech. Cincinnati Bell believes the 
truth of this factual claim-that the partners' return 
on equity would be greater if the Partnership were 
liquidated immediately-is incontestably 
demonstrated by the record evidence. 
*10 Cincinnati Bell first points to the Partnership's 
lackluster performance over its ten-year life. Next, 
Cincinnati Bell's experts testified that Ameritech's 
financial forecasts for future cash flow are 
implausible. In fact, Cincinnati Bell's experts 
suggest that the net present value of the Partnership, 
based on Cincinnati Bell's own forecasts, is 
negative. Finally, Cincinnati Bell's experts testified 
that the Partnership can be sold today to a strategic 
buyer (another telecommunications company) for 
$700 million to $850 million, making its sale value 
enormously greater than its operating value. 
Ameritech responds to all of these arguments but it 
especially attacks the claims regarding the 
Partnership's past and predicted future financial 
performance. Assembling its own financial experts, 
Ameritech challenges the conclusions of Cincinnati 
Bell's experts and, without doubt, the "battle of the 
experts" in this case would consume much time and 
effort were this issue ever tried before the Court. 
But I find it unnecessary to enter into the fray over 
the Partnership's net present value as an operating 
business compared to its sale value to a third party. 
This debate, in my opinion, obscures the essential 
point: Under the Partnership Agreement Ameritech, 
as the general partner, has no authority to sell the 
Partnership's business. The Partnership Agreement 
specifically provides that the Partnership's purpose 
is to fund, establish and provide cellular services in 
the designated geographic area. The general partner 
is given broad powers in furtherance of this 
purpose-to market, sell and maintain cellular 
services in the limited geographic area for which the 
Partnership is licensed. In a fundamental sense, 
selling the Partnership's business would be contrary 
to the Partnership's stated purpose. A forced sale by 
judicial decree of dissolution would end the 
Partnership's ability to carry out its purpose of 
providing cellular services in the affected region. 
Cincinnati Bell notes that the Partnership 
Agreement, in Section 4.1, grants Ameritech the 
power to sell the "cellular service system," as well 
as cellular services and, thus, such action is actually 
consistent with the Partnership Agreement's terms 
and conditions. See Kansas RSA 15 Limited 
Partnership v. SBMS RSA, Inc., Del.Ch., C.A. 
No. 13986, Allen, C. (March 8, 1995) (refusing to 
grant summary judgment where similar language 
was in issue). Nevertheless, I find this language 
consistent with the purpose of funding, establishing 
and providing cellular services in the particular 
geographic region. The general partners' power to 
market, sell, operate and maintain the cellular 
service system is necessary for carrying out the 
Partnership's business purpose- promoting and 
providing cellular services to subscribers. Based on 
the terms of the Partnership Agreement, I conclude 
as a matter of law that Ameritech, as the general 
partner, has no authority to sell the Partnership's 
business. 
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*11 Nor do applicable provisions of Delaware's 
partnership statutes give Ameritech the right to sell 
the Partnership's business without the unanimous 
consent of all the partners. Under § 17-403(a) of 
the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, a 
general partner of a limited partnership "has the 
rights and powers and is subject to the restrictions of 
a partner in a partnership without limited partners." 
6 Del.C. § 17-403(a). A partner in a partnership 
without limited partners is governed by Delaware 
Uniform Partnership Law § 1509, which provides in 
pertinent part: 
(c) Unless authorized by the other partners or 
unless they have abandoned the business, one or 
more but less than all partners have no authority 
to: 
* * * 
(2) Dispose of the good will of the business; 
(3) Do any other act which would make it 
impossible to carry on the ordinary business of a 
partnership.... 
6 Del.C. § 1509(c) (emphasis added). 
In the absence of language in a partnership 
agreement expressly empowering the general partner 
to sell the Partnership's business (as here), a general 
partner cannot sell the business without unanimous 
consent of all the partners. As a result, each 
partner, including Ameritech in this case, has a right 
under the applicable Partnership Law Statute (6 
Del.C. § 1509) to withhold consent to a sale of the 
Partnership's business. 
Cincinnati Bell dismisses the statute's unanimous 
consent restriction by saying the restriction cannot 
"supersede the unquestioned duty of a general 
partner to sell a business when necessary to meet 
[the general partner's] fiduciary obligations owed 
the limited partners." Cincinnati Bell urges the 
Court to order dissolution and sale of the 
Partnership because Ameritech has a fiduciary duty 
to sell it and refuses to do so. 
In some respects I think Cincinnati Bell's argument 
for dissolution and sale implicitly broadens this 
Court's power to decree judicial dissolution of a 
limited partnership as defined under § 17-802 of the 
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act. The 
Court of Chancery's power to order dissolution and 
sale, in my opinion, is a narrow and limited power. 
See PC Tower, Del.Ch., C.A. No. 10788. The 
Court should not enlarge the dissolution power 
beyond the reach intended by the Legislature when it 
enacted § 17-802. Cf. Red Sail Easter Limited 
Partners, LP v. Radio City Music Hall Productions, 
Inc., Del.Ch., C.A. No. 12036, Allen, C. (Oct. 6, 
1992) (applying PC Tower standard and § 17-802 
standard and refusing to adopt broader dissolution 
principles from general partnership law). 
Nevertheless, I have considered Cincinnati Bell's 
argument that general fiduciary duty principles, by 
analogy to corporation law or to trust law, require 
Ameritech to sell the Partnership to another 
competing telecommunications company. Fiduciary 
duties of care and loyalty require a sale in these 
circumstances, Cincinnati Bell argues, because (1) 
it's the prudent thing to do when an asset's operating 
value is less than its sale value; (2) the partners 
never expected that the Partnership's wireless phone 
business would compete directly against the 
partners' wireline phone business; and (3) 
Ameritech as general partner is competing, via the 
Partnership that it manages, against Cincinnati Bell's 
wireline business in the Cincinnati region. These 
developments-together with Cincinnati Bell's 
prediction that the level of competition threatened by 
the Partnership's business will increase dramatically 
in the future-have changed the partners' underlying 
business assumptions about the Partnership's 
business. With the Partnership poised to compete 
directly against the limited partners who fund it with 
significant capital contributions, Cincinnati Bell 
vigorously contends that Ameritech's refusal to sell 
is a violation of its fiduciary obligations to the other 
partners. 
*12 Ameritech is quick to point out that the 
partners did foresee the competitive threat wireless 
services posed to wireline companies, that the 
Partnership Agreement itself does not proscribe 
competition between the Partnership and the 
constituent partners, that the Partnership actually 
enhances each partner's competitiveness by allowing 
partners to "resell" and "bundle" services such as 
wireless plus local or long distance with wireline 
services, and that Ameritech's own experts 
demonstrate that the Partnership is more valuable if 
operated rather than sold now. 
All of the charges and counter-charges regarding 
this Partnership's lackluster past performance, and 
the highly conjectural claims over its sale value 
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today versus five years from now, are beside the 
point. Even accepting Cincinnati Bell's factual 
allegations about the Partnership's competition with 
the partners and its contention that the Partnership 
has a greater value if sold than if operated, 
Ameritech is entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law on the breach of fiduciary duty claims 
in Counts II and III. Corporation law is the source 
of most Delaware jurisprudence relating to the 
fiduciary duty of managers. Partnerships have much 
in common with the business corporation, not least 
of which is that the general partner exercises full 
managerial authority of the partnership similar to 
that exercised by a board of directors for a 
corporation. Thus, general fiduciary principles as 
applied in Delaware's corporation law decisions are 
applicable in the context of this limited partnership. 
Litman v. Prudential-Bache Properties, Del.Ch., 
611 A.2dl2, 15(1992). 
A majority stockholder in a Delaware corporation 
owes no duty to sell its holdings in the corporation 
just because the sale would profit the minority. 
Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., Del.Supr., 535 
A.2d 840, 844-845 (1987) (holding that a 
shareholder is under no duty to sell its holdings in 
corporation even if it is a majority shareholder, 
merely because the sale would profit the minority). 
Similarly, directors of the corporation have no 
obligation to approve a sale of the company's assets, 
even if such a sale would be advantageous, where 
the directors rightfully hold a veto of such a sale as 
shareholders. Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., Del.Supr., 
676 A.2d 436, 437 (1996) (discussing Thorpe v. 
CERBCO, Inc., Del.Ch., C.A. No. 11713, Allen, 
C. (Oct. 29, 1993), Mem.Op. at 10-11, where 
Chancellor Allen held that a majority stockholder's 
ownership of its stock includes the property right to 
cast the controlling vote and to veto a sale of the 
business, even if a sale would be in the best interests 
of minority stockholders). 
These same principals apply in the context of this 
limited Partnership. Ameritech owns 52% of the 
Partnership. Ameritech has property rights akin to 
those of a majority stockholder. Cincinnati Bell, 
with a 45% interest, is a passive minority investor 
widi limited liability. Cincinnati Bell has no 
management authority. As with a minority 
stockholder, Cincinnati Bell has no right to demand 
that the majority owner sell all the business assets 
just because a sale would profit Cincinnati Bell. 
*13 Like a majority stockholder in a corporation, 
Ameritech is the general partner and majority 
Partnership owner and is entitled to exercise its veto 
of a sale of the Partnership's business. Exercise of 
its property right in this fashion does not breach 
Ameritech's fiduciary duty to the minority interest 
partners. Ameritech's responsibility is to manage 
the Partnership in accordance with its purpose of 
establishing and providing cellular services in the 
Cincinnati, Columbus and Dayton region. 
Ameritech is under no fiduciary obligation to 
abandon that purpose and sell the business because 
one limited partner—Cincinnati Bell—believes it 
would be in its own strategic business interest to do 
so. All of the partners are entitled to resell 
Partnership wireless services, and to bundles 
services (offering wireless via the Partnership with 
local/long distance wireline) for its own customers, 
thereby offsetting potential losses in the wireline 
business with wireless services from the Partnership. 
This is the purpose of the Partnership, clearly 
expressed in the Partnership Agreement. If the 
partners want to sell the Partnership's business, all 
of the partners must consent to such a sale. Unless it 
is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business 
in conformity with its purpose or unless all the 
partners agreed to a dissolution of the business, 
Ameritech is under a duty to carry out the 
Partnership's purpose as expressed in the 
Partnership Agreement. If a partner does not share 
Ameritech's vision of the Partnership's viability in 
the cellular market, that partner retains the right 
under the Partnership Agreement to cash out its 
interest in the Partnership or to withdraw from the 
Partnership. In these circumstances, therefore, I 
conclude that as a matter of law Ameritech is 
entitled to summary judgment on Cincinnati Bell's 
claim in Counts II and III that Ameritech has 
breached its fiduciary duties of care and loyalty by 
refusing to sell the Partnership's business. [FN9] 
FN9. I do not accept Cincinnati Bell's argument 
that trust law principles apply in this setting. A 
trustee's duty is to invest and conserve the trust 
assets for the benefit of the cestui que trust. A 
general partner's obligation, like that of a director, 
is to manage a specific business, a task that implies 
entrepreneurial risks. Because of the fundamental 
difference between the duties and functions of a 
trustee and a general partner in this case, I do not 
think trust law principles should, by analogy, be 
applied to Ameritech's duties as general partner of 
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the Partnership. Cf. Cinerama, Inc. v. 
Technicolor, Inc., Del.Ch., 663 A.2d 1134, 1148 
(1994). 
C. Counts II and III: Cincinnati Bell's Claims of 
Mismanagement and Gross Negligence 
In Counts II and III of its amended and 
supplemental complaint, Cincinnati Bell alleges that 
Ameritech has breached the Partnership Agreement 
and has managed the Partnership in a grossly 
negligent manner. Cincinnati Bell has alleged 
numerous specific examples of Ameritech's gross 
mismanagement, but Cincinnati Bell insists that it is 
the "pattern" of conduct of Ameritech that 
constitutes gross mismanagement. For this pattern 
of mismanagement, Cincinnati Bell seeks money 
damages. 
Before turning to the specific instances of alleged 
mismanagement (and the pattern of conduct of 
which they form constituent elements), it is useful to 
review the relevant terms of the Partnership 
Agreement concerning management and control of 
the Partnership. As mentioned earlier, § 1.3 of the 
Partnership Agreement notes the Partnership's 
purpose is to fund, establish and provide cellular 
services. In §§ 7.1 and 7.2, the Partnership 
Agreement sets out in broad terms the powers of a 
general partner: 
*14 7.1 Partnership Powers. In furtherance of the 
business purpose specified in Section 1.3, the 
Partnership, and the General Partner on behalf of 
the Partnership, shall be empowered to do or 
cause to be done any and all acts reasonably 
deemed by the General Partner to be necessary or 
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the 
Partnership or [similarly to] forebear from doing 
any act ... including without limitation, the power 
and authority: 
(a) To enter into, perform and carry out contracts 
and agreements of every kind necessary or 
incidental to the accomplishment of the 
Partnership's purposes, including, without 
limitation, contracts and agreements with the 
General Partner and Affiliates of the General 
Partner ... 
* * * 
(c) To carry on any other activities necessary to, 
in connection with or incidental to any of the 
foregoing. 
7.2 Powers of the General Partner. In addition to 
those powers vested pursuant to Section 7.1, the 
General Partner hereby is vested with the power 
to: 
(a) Manage, supervise and conduct the affairs of 
the Partnership; 
(b) Make all elections, investigations, evaluations 
and decisions, binding the Partnership hereby, that 
may be necessary or appropriate in connection 
with the business purposes of the Partnership ... 
Importantly, § 16.1 of the Partnership Agreement 
confers upon Ameritech, in exercising these 
managerial powers, broad contractual protection for 
conduct in its capacity as general partner: 
16.1 Exculpation of the General Partner. The 
General Partner will not be liable for any loss to 
the Partnership or the Limited Partners by reason 
of any act or failure to act unless the General 
Partner was guilty of willful misconduct or gross 
negligence. 
These provisions clearly demonstrate that the 
parties to the Partnership Agreement contracted to 
broadly empower the general partner to decide how 
to conduct the Partnership's business, including 
dealing with itself. In addition, the parties expressly 
limited the general partner's liabilities for loss by 
reason of any act or failure to act unless the general 
partner was guilty of willful misconduct or gross 
negligence. 
Cincinnati Bell's complaint does not charge the 
general partner, AMCI, with willful misconduct. 
Instead, Cincinnati Bell characterizes AMCI's 
conduct over the years as gross negligence and gross 
mismanagement. Under Delaware law, therefore, it 
is Cincinnati Bell's burden to plead and to prove that 
AMCI was "recklessly uninformed" or acted 
"outside the bounds of reason." Tomczak v. Morton 
Thiokol, Inc., Del.Ch., C.A. No. 7861, Hartnett, 
V.C. (April 5, 1990), Mem.Op. at 31-32; Rabkin 
v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp., Del.Ch., 547 
A.2d 963, 970 (1986). 
Ameritech argues that three acts of alleged gross 
negligence in particular are barred by the statute of 
limitations. I will consider these three events 
(hereinafter "the stale claims") at the outset, and 
treat the remaining nine examples of gross 
negligence (hereinafter "the pattern of 
mismanagement claims") later in this Opinion. 
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(1) The Stale Claims. 
*15 Cincinnati Bell charges that AMCI raised 
prices for cellular services in order to compensate 
for declining revenues per customer. AMCI 
miscalculated the effect of the increase. The price 
increase resulted in customer defections and a loss 
of sales to new customers. AMCI eventually was 
forced to roll back the price increases. Ameritech 
disputes this claim, providing uncontradicted 
evidence that the price increase occurred in other 
AMCI managed partnerships, and not in the Ohio 
market. Importantly for this motion, however, is 
the undisputed fact that the increases occurred in 
1989, over four years before this lawsuit was filed. 
Next, Cincinnati Bell accuses AMCI of gross 
negligence or a breach of the Partnership Agreement 
when it caused the Partnership to acquire certain 
retail store operations in 1985 and 1989 and to 
operate them thereafter. Cincinnati Bell also 
complains that in 1992 AMCI changed its marketing 
strategy by offering to rent cellular telephones 
without first doing a study or analysis to determine 
the effect of such a change in strategy. Cincinnati 
Bell's own records, however, clearly show that the 
rental program began in 1990. 
Cincinnati Bell instituted this action on February 
23, 1994. All of the above incidents of alleged 
gross negligence or breach of the Partnership 
Agreement occurred before February 23, 1991, or 
more than three years before Cincinnati Bell filed 
the complaint. Delaware's three years statute of 
limitation applies to claims for breach of contract 
and to money damage claims for breach of fiduciary 
duty. 10 Del.C. § 8106; Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 
Del.Supr., 262 A.2d 246, 250-51 (1970). 
Accordingly, unless the statute of limitations has 
been tolled in this case, Section 8106 bars these 
three specific claims of alleged gross negligence. 
Not surprisingly, Cincinnati Bell offers five theories 
for why the statute of limitations should be tolled. 
Of course, where a plaintiff knows or should know 
of a supposed wrong, the statute of limitations is not 
tolled. See Kahn v. Seaboard Corp., Del.Ch., 625 
A.2d 269, 277 (1993). Although Cincinnati Bell 
had contemporaneous knowledge, via its personnel 
monitoring the Partnership, of the incidents of which 
it now complains, it says it did not file the suit 
within the appropriate time because it relied on 
Ameritech's financial forecasts and was lulled into a 
false sense of complacency. Cincinnati Bell also 
characterizes AMCI's alleged wrongs as "continuing 
torts," for which the statute of limitations 
commences to run only when the tortious acts have 
ceased. See Van Heest v. McNeilab, Inc., 624 
F.Supp. 891 (D.Del. 1985). Next, Cincinnati Bell 
contends that its cause of action against Ameritech 
did not accrue until some undefined moment after 
February 23, 1991, when Ameritech's complete 
"portfolio" of negligent acts amounted, in 
combination, to gross negligence, thereby giving 
rise to an actionable claim. Citing Bovay v. H.M. 
Byllesby & Co., Del.Supr., 38 A.2d 808 (1944), 
Cincinnati Bell also insists that Ameritech's self-
dealing equitably tolled the statute of limitations. 
Finally, Cincinnati Bell argues that the three year 
statute of limitations pursuant to Section 8106 is 
tolled until actual damages caused by the asserted 
wrongs have been found to exist. 
*16 Based on the uncontroverted facts, Cincinnati 
Bell's claims of gross mismanagement arising from 
the 1989 price increase, the 1985 and 1989 
acquisition of retail stores and the 1990 cellular 
phone rental program, all are barred by the three 
year limitations period established in Section 8106. 
None of the reasons offered by Cincinnati Bell for 
tolling the statute are persuasive. First, a statute of 
limitations begins running even though actual or 
substantial damages are inflicted at a later date. 
Kaufman v. C.L. McCabe & Sons, Inc., Del.Supr., 
603 A.2d 831, 834 (1992); Isaacson, Stolper & Co. 
v. Artisan's Savings Bank, Del.Supr., 330 A.2d 
130, 132 (1974). Second, equitable tolling occurs 
when the plaintiff can show it was ignorant of the 
wrong due to the defendant's fraud or fraudulent 
concealment or some other circumstance justifying 
why plaintiff did not have reason to know of the 
facts constituting the alleged wrong. Kahn v. 
Seaboard Corp., Del.Ch., 625 A.2d 269, 276 
(1993). See In re Maxxam, Inc./Federated 
Development Shareholders Litig., Del.Ch., C.A. 
No. 12111, Jacobs, V.C. (June 21, 1995), 
Mem.Op. at 13-14; Patterson v. Hanby, Del.Ch., 
C.A. No. 6354 & 6062, Walsh, V.C. (April 24, 
1985), Mem.Op. at 5-6. Cincinnati Bell cannot 
show that it was ignorant of the wrong because the 
undisputed facts show that it knew of the stale 
claims at the time, including the alleged self-dealing 
claim. Bovay v. H.M. Byllesby & Co., thus does 
not apply. Third, Cincinnati Bell's portfolio theory, 
combining all of Ameritech's alleged negligent acts 
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to make one later claim of gross negligence, is inapt 
here where the stale claims are actually separate 
claims involving discrete business decisions made by 
different persons. A combination of negligent acts 
by the same person may constitute gross negligence 
when the negligent acts can be viewed as cumulative 
with causative factors or inextricably related events 
leading to a particular incident or injury. In this 
case, the undisputed facts show that Cincinnati 
Bell's claims relate to the alleged negligence of 
separate persons, making independent business 
judgments, under distinct business conditions. 
These separable acts cannot be woven together as 
though they are part of an intertwined fabric 
constituting a monolithic course of conduct. Indeed, 
each incident cited by Cincinnati Bell is a free-
standing event, a business judgment with its own 
distinct subject matter. Cincinnati Bell has taken 
separate business decisions involving different 
people separated by time and lumped them together 
as one actionable wrong. Cincinnati Bell's 
argument, however, is belied by the pleadings and 
by the record evidence. Accordingly, Cincinnati 
Bell's portfolio theory, and the continuing tort 
theory, are inapplicable. Finally, even Cincinnati 
Bell's complaint contradicts the claim that it delayed 
bringing this lawsuit because of its reliance on 
Ameritech's financial forecasts. The complaint 
alleges that Cincinnati Bell did not assert its 
dissolution claim earlier because of Ameritech's 
rosy forecasts regarding the Partnership's future 
profitability. No other particularized facts support 
Cincinnati Bell's argument that its reliance on 
Ameritech's financial forecasts caused it to delay 
filing a lawsuit concerning the stale mismanagement 
claims. 
*17 The undisputed facts do not support Cincinnati 
Bell's contention that the statute of limitations 
should be tolled. Accordingly, because Cincinnati 
Bell knew or should have known of the stale claims 
at the time of the alleged grossly negligent actions, I 
find that the three stale claims are barred by the 
statute of limitations. 10 Del.C. § 8106. 
I turn now to the nine remaining examples of 
alleged gross negligence and mismanagement. 
Because Cincinnati Bell insists that the examples 
should be viewed collectively, as a pattern of 
mismanagement, I will treat them collectively, 
rather than individually. 
(2) Ameritech's Alleged Pattern of Mismanagement. 
The complaint recites a litany of decisions by 
Ameritech that, in Cincinnati Bell's view, have had 
disastrous consequences for the Partnership. 
Cincinnati Bell portrays these decisions as either 
based on inadequate information, poor planning, 
self-interestedness, or disregard for the terms of the 
Partnership Agreement. 
In early 1992, AMCI began implementation of the 
"D2000" initiative, which sought to reduce customer 
acquisition costs by cutting sales commission rates 
across the board. Unfortunately, D2000 had 
unfavorable results because competitors kept their 
commission rates high, thus causing the Partnership 
to lose many important channels of distribution to its 
competitors. The loss of distribution channels 
resulted in lower subscriber growth rates. 
Cincinnati Bell attacks AMCI for "inadequate 
investigation" of the D2000 initiative. 
Cincinnati Bell also points to certain non-officer 
bonuses that AMCI paid in years when "revenue 
goals" were not achieved by the Partnership. 
Evidently, Ameritech rewards managers in the Ohio 
Partnership in whole or in part on the basis of 
AMCI's performance in managing all of 
Ameritech's Partnership ventures, not just on the 
basis of the Ohio Partnership's performance. In 
years when the Ohio Partnership performed poorly, 
therefore, AMCI still paid bonuses based on 
Ameritech's bonus "structure." 
Cincinnati Bell next contends that since at least 
1992 Ameritech should have made efforts to sell the 
Partnership, as a sale would have been instantly 
profitable to all the partners. This contrasts sharply, 
says Cincinnati Bell, with the ongoing dismal 
operating performance of the Partnership under 
AMCI. Furthermore, in light of the Partnership's 
allegedly poor performance, Cincinnati Bell 
contends Ameritech should turn over the 
Partnership's management authority from AMPS 
and AMCI to a "competent outside manager." 
Yet another decision of which Cincinnati Bell 
complains occurred when Ameritech prematurely 
caused the Partnership to begin converting from 
analog to digital equipment, phasing out Series I cell 
site equipment and upgrading it to Series II 
equipment. This conversion cost the Partnership 
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about $* million in 1993, an expense that Cincinnati 
Bell contends the Partnership does not need to incur 
until 1997. 
Cincinnati Bell also faults Ameritech for not having 
an adequate marketing plan for the Ohio 
Partnership. Cincinnati Bell's expert, Dr. Frederick 
Russ, a professor of marketing at the University of 
Cincinnati, testified that AMCI's Ohio market plans 
would not receive a passing grade in his marketing 
strategy class. To illustrate the deficiency, 
Professor Russ contends AMCI should adopt a plan 
that follows the general marketing plan framework 
suggested by Philip Kotler, an authority on 
marketing management. [FN10] Another instance 
of gross negligence, according to Cincinnati Bell, is 
AMCI's improper reimbursements for expenses and 
overhead from 1991-1994. AMCI staffs all 
Partnership activities and charges the Partnership 
with expenses and overhead. Cincinnati Bell notes 
that under Section 14.2 of the Partnership 
Agreement such expenses must be "incurred" by the 
general partner and that is AMPS, not AMCI. 
Thus, Cincinnati Bell contends these expenses and 
costs as allocated by AMCI were not allowed under 
the Partnership Agreement. 
FN 10. Philip Kotler is a professor at the Kellogg 
Graduate School of Management, Northwestern 
University, and author of the most widely used 
marketing textbook in graduate schools of business. 
See Ameritech's Appendix, Vol. II at 549-577. 
*18 Cincinnati Bell argues that Ameritech has been 
grossly negligent in failing to merge or "partner" 
with other wireless carriers in a national consortium 
as a response to the advent of PCS and the efforts of 
AT & T and GTE to create a national wireless 
business composed of both cellular and PCS 
licenses. Finally, Cincinnati Bell claims that 
Ameritech's forecasts of the Partnership's cash 
flow, profitability and capital needs demonstrated 
gross mismanagement, both because of the manner 
in which the forecasts were prepared and because 
ultimately the forecasts proved inaccurate. 
The Partnership Agreement exculpates Ameritech 
from liability for loss to the Partnership or the 
limited partners for its acts or omissions unless the 
act or omission amounts to willful misconduct or 
gross negligence. Cincinnati Bell lists nine acts or 
omissions as examples of a pattern of gross 
negligence and mismanagement. Cincinnati Bell 
contends the evidence surrounding these acts or 
omissions is in dispute and, thus, summary judgment 
is inappropriate. 
Most of the disputed evidence, however, centers 
around conflicting opinions by experts concerning 
the wisdom of a particular business strategy 
undertaken by AMCI on behalf of the Partnership 
(for example, the D2000 initiative; the switch from 
analog to digital equipment; the absence of a 
Kotler-type marketing plan; the failure to partner 
with other wireless carriers in a national consortium; 
the structure for awarding incentive bonuses). 
Ameritech counters each charge of mismanagement 
with an arsenal of statistics and expert opinion 
justifying the business decisions undertaken on 
behalf of the Partnership. None of this disputed 
evidence, however, is a basis for denying summary 
judgment because the material facts are in 
agreement-all of the questioned acts or decisions 
were business decisions undertaken in good faith by 
the managing partner to meet a strong competitor in 
the Ohio market (CCI), often on the advice of 
consultants and experts hired by the managing 
partner specifically for the purpose of making such 
decisions. Thus, in the D2000 initiative example, 
the uncontested facts reveal that Ameritech adopted 
it on the recommendation of qualified outside 
consultants and implemented the plan to the 
consultants' satisfaction. So even though Cincinnati 
Bell now points to opinions post hoc from its experts 
that the initiative was poorly conceived or 
implemented, it cannot show that Ameritech's 
conduct represents gross negligence. The evidence 
is and would be that Ameritech adopted D2000 after 
soliciting advice from recognized experts. As a 
matter of law, on those undisputed facts, I cannot 
conclude that Ameritech acted in a recklessly 
uninformed manner. 
This same conclusion is inevitable with regard to 
the decisions not to join a national consortium of 
wireless carriers or to switch to digital equipment 
earlier rather than later in the Partnership's life. 
These are the sorts of business judgments typically 
made by a general partner. No evidence indicates 
that the general partner made these decisions without 
a review of the costs, advantages and disadvantages. 
In each instance, undisputed facts show that each 
suspect decision was the product of a cost benefit 
calculation commonplace in business entities 
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operating in a highly competitive market. 
*19 Ameritech's failure to sell the Partnership's 
business and to hire a competent outside manager 
also do not fall outside the bounds of reason. As 
earlier noted, Ameritech is under no duty to sell its 
majority interest in the Partnership, even if to do so 
would benefit the minority. Nor is it legally 
required, as the majority interest holder and as the 
general managing partner, to turn management of 
the Partnership over to an outside party. If 
Ameritech were legally obligated to do so, it would 
find itself in the dubious position of having 
surrendered management to another while remaining 
fully liable as the general partner. 
Even treating all nine discrete acts or omissions as 
one seamless web of general partner decisions, I 
cannot find from the uncontradicted facts that they 
fall outside the bounds of reason or that they were 
recklessly uninformed. See Tomczak v. Morton 
Thiokol, Inc., Del.Ch., C.A. No. 7861, Hartnett, 
V.C. (April 5, 1990). To the contrary, all of the 
acts, from forecasting cash flow and switching to 
digital equipment to foregoing a particular marketing 
plan and adopting the D2000 initiative—reflect 
decisions undertaken in good faith and based on 
informed judgments, even if particular decisions 
ultimately proved mistaken or less advantageous 
than originally conceived. 
Cincinnati Bell's claim suggests Ameritech should 
function as a guarantor of the Partnership's 
performance. But the Partnership Agreement is 
silent as to the performance, profitability or even an 
expected time for the limited partners to receive a 
particular return on their investments. Considering 
the terms of the Partnership Agreement and the 
absence of any disputed facts concerning the basis 
for Ameritech's acts on behalf of the Partnership as 
its general partner, I find as a matter of law that 
Ameritech's conduct does not rise to the level of 
gross negligence or gross mismanagement. 
Accordingly, I grant defendants' motion for 
summary judgment as to the gross mismanagement 
and gross negligence claims of Counts II and III of 
plaintiff's amended and supplemental complaint. 
* * * 
Although the above conclusions make it 
unnecessary to consider further issues raised by the 
parties, it is noteworthy that Cincinnati Bell's claim 
for damages under Counts II and III appears 
unsupportable under Delaware law. In its amended 
complaint, Cincinnati Bell asks the Court to award 
"damages for the difference between the present 
value of [Cincinnati Bell's] limited partnership 
interest and the value such interest would have had 
but for [Ameritech's] gross mismanagement, 
negligence and breach of fiduciary duties." 
(Amended Complaint, Tf 31, Prayer C). [FN 11] 
Cincinnati Bell's claim for damages is clearly 
derivative in nature. Damages for the general 
partners' breach of fiduciary duties or for gross 
mismanagement would fall on the Partnership and 
all its partners. Litman v. Prudential-Bache 
Properties, Del.Ch., 611 A.2d 12, 15 (1992). 
Thus, I fail to see on what basis Cincinnati Bell can 
assert a claim for damages based upon what 
Cincinnati Bell's minority interest would be worth 
"but for" Ameritech's alleged gross mismanagement 
of the Partnership's business. 
FN11. It is also noteworthy that the parties have 
addressed the pending motions with reference to 
injunctive and declaratory relief being sought in 
connection with Counts II and III of the amended 
and supplemental complaint. Having carefully read 
the amended and supplemental complaint, I find no 
reference to injunctive or declaratory relief in 
either Count II or Count III, or the general prayers 
for relief. 
*20 Additionally, Cincinnati Bell's damages claim 
appears predicated on assumptions about what the 
Partnership ought to be worth based on comparisons 
to industry averages. Cincinnati Bell's expert, for 
example, created a financial model for purposes of 
this case based on financial and operating ratios 
characteristic of the cellular industry. Extrapolating 
from that data, Cincinnati Bell's expert drew 
comparative conclusions about the Partnership's 
predicted cash distributions, data from which 
Cincinnati Bell ultimately derives the measure of 
damage to its minority interest. 
Damages cannot be speculative or uncertain, Wise 
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., Del.Super., 181 
A. 302, 305-06 (1935), but must be at least based on 
a "reasonable estimate." Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 
Del.Ch., C.A. No. 11713, Allen, C. (Oct. 29, 
1993), Mem.Op. at 10. Here, Cincinnati Bell's 
damage claims do not appear based on a reasonable 
estimate; rather, the damages are based on 
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linked specifically to the alleged acts of gross 
mismanagement or gross negligence. Accordingly, 
summary judgment is equally appropriate with 
respect to Cincinnati Bell's damages claim under 
Counts II and III. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, I grant summary 
judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff 
as to all counts of the amended and supplemental 
complaint. An Order has been entered in 
accordance with this decision. 
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ORDER 
For the reasons set forth in this Court's 
Memorandum Opinion entered in this case on this 
date it is ORDERED: 
1) that summary judgment is entered in favor of 
Defendants and against Plaintiff with respect to all 
claims in Counts I, II and III of the Amended and 
Supplemental Complaint; and 
2) that the costs of this action are assessed to 
Plaintiff. 
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